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Abstract 
 
I 
Abstract 
Nowadays, information technology (IT) has become an integral part of our everyday life. In 
both the private and business context, we extensively use different IT systems for data 
production, data organization, data analysis, and communication with others. Due to the 
extensive usage of IT, the amount of digitalized personal and organizational information is 
rapidly and incessantly rising — making both private individuals and organizations attractive 
targets for attackers. The necessity to effectively protect sensitive data from IT security 
incidents is highly discussed in practice and research, it attracts high media attention, and our 
society should be actually aware of the importance of IT security in today’s digital world. 
However, recent reports demonstrate that organizations as well as private individuals — even 
though they are afraid of the rapid evolution of IT security risks — still often refrain from 
adopting the necessary IT security safeguards. To better prepare our society for the ongoing 
risks arising from extensive IT usage, a better understanding of how IT security is perceived 
by private individuals and managers is required. 
Motivated by the findings and theoretical underpinnings from previous research, this thesis 
addresses several research questions with respect to IT security perceptions and behaviors of 
private individuals and managers in organizations. By conducting four studies — one among 
private individuals and three among managers in organizations — the thesis not only 
contributes to the current research but also provides useful recommendations for practice. 
Suppliers of IT and IT security products as well as managers in customer organizations can 
especially learn from the findings of the studies. 
First, research paper A is focused on the private context and analyzes the gender differences 
in mobile users’ IT security perceptions and protective behaviors. Drawing on Gender 
Schema Theory and Protection Motivation Theory, a mixed-method study (survey, 
experiment, and interviews) under laboratory conditions is conducted. The results show that 
IT security perceptions of females and males are based on different downstream beliefs and 
indicate that females are more likely to translate their intention to take precautionary actions 
into actual behavior than males.  
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The studies presented in research papers B, C, and D are conducted within the business 
context and focus on the IT security perceptions and behaviors of managers in organizations. 
Research paper B analyzes top managers’ IT security awareness. Since previous research 
predominantly investigated IT security awareness at the employee level, a comprehensive 
conceptualization of IT security awareness at the management level is currently missing. To 
address this research gap, a structured literature review and expert interviews are performed in 
order to develop and test a comprehensive conceptualization — including both individual and 
organizational factors — of top managers’ IT security awareness. 
Within research paper C, managers’ willingness to pay for IT security is in the focus of the 
investigation. Previous research largely neglected that various IT security safeguards might be 
differently evaluated by organizations, for example, due to different IT security requirements. 
By drawing on Kano’s Theory, the study takes into account that — depending on the 
organization’s individual IT security requirements — the implementation of IT security 
safeguards can also be associated with disadvantages. Based on interviews and an empirical 
study among managers, the study reveals that IT security safeguards are differently evaluated 
and that these different evaluations are associated with different levels of managers’ 
willingness to pay. 
Finally, research paper D analyzes managers’ Status Quo-Thinking in risk perception. Based 
on Prospect Theory, Status Quo Bias research, and an empirical study among managers, the 
findings indicate that managers’ risk evaluations and decisions to adopt new technologies are 
highly dependent on their assessments of the systems currently used in the organization. 
Moreover, the results implicate that the impact of Status Quo-Thinking on managers’ risk 
assessments and intentions to adopt new technologies is stronger the less experienced a 
manager is with a new technology, probably resulting in an incorrect risk assessment and 
inappropriate adoption behavior. 
Implications for research and practice are discussed in more detail within each research paper 
and summarized in the final chapter of the thesis. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Informationstechnologien (IT) sind längst integraler Bestandteil unseres alltäglichen Lebens. 
Sowohl im privaten als auch im beruflichen Kontext wird eine Vielzahl verschiedener IT-
Systeme genutzt, um Daten zu produzieren, zu organisieren und zu analysieren sowie um mit 
Anderen zu kommunizieren. Infolge der stetig zunehmenden Integration von IT-Systemen in 
unseren privaten und beruflichen Alltag, wachsen die Anzahl und der Umfang digitalisierter 
Informationen rapide und stetig. Dies ist zwar mit Vorteilen verbunden, führt aber gleichzeitig 
dazu, dass Privatpersonen und Unternehmen zu attraktiven Zielen für Angreifer werden. Das 
Thema IT-Sicherheit genießt eine hohe Aufmerksamkeit in Forschung und Praxis, ist nahezu 
täglicher Bestandteil der medialen Berichterstattung und die Gesellschaft sollte sich längst 
über das Ausmaß der Bedrohungen durch IT-Sicherheitsrisiken bewusst sein. Dennoch zeigen 
aktuelle Statistiken, dass sowohl Unternehmen als auch Privatpersonen häufig darauf 
verzichten die erforderlichen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen umzusetzen. Um unsere Gesellschaft in 
Zukunft besser auf die kontinuierlich wachsende Gefahr vorbereiten zu können, wird ein 
tiefer gehendes Verständnis der Wahrnehmung von IT-Sicherheit durch Privatpersonen und 
Manager in Unternehmen benötigt. 
Motiviert durch die theoretischen Grundlagen und die Ergebnisse vorheriger Forschung, 
werden in dieser Arbeit verschiedene Forschungsfragen im Hinblick auf die Wahrnehmung 
von IT-Sicherheit adressiert – einerseits aus der Perspektive von Privatpersonen und 
andererseits aus der Perspektive von Managern. Insgesamt wurden vier Studien durchgeführt 
und publiziert: eine Studie unter Privatpersonen und drei Studien unter Managern. Die 
Ergebnisse tragen zum aktuellen Stand der Forschung bei, liefern eine Basis für zukünftige 
Untersuchungen und ermöglichen das Ableiten wertvoller Handlungsempfehlungen für 
Privatpersonen und Praktiker. Insbesondere IT- und IT-Sicherheitsanbieter sowie Manager in 
Kundenunternehmen können von den Erkenntnissen profitieren. 
Im Rahmen des ersten Forschungsartikels (Forschungspapier A) werden die Wahrnehmung 
von IT-Sicherheit und das daraus resultierende Verhalten unter Privatpersonen untersucht. 
Dabei steht, basierend auf den theoretischen Grundlagen der „Protection Motivation Theory“ 
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und der „Gender Schema Theory“, die Analyse von geschlechterspezifischen Unterschieden 
im Fokus der Untersuchung. Die Ergebnisse der Studie (Fragebogen, Experiment und 
Interview) unter Smartphone-Nutzern zeigen, dass die Wahrnehmung von IT-Sicherheit bei 
Männern und Frauen auf unterschiedlichen kognitiven Prozessen basieren kann. Darüber 
hinaus weist die Studie darauf hin, dass Männer – im Gegensatz zu Frauen – dazu tendieren, 
sich nicht entsprechend ihrer Intention zu verhalten und häufig davon absehen entsprechende 
Sicherheitsmaßnahmen auch tatsächlich umzusetzen.  
Die Studien der anderen drei Forschungsartikel (Forschungspapier B, C und D) wurden im 
Unternehmenskontext durchgeführt. Forschungspapier B analysiert das Bewusstsein für IT-
Sicherheit von Topmanagern. Da die bestehende Forschung überwiegend das IT-
Sicherheitsbewusstsein von Mitarbeitern untersucht, fehlt es derzeit an einer umfassenden 
Konzeptualisierung auf Ebene des Topmanagements. Um diese Forschungslücke zu 
schließen, wurde zunächst eine strukturierte Literaturrecherche durchgeführt und auf deren 
Basis eine Konzeptualisierung des IT-Sicherheitsbewusstseins von Topmanagern entwickelt, 
die sowohl individuelle als auch unternehmensbezogene Faktoren umfasst. Anschließend 
wurde die entwickelte Konzeptualisierung mithilfe von Experteninterviews validiert und 
angepasst. 
In Forschungspapier C steht die Zahlungsbereitschaft für IT-Sicherheitsmaßnahmen im 
Fokus. In der bestehenden Forschung wurde bisher nur unzureichend berücksichtigt, dass IT-
Sicherheitsmaßnahmen – z. B. aufgrund von individuellen IT-Sicherheitsanforderungen eines 
Unternehmens – von verschiedenen Managern unterschiedlich bewertet werden können. Um 
dies zu adressieren, wurde die in der Marketingforschung etablierte „Kano Theorie“ 
herangezogen und auf den IT-Sicherheitskontext angepasst. Die Ergebnisse der Interviews 
und der empirischen Studie unter Managern in Unternehmen lassen erkennen, dass IT-
Sicherheitsmaßnahmen von verschiedenen Managern unterschiedlich bewertet werden 
können und dass diese unterschiedlichen Bewertungen zu divergierenden 
Zahlungsbereitschaften führen. 
Schließlich wird in Forschungspapier D, basierend auf den theoretischen Grundlagen der 
„Prospect Theory“ und bestehender „Status Quo Bias“-Forschung, das Status-Quo-Denken 
von Managern bei der Risikowahrnehmung untersucht. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen 
Studie unter Managern in Unternehmen zeigen, dass die Risikobewertung und die 
Entscheidung eine neue Technologie zu adoptieren stark von der Wahrnehmung der derzeitig 
genutzten IT-Systeme beeinflusst wird. Darüber hinaus weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, 
Zusammenfassung  
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dass dieses Status-Quo-Denken einen stärkeren Einfluss auf die Bewertung einer Technologie 
und die damit verbundene Adoptionsintention hat, je weniger Erfahrung ein Manager mit der 
betrachteten Technologie aufweist. Die Unsicherheit, welche mit fehlender Erfahrung 
einhergeht, kann dazu führen, dass Manager ihre verfügbaren Erfahrungen mit bereits 
bestehenden Technologien heranziehen. Dies kann wiederum eine verzerrte 
Risikowahrnehmung und das Treffen nachteiliger Entscheidungen mit sich bringen. 
Die praktischen und theoretischen Implikationen werden in jedem Forschungspapier 
ausführlich diskutiert und im letzten Kapitel der vorliegenden Arbeit zusammengefasst. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Problem Description 
We are living in the age of digitalization, which is characterized by keywords like Industry 
4.0, Internet of Things, Cloud Computing, and Big Data. By now, information technology 
(IT) is an integral part of both our private and professional everyday life. For example, from 
an organization’s perspective, new IT developments frequently provide new opportunities to 
optimize business and production processes, to reduce cost and time investments, or to 
develop completely new business models. In many industries, promptly taking advantage of 
new technological developments can be crucial for remaining competitive and securing the 
organization’s existence. Nowadays, a successful organization without IT is hard to imagine. 
From an individual’s perspective, the usage of modern technologies (e.g., smartphones, 
tablets, or wearables) in private life has become similarly important. The technologies do not 
only offer new possibilities to communicate and interact with others, they also provide 
essential assistance in organizing everyday life. Against the background of extensive usage of 
IT in private and professional life, the amount of digitalized personal and organizational 
information is rapidly and incessantly rising. According to a recent report from IBM (2016), 
“[…] 90 percent of the data in the world today has been created in the last two years alone 
[…]” (p. 3). The International Data Corporation (IDC) predicts that the total amount of digital 
data annually created worldwide will increase from 4.4 zettabytes in 2013 to 44 zettabytes by 
2020, that is an impressive number of 44,000,000,000,000 gigabytes newly created every year 
(IDC 2014a). 
Because of the enormous data base emerging, private individuals and organizations using 
modern IT become attractive targets for attackers. This is also reflected in the 
disproportionate, increasing number of IT security incidents. At least since the Sony Picture 
Entertainment hack (e.g., BBC 2014), the Yahoo hack (e.g., Guardian 2016), the iCloud hack 
(e.g., Forbes 2014), or the Uber hack (e.g., Guardian 2017) — just to name a few prominent 
examples — the topic of IT security attracts high media attention and is highly discussed in 
research and society. The danger that arises from extensive IT usage is well recognized and, 
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accordingly, the global market for IT security products is constantly growing (Statista 2017a). 
However, although the members of our society should be actually aware of the importance of 
IT security in the digital age, both private individuals and organizations often refrain from 
adopting the necessary IT security measures. IDC stated that while 40 percent of the annually 
created data actually require a certain degree of data protection, less than 20 percent are 
respectively protected (IDC 2014a). 
Considering the ongoing digitalization, it can be assumed that the number and variety of IT 
security threats that individuals and organizations are exposed to will continue to grow. IT 
experts assess IT developments like Internet of Things and Cloud Computing to be main 
drivers for change in IT security (Statista 2017b). It is predicted that, compared to 2015, the 
estimated annual cost for data breaches worldwide will increase almost four times to $2.1 
trillion by 2019 (Forbes 2016). Obviously, it is absolutely necessary to better prepare our 
society — both private individuals and organizations — for the growing danger resulting 
from the increasing number of IT security risks. To this end, useful recommendations and 
promising methods that encourage organizations as well as private individuals to actively 
protect their data from risks must be developed, tested, and improved. 
From a theoretical point of view, it must be considered that IT security-related decisions of 
individuals within the private context and managers within the organizational context are 
made against the background of different environmental conditions. Therefore, the decisions 
are probably influenced by and based on different factors. Accordingly, existing studies in 
Information Systems (IS) research analyzing IT security perceptions and behaviors can be 
divided into two categories: studies conducted within the private context and studies 
conducted within the business context. Within the private context, many researchers 
investigated how individuals perceive risks that are associated with the usage of IT and how 
these risk perceptions influence their consequent behavior (e.g., Featherman and Pavlou 2003; 
Lee 2009; Liebermann and Stashevsky 2002). More specific, many studies are focused on 
analyzing privacy-related risk perceptions that arise from disclosing private information when 
using modern IT (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags 2004; Krasnova et al. 2009; Shin 2010). For 
example, it is found that the perception of privacy risks can be the reason for an individual to 
refrain from using social networks, e-banking, or location-based services (e.g., Lee 2009; 
Smith et al. 2011; Zhou 2011). As such, these studies analyze how risks perceived by 
individuals influence their (amount of) IT usage. Studies focusing on how individuals decide 
to implement an IT security safeguard to stay safe while using IT in everyday life are rare. 
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The extant literature that focuses on individuals’ adoption of IT security safeguards, such as 
anti-spyware software or backups (e.g., Boss et al. 2015; Liang and Xue 2010), mostly builds 
on quantitative data collected with questionnaires. As a consequence, the analyses and results 
are based on adoption intentions and behaviors as stated by the participants. Findings from 
psychological research that demonstrate that intentions do not always lead to appropriate 
behaviors or that stated behaviors do not necessarily match with actual behaviors (Sheeran 
2002) are largely neglected. Moreover, none of the existing studies in the private context 
considers that females and males differ in their risk evaluations and protection behaviors in a 
wide variety of domains (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; Harris et al. 2006). For example, males are 
often found to be more likely to ride a motorcycle without a helmet or to abstain from using 
sunscreen (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; Harris et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2004). Although having 
gender-mixed samples and despite inconsistencies among the findings, none of the existing 
studies analyzes the existence and role of gender differences when investigating risk 
perceptions and protective behaviors in the IT security domain. 
Within the business context, the extant research predominantly pays attention to IT security 
perceptions and behaviors at the employee level. Employees are often considered to be the 
key factor for ensuring a high level of IT security within an organization (Bulgurcu et al. 
2010). In particular, the compliance behavior of employees with an organization’s IT security 
policies is often in focus (e.g., Boss et al. 2009; Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Pahnila et al. 2007; 
Siponen et al. 2010; Vance et al. 2012). In this context, employees’ IT security awareness is 
identified to play a central role because it significantly influences the downstream 
assessments of perceived risks and, therefore, the consequent intentions and security-related 
behaviors (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Based on that, several security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA) programs for increasing the IT security awareness at the employee level 
have been developed, analyzed, and tested (e.g., Doherty and Fulford 2006; Puhakainen and 
Siponen 2010; Siponen 2006; Siponen et al. 2010). Moreover, many studies investigated the 
role of managers in improving employees’ security awareness and behaviors. As such, a top-
down effect from the management level to the IT security behavior at the employee level is 
assumed (e.g., Kritzinger and Smith 2008): Managerial actions toward IT security increase 
the IT security awareness at the employee level (e.g., Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; 
Haeussinger and Kranz 2013; Spears and Barki 2010) and, therefore, enhance employees’ IT 
security behaviors (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Hu et al. 2012). However, while these studies 
clearly emphasize the crucial role of managers in ensuring a high level of IT security within 
an organization (e.g., Ashenden 2008; Sharma and Yetton 2007), IS research on IT security 
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from the perspective of managers is still rare. Consequently, IT security perceptions and 
coping behaviors at the management level are still far from being well understood and more 
research is needed. 
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
Overall, within the private and business context, prior research on IT security perceptions and 
behaviors leave many research questions unanswered. Considering the rapid evolution and the 
ever-increasing complexity of IT security risks, the need for further research on IT security 
perceptions and coping behaviors of private individuals and managers in organizations 
appears even more important. To address this, the overarching objective of this thesis is to 
advance our understanding about IT security perceptions and behaviors of private individuals 
and managers in organizations. In sum, this thesis includes four studies (one within the private 
context and three within the business context) — each addressing another research question. 
The results of the four studies were published in the proceedings of different reputable 
conferences, provide a basis for new research avenues, and come with numerous implications 
for private individuals as well as practitioners. In the following, a summary of the four 
research questions and the corresponding objectives are presented. In chapters 3 to 6 of this 
thesis, related research and identified research gaps will be presented in more detail. 
Studies on IT security perceptions and behaviors within the private context often show 
inconsistencies in their findings. In psychological research, it is assumed that females’ and 
males’ appraisals of risks and behaviors are based on different cognitive processes because 
they are differently educated by society (Bem 1981). Even in times of gender equality, 
females and males are still somehow differently educated, especially when it comes to risk 
assessments. For example, parents might be more worried about letting their teenager walk 
home alone from a party in the middle of the night in the case of a girl. As such, females are 
still often considered to be somehow more vulnerable than males, which, in turn, influences 
the way females and males are educated when it comes to risk assessments and behaviors. As 
a consequence of different education, males and females can have different cognitive 
associations with certain types of information and, therefore, exhibit different behaviors (Bem 
1981; Tamres et al. 2002). If females and males really differ in their risk perceptions and 
behaviors in the IT security domain, it is indispensable to understand these gender differences 
for formulating useful recommendations and for developing appropriate IT security 
safeguards. Therefore, the study presented in chapter 3 addresses the following research 
question (RQ): 
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RQ 1:  How do females and males differ in their IT security perceptions and protective 
behaviors? 
As mentioned in 1.1, previous research on IT security perceptions and behaviors within the 
organizational context is predominantly focused on the employee level. Up to now, only a few 
studies analyzed IT security perceptions and behaviors from the perspective of managers in 
organizations. Consequently, many research gaps exist that must be addressed in order to 
improve our understanding of managers’ IT security perceptions and behaviors. Research 
regarding the following three aspects is especially rare: IT security awareness at the 
management level, managers’ willingness to pay for IT security, and perceptual biases that 
distort managers’ risk assessments. 
While findings from studies at the employee level showed that IT security awareness 
significantly influences IT security perceptions and behaviors (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; 
D'Arcy et al. 2009; Goodhue and Straub 1991), only a few studies investigated the concept of 
IT security awareness at the top management level and its influence on the effectiveness of an 
organization’s IT security management (e.g., Choi et al. 2008; Isomäki and Bilozerov 2012; 
Ng and Feng 2006). An organization’s top management ultimately decides about resource 
allocations and thus, also largely determines an organization’s investment decisions regarding 
IT security. Therefore, the IT security awareness of managers can be assumed to be at least of 
equal importance for ensuring a high level of IT security as the awareness of the 
organization’s employees. In order to improve current knowledge about the concept of top 
managers’ IT security awareness and its role in the organizational IT security management 
and to provide useful recommendations, the study presented in chapter 4 addresses the 
following research question: 
RQ 2:  What is the role of top managers’ IT security awareness in the organizational 
decision-making about IT security investments? 
There is also little knowledge about how much managers are willing to pay for implementing 
IT security safeguards in their organizations’ IT systems and how their willingness to pay 
(WTP) is formed. Previous research on technology adoption shows that the perceived costs 
negatively influence adoption behaviors — in both the private context (e.g., Featherman and 
Pavlou 2003; Kim et al. 2007) and the business context (e.g., Kuan and Chau 2001; Saunders 
and Clark 1992). Furthermore, studies within the private context showed that the negative 
influence of perceived costs on an individual’s adoption decision is also significant regarding 
the adoption of IT security safeguards (Boss et al. 2015; Liang and Xue 2010). A significant 
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effect of financial reasons on adoption decisions can also be expected in the business context 
but it is, however, not further analyzed until now and managers’ WTP for IT security is far 
from being well understood. Therefore, the study presented in chapter 5 addresses the 
following research question: 
RQ 3:  How is managers’ willingness to pay for IT security determined? 
From psychological research, it is known that individuals often tend to inadequately assess 
risks that they are exposed to, especially in uncertain situations. Various reasons for such a 
bias in risk assessments and their consequences were investigated (see e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman 1975). In IS research, previous studies found that managers’ IT security risk 
assessments are also subject to perceptual biases which can result in insecure behaviors (e.g., 
Loske et al. 2013; Rhee et al. 2012). For instance, Loske et al. (2013) and Rhee et al. (2012) 
analyzed the so-called Unrealistic Optimism, which is a bias in risk perception possibly 
arising when comparing the ‘own vulnerability’ to risks with the vulnerability of others 
during risk assessment. However, when analyzing managers’ IT security-related decisions, 
not only the comparison of other organizations, but also the comparison of the current 
situation, might be relevant and thereby influence managers’ risk assessments. For example, a 
manager might perceive a currently used IT system to be secure because the organization 
never experienced — or never recognized — an IT security incident due to its usage. 
However, the security risks of this system might be immense so that the implementation of a 
specific safeguard or a replacement of the system with a new, more secure one might actually 
be necessary. In this case, the manager uses the past experience as a reference point when 
assessing the currently present risk that may lead to an underestimation of the risk. In 
psychological research, the usage of reference points when assessing new technologies is 
called Status Quo-Thinking and can result in a Status Quo Bias (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1991; 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Schweitzer 1995). This perceptual bias, which may lead to 
the insecure behavior of managers because of an inadequate evaluation of risks, is in the focus 
of the fourth research question in chapter 6: 
RQ 4:  How does Status Quo-Thinking influence managers’ decisions in adopting new 
IT systems? 
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters (see Figure 1). Following this introductory 
chapter, the theoretical and methodological fundamentals are introduced in chapter 2. The 
core of this cumulative dissertation comprises four peer-reviewed and published research 
papers — each addressing one of the four research questions outlined hereinabove.1 The first 
research paper focuses on IT security perceptions and behaviors from the perspective of 
private individuals and is presented in chapter 3. The other three research papers are based on 
studies that focus on the perspective of managers in organizations. These three papers within 
the business context are presented in chapter 4 to 6. Finally, the thesis concludes in chapter 7 
with a summary of the key findings and implications. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Thesis 
In the following, the four research papers included in this thesis are listed and briefly 
summarized. The summaries as well as the research papers in chapters 3 to 6 are written from 
the first-person-plural point of view (i.e., we) in order to express that the four studies were 
conducted with co-authors and, therefore, they also reflect their opinions. The four research 
papers along with their respective publication outlets and publication dates are: 
                                                        
1
  To ensure a consistent layout throughout the thesis, the four published research papers in chapters 3 to 6 
are presented in a slightly revised version from the original. 
IT Security from the Perspective 
of Private Individuals 
IT Security from the Perspective 
of Managers in Organizations 
Research Paper A: 
Gender Differences in IT 
Security Appraisals and 
Protective Actions
Chapter 3 (RQ 1)
Research Paper B: 
Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness
Chapter 4 (RQ 2)
Research Paper C: 
Decision Makers’ Willingness to Pay for IT Security
Chapter 5 (RQ 3)
Research Paper D: 
Managers’ Status Quo-Thinking
Chapter 6 (RQ 4)
Summary of Key Findings and Thesis ConclusionChapter 7
IntroductionChapter 1
FundamentalsChapter 2
1 Introduction 
 
8 
Research paper A: Sonnenschein, R., Loske, A., and Buxmann, P. 2016. “Gender 
Differences in Mobile Users’ IT Security Appraisals and Protective Actions: 
Findings from a Mixed-Method Study.” In: Proceedings of the 37th International 
Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Dublin, Ireland. VHB: A. 
Research paper B: Sonnenschein, R., Loske, A., and Buxmann, P. 2017. “The Role of 
Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness in Organizational IT Security 
Management.” In: Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on 
Information Systems (ICIS), Seoul, South Korea. VHB: A. 
Research paper C: Sonnenschein, R., Loske, A., and Buxmann, P. 2016. “Which IT 
Security Investments Will Pay Off for Suppliers? Using the Kano Model to 
Determine Customers’ Willingness to Pay.” In: Proceedings of the 49th Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Kauai, Hawaii, 
USA. VHB: C. 
Research paper D: Heidt, M., Sonnenschein, R., and Loske, A., 2017. “Never Change 
A Running System? How Status Quo-Thinking Can Inhibit Software As A Service 
Adoption In Organizations.” In: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on 
Information Systems (ECIS), Guimarães, Portugal. VHB: B, SIGSVC (Special 
Interest Group on Services in the AIS) Best Paper of the Year Award. 
Research paper A (chapter 3) draws on Gender Schema Theory (Bem 1981) and Protection 
Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975) and analyzes gender differences in IT security perceptions 
and behaviors of mobile users (RQ 1). By utilizing a two-step mixed-method research 
approach (step 1: survey, step 2: experiment and interviews), we collected data from 177 
Android users (71 female and 106 male mobile users). Our results show that female and male 
mobile users’ security behaviors are based on different threat and coping appraisals. 
Moreover, while we found a significant relationship between protection intentions and the 
implementation of technical IT security safeguards in the female sample, we did not find one 
in the male sample. Overall, the results of this study show that gender differences in IT 
security perceptions and behaviors of private individuals exist and offer important 
implications for practice and future research. 
Our study in research paper B (chapter 4) is focused on understanding the concept of top 
managers’ IT security awareness in the organizational IT security management (RQ 2). Based 
on a structured literature review and expert interviews, we developed and tested a 
conceptualization of top managers IT security awareness, including its role in the 
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organizational IT security management. In total, we identified seven factors that form two 
distinct dimensions of managerial IT security awareness (four factors in the individual 
dimension and three factors in the organizational dimension). We show that top managers’ IT 
security awareness ultimately determines the scope for action (i.e., budget, human resources, 
and flexibility in decision-making) of the IT security specialists and thus, the IT security level 
of the organization. Furthermore, our results indicate that not only the awareness of top 
managers but also of managers at the department level is crucial for ensuring a high level of 
IT security. The proposed conceptualization will enable both future research and practitioners 
to improve our understanding of top managers’ IT security awareness and its role in the 
organizational IT security management, and subsequently, to develop and improve 
interventions dedicated at increasing managers’ IT security awareness and the effectiveness of 
an organization’s IT security management. 
By drawing on Kano’s Theory of Attractive Quality (Kano et al. 1984), research paper C 
(chapter 5) analyzes how managers evaluate the available IT security safeguards and how this 
evaluation determines their willingness to pay (WTP) (RQ 3). Based on expert interviews and 
an empirical study within 84 managers from different organizations, we found that managers 
differently evaluate IT security safeguards and that this evaluation determines their 
willingness to pay. The results enable researchers and practitioners to better understand the 
different needs among various organizations as well as the associated willingness to pay of 
managers. Suppliers of IT security products can use the findings to improve their IT security 
strategies, which may provide both economic and competitive advantages. 
Research paper D (chapter 6) is focused on Status Quo-Thinking of managers when deciding 
to adopt a new technology (RQ 4). Drawing on Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) and Status Quo Bias research, we derived a research model that explicates the influence 
of the incumbent technology on the evaluation of benefits and risks of SaaS. Based on 123 
data sets conducted with the help of a survey among different managers, we empirically tested 
our developed model and thereby demonstrated that managers’ attitude toward a new 
technology is highly dependent on their assessments of the current systems and their 
experiences with the new technology. A lack of experience will increase the impact of the 
Status Quo on managers’ assessments of a new technology and, therefore, probably result in 
an incorrect risk assessment that inhibits managers to adopt a potential advantageous 
technology, such as a new IT security safeguard. 
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2 Fundamentals 
This chapter provides an overview of the fundamentals for the thesis. 
2.1 IT Security Objectives 
In general, IT security aims at protecting data and IT systems regarding their confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (Blackwell 1998; Fried 1994). Confidentiality refers to the 
protection of data and IT systems from unauthorized access, integrity is protecting data and IT 
systems from unauthorized modification, and availability aims at ensuring that data and IT 
systems can be accessed by all authorized entities (Ma and Ratnasingam 2008). These three 
security objectives are also called the “golden security triangle” of CIA (confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability) (e.g., Shameli-Sendi et al. 2016) or “CIA triad” (e.g., Perrin 2008). 
Over time, researchers and practitioners introduced several other IT security objectives such 
as performance or non-repudiation (see e.g., Avižienis et al. 2004; Bedner and Ackermann 
2010; Gouscos et al. 2003). For example, Ackermann et al. (2012) developed a 
conceptualization of IT security in the context of IT outsourcing and included performance, 
accountability, and maintainability aside confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, 
these objectives are often context-dependent and can be subsumed under the CIA triad.  
2.2 Risk Perception 
For a reliable assessment of risks, a strong data base (e.g., long-term historical data) is 
needed. When the required data base is missing, risks are generally evaluated by people and, 
therefore, capture perceived risks that may differ from the actual risks (Slovic 1987). For 
example, when a study participant is asked to assess a risk they are exposed to, the risk 
measure represents their risk assessment and is a subjective judgment about the probability 
and potential damage of a negative event that does not necessarily correspond to the actual 
risk. Therefore, the risk-related decisions of individuals are generally based on perceived risks 
(Gigerenzer 2004) which may differ from the actual risks and, accordingly, lead to an 
incorrect risk assessment. Perceived risks are especially relevant in decision-making under 
uncertainty, discomfort and/or anxiety, and conflict (Bettman 1973). 
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In a wide area of domains, individuals have been found to be very incongruent in their risk 
perceptions (e.g., McKenna 1993; Perloff and Fetzer 1986; Weinstein 1982; Weinstein and 
Klein 1996). In the context of IT security, previous research showed the existence of 
phenomena like Unrealistic Optimism and Illusion of Control (Loske et al. 2013; Rhee et al. 
2005; Rhee et al. 2012). The phenomenon of Unrealistic Optimism refers to an optimistic bias 
that results from comparing oneself with others when assessing risks (Weinstein (1980); see 
also Theory of Social Comparison (Festinger 1954)). As mentioned above, a reliable risk 
assessment requires a strong data base. When individuals do not have the relevant information 
for objective risk assessments, they regularly start comparing themselves to others that show 
similar characteristics (Wood 1989). Individuals are biologically prone to factors like self-
enhancement, egocentric thinking, or representativeness heuristic, and perceiving own risks as 
lower than others’ risks is gratifying (Shepperd et al. 2002). As a consequence, they tend to be 
unrealistically optimistic in their comparative risk assessments. Perceiving oneself at a lower 
risk versus comparable others relativizes the threat, lets the threat appear less harmful and, 
therefore, increases personal well-being (Wills 1981). Illusion of Control is an exaggeration 
of perceived controllability (Hoorens 1996; Langer 1975) and is closely related to Unrealistic 
Optimism. Specifically, perceived controllability is an individual’s belief about how capable 
one is to achieve what is desired and prevent undesired events (Patrick et al. 1993) and it is 
found to influence an individual’s risk perceptions. Similar to risk perception, individuals 
have been found to show a self-serving tendency when assessing control (Hoorens 1996; 
Langer 1975). 
Perceived risks are known to have a strong influence on attitudes and intentions (Ajzen 1985; 
Smith 1992). Psychological research repeatedly demonstrated that perceived risks largely 
predict individuals’ protection behaviors (e.g., Rogers 1975; Weinstein 1993; Witte 1992). 
Therefore, an underestimation of risks may result in not taking the necessary actions (e.g., 
implementing an IT security safeguard) and can have far-reaching consequences. Moreover, 
previous studies in IS research showed that perceived IT security risks can inhibit an 
individual to adopt a new technology like e-commerce or e-banking (e.g., Lee 2009; 
Liebermann and Stashevsky 2002; Luo et al. 2010).  
Similar to the Theory of Social Comparison, the so-called Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) considers that decisions under uncertainty (e.g., missing information) are not 
necessarily based on a rational weighing up of risks and benefits and their corresponding 
probability weights. It is argued that individuals’ value functions are rather dependent on 
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reference points than on the actual final outcomes. When individuals are confronted with the 
decision to adopt a new technology, information or experience is often only limitedly 
available due to the degree of innovation. Therefore, an existing technology will serve as a 
reference point when assessing the new technology (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Shoham and Fiegenbaum 2002). For example, when an individual sees an advertisement of a 
new bank, which claims to provide a more secure e-banking to their customers, the individual 
will probably use his or her current bank as a reference point because of missing experience 
with the newly advertised one. If the individual has never experienced a security incident in e-
banking, the risk perceived to be associated with the current bank is automatically lower and 
the perceived risk of switching to the new one higher. However, the security level of the new 
bank may actually be higher. In this case, an incorrect assessment of IT security risks inhibits 
the individual from adopting a new, more secure technology. 
2.3 Research Design and Methods 
This section provides an overview and discusses the methods selected for the research designs 
within the four research papers in this thesis (chapters 3 to 6). 
A large amount of different research methods exist that have been successfully applied by 
previous research in different domains. These methods can be distinguished in many different 
ways, whereas the categorization in quantitative and qualitative research methods is the most 
common one (Myers 1997). The main differences between these two categories are given by 
the data sample, data collection, and data analysis. Quantitative research methods have their 
origin in the natural sciences and were used for studying natural phenomena (Myers 1997). 
As such, quantitative studies generally aim at quantifying data in order to generalize statistical 
results from a sample to an entire population of interest. Contrarily, qualitative methods 
originally stem from the social sciences (Myers 1997) and are assumed to be particularly 
suitable for gaining an in-depth understanding of motivations and behavioral phenomena. 
While qualitative research methods are typically exploratory in nature, quantitative methods 
are generally highly structured and rather explanatory. For example, quantitative research 
methods include surveys, numerical methods, laboratory experiments, and formal approaches 
(Myers 1997) while case studies, action design, or grounded theory studies belong to the 
category of qualitative methods (Creswell 2014; Myers 1997). The two categories of research 
methods have different benefits and shortcomings. For example, while qualitative methods 
can support researchers in gaining well-grounded descriptions and explanations of a “real-
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world phenomena”, quantitative methods come along with benefits like careful measurement, 
experimental control, generalizable samples, and statistical tools (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
Both categories are well-accepted in the IS discipline and need not be viewed as incompatible 
since they can also be combined. A combination of multiple qualitative and quantitative 
research methods within a single study is called “mixed-method research” (Creswell 2014; 
Venkatesh et al. 2013). Previous work strongly encourages IS researchers to conduct more 
mixed-method studies for several reasons (Mingers 2001; Venkatesh et al. 2013). For 
example, mixed-method studies can provide complementary views on the same phenomena or 
relationship and they can be helpful in gaining a complete picture of a phenomenon or in 
compensating for the disadvantages of one method. A list of different purposes to use mixed-
method approaches can be found in Venkatesh et al. (2013). 
The studies within the present thesis include quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-method 
research designs. An overview of the different research designs used in the respective studies 
is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Overview of Research Design and Methods in the Thesis 
For analyzing gender differences in mobile users’ IT security perceptions and behaviors 
(research paper A), a two-step mixed-method approach under laboratory conditions is chosen 
in order to gain a holistic understanding (Venkatesh et al. 2013). In the first step, the 
participants were asked to complete a survey, whereas the second step comprised a behavioral 
experiment and qualitative interviews. The quantitative and qualitative data were concurrently 
collected and integrated for data analysis (Creswell 2014; Venkatesh et al. 2013). By applying 
a mixed-method design, we were not only able to measure the perceptions and stated 
intentions of the participants but also their actual behaviors. 
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In research paper B (chapter 4), a structured literature review and qualitative expert interviews 
were conducted. The structured literature review serves as basis for developing a 
conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness (Webster and Watson 2002). Then, 
the developed conceptualization is evaluated by conducting qualitative expert interviews. The 
interviews were conducted due to several reasons: to confirm and expand the proposed 
conceptualization, to gain complementary views on the concept, and to ensure a complete 
picture of the phenomenon. 
The investigation of managers’ willingness to pay in research paper C (chapter 5) also applies 
a mixed-method research design. Due to its explorative nature, the study starts with 
qualitative expert interviews that serve as basis for preparing the survey for a quantitative 
study. By combining the two research methods, the hypothesized theoretical relationships can 
be tested. 
Finally, research paper D (section 6) employs a quantitative method to analyze managers’ 
Status Quo-Thinking. Specifically, a survey is chosen for data collection because this 
quantitative research method is appropriate for ensuring a careful measurement and allows 
generalizing results to a population of interest. 
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3 Research Paper A: Gender Differences in IT Security Appraisals and 
Protective Actions 
Title: Gender Differences in Mobile Users’ IT Security Appraisals and 
Protective Actions: Findings from a Mixed-Method Study 
Authors:  Sonnenschein, Rabea 
   Loske, André 
   Buxmann, Peter 
Published in: Proceedings of the 37
th
 International Conference on Information 
Systems (ICIS), Dublin, Ireland 2016 
Abstract 
Recent reports show that mobile users often refrain from taking the necessary precautionary 
actions to protect their mobile devices from IT security threats. To improve users’ protective 
behavior, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the downstream beliefs and 
attitudes. Although previous IS research has intensively investigated protection behavior in 
the IT context, findings from psychological studies that people’s threat and coping appraisals 
are gender-specific are largely neglected. Drawing on Gender Schema Theory and Protection 
Motivation Theory, the present study analyzes gender differences in the formation of mobile 
users’ intentions to take precautionary actions and their consequent coping behavior. 
Utilizing a two-step mixed-method research approach (survey, experiment, and interviews) 
and drawing data from 177 Android users, we show that female and male mobile users’ 
problem-focused coping behaviors are based on different threat and coping appraisals. These 
findings have significant implications both for future research and for practitioners. 
 
Keywords: Gender Differences, Gender Schema Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, 
Threat Appraisal, Coping Appraisal, Mobile Security. 
  
3 Research Paper A: Gender Differences in IT Security Appraisals and Protective Actions 
 
16 
3.1 Introduction 
Mobile devices presently constitute an inherent part of our everyday lives. The rapid increase 
in mobile device usage has led to a shift in security breaches from traditional PCs to tablets 
and smartphones (Gartner 2014). In particular, mobile devices are known to be repositories 
for large amounts of personal data, such as contact information, e-mails, calendars, and 
profiles (Guardian 2015); thus, gaining access to a person’s smartphone can enable an 
attacker to produce a large amount of damage. Recent studies report that 5.2 million 
smartphones are lost or stolen in the US every year and that over 25% of all mobile devices 
encounter a network attack each month (Skycure 2015). Moreover, it has been found that 
nearly one out of four (24.7%) mobile apps include at least one high-risk security flaw 
(NowSecure 2016). Although the potentially far-reaching consequences (e.g., financial, 
reputational, and psychological damage) of mobile IT security incidents are well recognized 
in today’s society, security reports have found that users often refrain from actively coping 
with existing mobile threats (i.e., they do not take the necessary precautionary actions, such as 
installation of safeguarding measures) (AVAST 2014). In order to address this insufficient 
coping behavior, it is essential to understand how mobile users decide to actively cope with 
mobile IT security threats (i.e., to adopt safeguarding measures), including which factors this 
decision is based on.  
Drawing on psychological research, studies on IT security behaviors postulate that 
individuals’ protection intentions are fundamentally based on two cognitive processes: a 
threat appraisal (i.e., evaluation of the perceived IT security threat) and a coping appraisal 
(i.e., evaluation of available actions for coping with the perceived IT security threat) (Floyd et 
al. 2000; Fry and Prentice-Dunn 2005; Milne et al. 2002). Although several studies have 
analyzed the coping behavior of users in the IT context (e.g., Johnston and Warkentin 2010; 
Lee et al. 2008; Liang and Xue 2010), the results often exhibit inconsistencies regarding 
which factors significantly influence users’ coping decisions. Moreover, despite having 
gender-mixed samples, existing studies largely neglect the finding from psychological 
research that females and males often differ in their cognitive appraisals of threat and 
consequent coping actions. In particular, psychological research has argued that females’ and 
males’ appraisals are based on different cognitive processes because society educates them 
differently (Bem 1981). For example, it is commonly believed that males are more likely to 
confront a problem head-on, while females exhibit more emotional responses to problems 
(Tamres et al. 2002). The different ways in which females and males are expected to cope 
with problems in turn influence how they are educated when they are children (Tamres et al. 
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2002) (e.g., boys are less likely than girls to receive their parents’ understanding when they 
exhibit emotional responses to problems). As a consequence of their gender-specific 
education as children, females and males have different cognitive associations with certain 
types of information and thus exhibit different behaviors (Bem 1981). Considering the 
technological nature of IT security, which historically has tended to be seen as a more 
masculine discipline (Trauth et al. 2010), similar gender differences in cognitive appraisal 
processes and consequent coping behaviors are likely to influence coping actions in the IT 
security context. For example, males are generally believed to be more “into” technology than 
females, and males are therefore more encouraged in the course of their education to be action 
oriented regarding technology use (Tamres et al. 2002). As a result, females and males will 
have different cognitive associations with IT security-related information and will therefore 
base their decisions to cope with IT security threats on different cognitive processes. If 
females and males differ in their IT security appraisals (threat and coping appraisals), it is 
essential to understand these differences in order to effectively increase users’ intentions to 
actively protect their devices and consequently increase the IT security level of mobile users, 
organizations, and in turn, society as a whole. Thus, this study addresses the following 
research question: How do female and male mobile users differ in their IT security appraisals 
(threat and coping appraisals) and coping actions?  
In IS research, the role of gender has been the focus of several studies in different contexts. 
These studies can be roughly divided into two broad categories: studies that focus on gender 
differences in the IS workforce and studies that focus on gender differences in IT adoption 
and IT use (Trauth 2013). However, research on gender differences in the IT security context 
is rare. As such, the underlying cognitive processes — IT security threat and coping 
appraisals — are far from well understood. While a few studies analyze gender differences in 
IT security policy compliance behavior at the organizational level (Bansal et al. 2016; Bansal 
and Shin 2016), there is little research on gender differences in security appraisals and coping 
behavior at the individual level of analysis. Thus, we answer the call of Trauth (2013) to 
conduct more studies on gender differences in IS research since gender is a fundamental 
characteristic of users and thus is likely to have a substantial impact on individuals’ IT 
security behavior. 
Drawing on Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Gender Schema Theory, we derive a 
research model of mobile users’ IT security behavior. Specifically, we apply Gender Schema 
Theory to analyze the role of gender in the threat and coping appraisals and consequent 
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coping behavior of mobile users, as suggested by PMT. In order to empirically test our 
theoretical model, we chose a two-step mixed-method research approach under laboratory 
conditions. This enabled us not only to analyze gender differences regarding self-stated 
appraisals and protection intentions but also to observe mobile users’ actual coping behavior. 
In the first step, participants completed a survey regarding their IT security appraisals (threat 
and coping appraisals) and their intentions regarding protection behavior (coping actions). In 
the second step, we conducted a behavioral experiment in order to observe the participants’ 
actual coping actions. Afterwards, we requested personal interviews with the participants. The 
qualitative data from the interviews enabled us to better understand how they made coping 
decisions, that is, the reasons for their IT-security-related decision making and, specifically, 
their previous coping actions within our study.  
The findings of this paper have several important theoretical and practical implications. The 
study extends our knowledge about individuals’ IT security behavior by examining how the 
gender of mobile users influences their cognitive IT security appraisals. Specifically, we 
found that female and male mobile users differ in their threat and coping appraisals and that 
their intentions to actively protect their mobile devices are influenced differently by these 
differences in their cognitive IT security-related perceptions. As this finding provides an 
opportunity to better explicate mobile users’ IT security behaviors, it is relevant not only for 
future research but also for practitioners. Mobile IT security providers can learn that they 
should consider the differences between females and males regarding security appraisals and 
coping behaviors when designing their marketing campaigns, in order to effectively 
emphasize the need for protective IT security measures. Suppliers of IT security training and 
organizations faced with paradigms like Bring Your Own Device can also benefit from the 
results of our study. When developing security workshops and training, they need to educate 
and train females and males differently regarding how to handle IT security issues. 
3.2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Protection Motivation Theory 
PMT (Rogers 1975) explains how individuals become motivated to cope with threats. PMT 
postulates that individuals’ protection motivation is shaped by two key processes: a threat 
appraisal and a coping appraisal (Floyd et al. 2000; Fry and Prentice-Dunn 2005; Milne et al. 
2002). The theory has been adapted to the IT security context by many researchers in different 
settings (e.g., Herath and Rao 2009b; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee et al. 2008; Lee and 
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Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010). For example, in the organizational context, PMT has been 
used to explain employees’ security behavior (Workman et al. 2008) and information security 
policy compliance (Herath and Rao 2009b; Vance et al. 2012), and in the private context, it 
has been used to analyze home users’ security behavior (Anderson and Agarwal 2010) and 
adoption of anti-spyware software (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Overall, it is assumed that 
when individuals perceive an IT security threat to be present, they will start to assess the 
threat (threat appraisal) and will subsequently evaluate available behaviors to cope with the 
threat (coping appraisal) (Liang and Xue 2010). 
In general, the threat appraisal is determined by an evaluation of the severity and the 
susceptibility of a threat. Severity refers to the damage that can be caused by the potential 
consequences of a security breach, and susceptibility is the perceived likelihood that one will 
become subject to the threat (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers 1986). Accordingly, perceived 
severity in the context of mobile IT security is defined as the extent to which an individual 
perceives that the negative consequences that can be caused by IT security incidents are 
severe for his or her mobile IT device. Perceived susceptibility is an individual's perceived 
subjective probability that IT security incidents will negatively affect his or her mobile IT 
device (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Liang and Xue 2010). Previous IS research assumes 
that perceived severity and perceived susceptibility do not directly influence protection 
motivation but will first result in a risk evaluation to determine the perceived security threat 
(Ng et al. 2009; Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). The perceived threat is defined as 
the extent to which an individual perceives the mobile IT security threat as dangerous or 
harmful (Liang and Xue 2010). In the context of IT security, a mobile user may perceive an 
attack on his/her mobile banking account to be associated with a large amount of (financial) 
damage (severity) but as very unlikely to happen (susceptibility). In contrast, losing the 
mobile device may also be associated with a large amount of damage (e.g., monetary loss 
with respect to the mobile device and reputational damage with respect to private pictures) but 
perceived as much more likely to happen and thus will be evaluated as a higher threat.  
In their coping appraisal, people determine the avoidability of a perceived IT security threat 
by considering two efficacy-related factors: the perceived effectiveness of a safeguard action 
and their perceived self-efficacy regarding implementation of safeguards (e.g., Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; Liang and Xue 2009; Liang and Xue 2010). Perceived effectiveness is 
defined as an individual's subjective assessment of how effective a safeguard action is for 
avoiding IT security incidents (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Liang and Xue 2010). 
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Perceived self-efficacy is defined as an individual's judgement of his or her personal skills, 
experience, knowledge, or competency regarding implementing safeguard actions against IT 
security threats (Compeau and Higgins 1995). Thus, the assessed effectiveness is determined 
by the perceived risk reduction that is achievable through implementation of the respective IT 
security safeguard, whereas the perceived self-efficacy is primarily determined by how 
confident people feel about implementing the IT security safeguard in order to cope with the 
perceived threat (Liang and Xue 2010). 
Accordingly, mobile users’ protection intention is defined as their stated behavioral intention 
to actively cope with mobile IT security threats in order to protect their mobile devices (Ajzen 
1991; Davis 1989; Liang and Xue 2009). The protection intention that results from a rational 
weighing up of the individuals’ threat and coping appraisals ultimately predicts the coping 
behavior. Individuals’ actual protective behavior comprises their actual coping actions that 
are in line with their behavioral intention, e.g., the implementation of an IT security app. 
3.2.2 Gender Schema Theory 
Several theories have been used to analyze and explain differences in the perceptions and 
behaviors of females and males. Overall, these theories can be classified into two broad 
categories: theories that emphasize psychological and/or sociostructural determinants of 
gender differences (e.g., Social Role Theory) (Eagly and Wood 1991; Franke et al. 1997), and 
theories that emphasize biological differences (e.g., Evolutionary Theory) (Buss 1988). 
Gender Schema Theory (Bem 1981) belongs to the first category and postulates that females 
and males differ in their cognitive information processing due to different socially construed 
cognitive structures that determine and direct their perceptions (see also Venkatesh and 
Morris 2000). Gender Schema Theory argues that societies allocate gender-specific roles to 
males and females and that these are anticipated in the societies’ socialization of children. In 
particular, children are taught during their childhood what it means to be a woman or a man 
and how to behave consistently with this gender schema. Due to this different socialization 
and education, females and males learn “to process information in terms of an evolving 
schema” (Bem 1981, p. 355) and thus develop gender-linked associations with information. 
As a consequence, females and males process information in decision-making situations 
based on different cognitive processes (Venkatesh and Morris 2000). 
Previous research has shown that Gender Schema Theory is useful for analyzing gender-
specific differences in the cognitive appraisals that lead to decision making in the context of 
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technology adoption (e.g., Venkatesh and Morris 2000). Therefore, we apply Gender Schema 
Theory to the theoretical underpinnings assumed by PMT in order to analyze the role of 
gender differences in mobile users’ threat and coping appraisals as well as their consequent 
coping behavior. 
3.2.3 Gender Differences in Appraisals and Coping Behaviors of Mobile Users 
According to PMT, coping behavior in the context of IT security is based on two cognitive 
appraisals: the appraisal of the threat (threat appraisal) and the appraisal of the resources that 
are available to address the threat (coping appraisal). From a Gender Schema Theory 
perspective, these two cognitive appraisals might be influenced by gender due to gender-
specific cognitive information processing. This assumption is also in line with previous 
research that has found that males and females differ in their threat appraisals and coping 
behaviors in other contexts (e.g., Dias et al. 2010; Lengua et al. 1999; Ptacek et al. 1992). 
Females are often seen as the more risk-averse gender (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; Harris et al. 
2006), while males are commonly viewed as being more likely to engage in risk behavior 
such as riding a motorcycle without a helmet or not using sunscreen (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; 
Harris et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2004). According to Gender Schema Theory, these beliefs 
about females’ and males’ expected behavior lead to a socialization of boys and girls 
according to which risk behavior is rather “masculine” (Byrnes et al. 1999; Wilson and Daly 
1985). In particular, females and males are educated differently regarding the way they 
appraise threats, and this might also impact their threat appraisal in the context of mobile IT 
security threats. A coping appraisal is based on an appraisal of one’s resources for addressing 
a threat (Tamres et al. 2002), and psychological research has therefore found that males 
evaluate information in the context of coping appraisals differently from their female peers, 
who are socialized to be more self-critical (Prentice and Carranza 2002). Considering that 
males are often found to show higher levels of self-confidence than females in the context of 
technology (Lenney 1977) and that they can be understood as the gender that is socialized to 
be self-confident, information processing within the coping appraisal might be also be 
influenced by mobile users’ gender. In sum, using the theoretical underpinnings of Gender 
Schema Theory to analyze the causal relationships that are assumed by PMT leads to the 
conclusion that mobile users’ threat and coping appraisals — which ultimately influence 
users’ intentions to actively cope with mobile IT security threats — are gender-specific 
because the underlying schematic processes are socially construed. 
3 Research Paper A: Gender Differences in IT Security Appraisals and Protective Actions 
 
22 
3.2.3.1 Gender Differences in Threat Appraisals 
In line with previous research in the IT security context (Liang and Xue 2009), we assume 
that in a threat appraisal, both perceived severity and perceived susceptibility positively 
influence mobile users’ perception of the security threat to their mobile devices. From a 
Gender Schema Theory perspective, it can be argued that female and male mobile users may 
differ in their threat appraisals because they are socialized to cope differently with threats. 
Females are generally seen as the more emotion-focused individuals, and psychological 
research shows that females experience emotion more intensively than males (Fujita et al. 
1991). As a consequence, females may base their threat perception primarily on their 
assessments of how emotionally upset or harmed they would be if the respective risk were to 
occur (Harris et al. 2006) and largely neglect considering the probability of the risk. In 
contrast, males are often seen as more problem-oriented and as applying more rational 
decision making (Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Stone and Neale 1984). Males are encouraged 
during childhood to confront problems head-on and objectively appraise situations rather than 
exhibiting emotional responses. Accordingly, it can be expected that male mobile users are 
more likely to be rational and include both perceived severity and perceived susceptibility in 
their evaluation of a perceived mobile IT security threat. Thus, it can be assumed that females 
base their threat evaluation primarily on perceived severity, while males’ risk evaluations will 
be more rational and therefore influenced by both perceived severity and perceived 
susceptibility. This assumption of a weaker influence of perceived susceptibility on perceived 
threat within females is also in line with the findings of Levy and Baron (2005), who found 
that females are less sensitive to risk susceptibility and therefore base their risk perceptions 
primarily on perceived severity (see also Gal 1996). In contrast, males’ threat perceptions 
have been found to be sensitive to both perceived susceptibility and perceived severity. 
Hence, in line with PMT and previous research on gender differences, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Perceived severity will have an equal positive impact on the perceived IT security 
threat for male and female mobile users. 
H1b: Perceived susceptibility will have a stronger positive impact on the perceived IT 
security threat for male mobile users than for female mobile users. 
Previous research has conclusively shown that when a mobile user perceives a security threat 
to be relevant, she or he will have a stronger intention to cope with this risk (e.g., Liang and 
Xue 2009; Liang and Xue 2010). In general, males have been found to be more likely to 
engage in risk behavior (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; Hersch 1996), while females have been 
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found to be more likely to avoid risky situations (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999; Harris et al. 2006). 
Considering that females are more likely to avoid risky behaviors and are often found to be 
more risk averse than males, females can be expected to be more sensitive to environmental 
risks than males. This is also in line with Evolutionary Theory, which argues that females 
have a greater tendency to avoid risks due to evolutionary reasons (Harris et al. 2006). 
Historically, females had to take care of their offspring and protect them from environmental 
risks, while males had to leave their safe homes to hunt. Thus, it can be assumed that the 
positive effect of a perceived mobile IT security threat on users’ protection intention (e.g., 
installing a security app to reduce the perceived threat) will be stronger for female mobile 
users than for male mobile users. Thus, we hypothesize:  
H1c: The perceived IT security threat will have a stronger positive impact on protection 
intentions for female mobile users than for male mobile users. 
3.2.3.2 Gender Differences in Coping Appraisals 
Regarding the coping appraisal, PMT generally assumes that the perceived effectiveness (i.e., 
the perceived risk reduction) associated with a protective action has a positive effect on the 
protection intention (e.g., Liang and Xue 2009; Liang and Xue 2010). Considering Gender 
Schema Theory, this cognitive process might be also influenced by gender-specific cognitive 
associations. Males have been observed to be more task oriented than females in several 
contexts (e.g., Minton and Schneider 1985; Venkatesh et al. 2003). They learn in early 
childhood that males have to confront problems head-on and that males are more talented in 
technology use than females. Thus, the effectiveness of a certain coping behavior — 
especially in the context of IT — can be expected to have a stronger influence on decision 
making regarding coping behavior for males than for females. This assumption is also in line 
with the theoretical underpinnings of Social Role Theory (Eagly and Wood 1991; Franke et 
al. 1997) and findings from previous IS research (Minton and Schneider 1985; Venkatesh et 
al. 2003). According to Social Role Theory, males, in contrast to females, typically find their 
work role more important than their family role (Barnett and Marshall 1991). Due to these 
gender-specific roles that are manifested in society, males are expected to be more motivated 
by achievement needs (e.g., effectively coping with threats) than females are (Hoffman 1972). 
Moreover, previous IS research on IT adoption has found that when a technology is perceived 
to be effective, this will have a stronger positive effect for male users’ intentions than for 
female users’ intentions (Venkatesh et al. 2003). In line with previous research, we therefore 
hypothesize: 
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H2a: Perceived effectiveness will have a stronger positive impact on protection 
intentions for male mobile users than for female mobile users. 
Besides the effect of perceived effectiveness on protection intentions, PMT also postulates 
that individuals’ perceived self-efficacy positively influences their protection intentions in 
their coping appraisals. From the Gender Schema Theory perspective, we need to consider 
that males have been found to be more self-confident than females in their technology-related 
skills (Li and Kirkup 2007). Compared to females, males tend to be less anxious about 
technology use (Bozionelos 1996). These differences between males and females may be 
rooted in the different ways that society educates males and females. While females are 
thought to be more anxious and less talented in technology use, males learn that their gender 
is known to be technically oriented. As a result, females’ perceived self-efficacy is subject to 
higher levels of uncertainty, which in turn may weaken a positive impact of their perceived 
self-efficacy on their protection intentions. Gender differences in the relationship between 
self-efficacy and intentions have also been found by previous IS research, e.g., in the context 
of accepting the mobile internet (Wang and Hsu 2010). Accordingly, self-efficacy can be 
expected to have a stronger positive impact on the protection intention for male mobile users 
than for female mobile users. We hypothesize: 
H2b: Perceived self-efficacy will have a stronger positive impact on protection 
intentions for male mobile users than for female mobile users. 
PMT assumes that individuals’ intentions to perform actions directly influence their actual 
behavior. However, with regard to coping behaviors, it is commonly assumed that females 
and males differ in their choice of coping strategies. Specifically, research often assumes that 
males are more likely to apply problem-focused coping strategies (i.e., behavior that aims to 
alter a threat by actively changing the environment), while females tend to apply more 
emotion-focused coping strategies (i.e., behavior that aims to alter the emotional response to a 
threat without actually changing the environment) (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). A major 
reason for gender differences in coping behaviors is provided by the so-called socialization 
hypothesis (Ptacek et al. 1992). In line with Gender Schema Theory, it is argued that females 
and males exhibit different coping behaviors because they are socialized to deal differently 
with stressful and risky situations. Accordingly, males are generally thought to be more likely 
to confront problems head-on (Tamres et al. 2002), which in turn strengthens the relationship 
between their protection intentions and active coping behavior (e.g., implementing an IT 
security safeguard on a mobile device), which is a form of problem-focused coping (Tamres 
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et al. 2002). In contrast, female mobile users’ protection intentions are expected to have a 
weaker impact on problem-focused coping, because they are socialized to deal with problems 
more emotionally and to be less action-oriented than males (Tamres et al. 2002). While a 
large stream of research has found that females and males differ in their coping behaviors in 
various contexts and situations, the findings of these studies are often inconsistent. For 
example, in certain situations (e.g., in coping with relationship stressors), males are found to 
apply more emotion-focused coping strategies (Tamres et al. 2002). Since problem-focused 
coping strategies in the context of mobile IT security require appraising technology-related 
threats and coping options as well as performing technology-related actions, we follow the 
widespread understanding of males as being the more problem-focused gender. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H3: Protection intentions will have a stronger positive impact on protective actions for 
male mobile users than for female mobile users. 
The research model is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Research Model (Research Paper A) 
3.3 Research Methodology 
3.3.1 Research Approach 
Most of the studies in IS research that examine individuals’ protective behavior assume that 
an individual’s intention to cope with a risk ultimately predicts his or her coping behavior, but 
they do not measure and analyze individuals’ actual behavior. Hence, a common criticism is 
that most studies on security behaviors are restricted to the measurement of self-reported data 
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and do not analyze actual behavior (e.g., Boss et al. 2015; Vance et al. 2014). As a 
consequence, we are still far from understanding the actual IT security behavior of individuals 
(Boss et al. 2015). To address this issue, we chose a two-step mixed-method approach (see 
Figure 4) that includes a survey to gather quantitative data and a behavioral experiment and 
interviews to observe participants’ actual coping behaviors. 
In the first step, we used the survey to gather quantitative data about mobile users’ threat and 
coping appraisals as well as their intentions regarding protective actions. We used the 
behavioral experiment and personal interviews in the second step to evaluate mobile users’ 
actual coping behavior in terms of problem-focused coping actions such as actively 
implementing technical security measures (e.g., a security app) on their mobile devices. 
 
Figure 4: Research Approach (Research Paper A) 
We chose to conduct our study based on Android users because this is the most widely used 
mobile operating system and is often seen as the most vulnerable one. For example, 
Kaspersky (2014) reported that 99% of all mobile malware is designed to target the Android 
platform. Kaspersky (2014) argues that Android is especially attractive to attackers because of 
the open nature of the Android operating system and its market share of over 70%. We 
focused our study on users of one specific operating system to ensure comparable 
environmental conditions, such as IT security threats grounded on system-specific 
characteristics. 
3.3.1.1 Step 1: Survey Development 
We established construct validity by adapting items from previous research. We pre-validated 
our measurement model, the behavioral experiment, and the interviews in a pre-study. First, 
the survey was evaluated and revised by eight IS researchers. Next, we conducted the study 
under laboratory conditions with eight mobile users. This pre-test resulted in small changes to 
the structure and wording of the survey. The final items and scales that were used are 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Items Used in the Quantitative Study 
Construct (Sources) Items / Scales 
Perceived 
susceptibility 
(Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; 
Witte 1996) 
My smartphone is at risk of being negatively affected by IT security 
incidents. (Susc1) 
It is likely that IT security incidents will negatively affect my 
smartphone. (Susc2) 
It is possible that IT security incidents will negatively affect my 
smartphone. (Susc3) 
(1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
Perceived severity  
(Herath and Rao 
2009b; Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; 
Witte 1996) 
If there is an IT security incident on my smartphone, it will be 
severe. (Sev1) 
If there is an IT security incident on my smartphone, it will be 
serious. (Sev2) 
I believe that information stored on my smartphone is vulnerable to 
IT security incidents. (Sev3) 
(1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
Perceived IT security 
threat 
(Liang and Xue 
2010) 
IT security incidents that can happen on my smartphone pose a threat 
to me. (Risk1) 
IT security incidents are a danger to my smartphone. (Risk2) 
It will be dreadful if my smartphone is affected by an IT security 
incident. (Risk3) 
(1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
Perceived 
effectiveness 
(Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; 
Witte 1996) 
Use of a security app is especially effective for protecting my 
smartphone. (Effective1) 
Use of a security safeguard measure would increase my level of 
protection for my smartphone. (Effective2) 
(1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
Perceived self-
efficacy 
(Bulgurcu et al. 
2010; Compeau and 
Higgins 1995) 
I can successfully choose and undertake mobile safeguard actions 
even if there is no one around to tell me what to do. (Self-eff1) 
I can successfully choose and undertake mobile safeguard actions if I 
have enough time to complete the job. (Self-eff2) 
I can successfully choose and undertake mobile safeguard actions 
since I have already carried out similar actions. (Self-eff3) 
(1 = not at all confident – 10 = totally confident) 
Protection intention 
(Bulgurcu et al. 
2010; Davis 1989; 
Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975) 
I intend to carry out all necessary safeguard actions to protect my 
smartphone against IT security incidents. (Int1) 
I plan to carry out all necessary safeguard actions to protect my 
smartphone against IT security incidents. (Int2) 
I intend to protect all the data stored on my smartphone and all apps 
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operating on my smartphone by undertaking corresponding 
safeguard actions. (Int3) 
(1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
Perceived effort* 
(Bulgurcu et al. 
2010; Liang and Xue 
2010) 
Undertaking safeguard actions to protect my smartphone against IT 
security risks is time consuming for me. (Effort1) 
Undertaking safeguard actions to protect my smartphone against IT 
security risks is burdensome for me. (Effort2) 
Choosing the right security app and using it is too much trouble. 
(Effort3) 
(1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
IT expertise* 
(Bhattacherjee and 
Sanford 2006)  
How much knowledge do you possess about the following 
technologies from a user's perspective: [mobile apps, e-mail 
technology, web browsers, malware/spyware in the mobile context, 
security apps] 
(1 = novice; 4 = intermediate; 7 = expert, formative) 
Income* Which is your monthly net income level? 
(1 = no regular income; 2 = <$500; 3 = >$500–$1,500;  
4 = >$1,500–$2,500; 5 = >$2.500–$5,000; 6 = >$5,000–$10,000; 
7 = >$10,000) 
* Controls 
 
We included age, income, and IT expertise as controls in our research model (see Figure 3), 
as recommended in previous research (Dias et al. 2010; Liang and Xue 2010; Venkatesh and 
Morris 2000). Moreover, we controlled for the perceived effort associated with protective 
actions since this construct is often considered as also potentially influencing individuals’ 
protection intentions (e.g., Liang and Xue 2010). However, we excluded perceived effort 
from our main hypotheses regarding the coping appraisal because — in line with Rogers 
(1975) — our study focuses on individuals’ beliefs about the efficacy of coping responses 
(i.e., perceived effectiveness and perceived self-efficacy). 
3.3.1.2 Step 2: Behavioral Experiment and Interviews 
In the experiment, information about the functionalities of a free version and a premium 
version of an IT security app was presented to the participants. They were then asked to 
decide whether they would take $5 in cash or a license for a premium version of the security 
app (worth $7.95) as a reward for their participation. In the experiment, we controlled for 
endowment and order effects by using four control groups (Plott and Zeiler 2005; Schwarz 
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1999), as shown in Figure 5 (see also Acquisti and Grossklags 2004). Regarding the 
endowment effect, one control group was given the security app license first and the other 
control group was given the cash first. The participants then had the option of exchanging 
their reward. In contrast, the participants in the order effect control groups were asked directly 
whether they wanted to choose the premium app license ($7.95) or the cash ($5), but the order 
in which the options were presented varied across the two order effect control groups. 
 
Figure 5: Control Groups in the Experiment 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 4, we also conducted personal mini-interviews in the second 
step. The interviews aimed at acquiring a better understanding of the mobile IT security 
decisions the participants made in the experiment by analyzing the extent to which the 
participants had already undertaken problem-focused actions in order to cope with mobile IT 
security threats. Therefore, the participants were asked to list how they had protected their 
mobile devices from mobile IT security threats. The semi-structured interviews were guided 
by two questions: What are the reasons for the decision you made in the experiment? Under 
what conditions would you have decided differently? 
3.3.2 Sampling 
Data were collected in two rounds. The first data collection took place between February 15 
and April 6, 2016 (58 females and 70 males) and the second between August 10 and August 
12, 2016 (15 females and 37 males). We used flyers to acquire participants at our university. 
A voucher with a minimum value of $5 was offered as an incentive for participating. The 
study was conducted in a laboratory at the university. Of the 73 female and 107 male mobile 
Android users who participated, three (two females and one male) had to be subsequently 
removed from the sample because the interview indicated that they had not read the 
information about the security app. In sum, our data set included 177 mobile users, of which 
106 were male (mean age = 24.6; median = 23.5; SD = 5.4) and 71 were female (mean age = 
25.8; median = 24.0; SD = 6.1). Nine of the 177 mobile users decided not participate in the 
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final step. Thus, 169 personal interviews (average duration 4 minutes) were conducted and 
recorded for analysis (protocol, audio files). The demographic characteristics of the sample 
used in this study are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Demographic Sample Characteristics 
Age n Share Education n Share Gender n Share 
18–23 82 46.3% Less than high school 2 1.1% Female 71 40.1% 
24–29 77 43.5% High school degree 9 5.1% Male 106 59.9% 
30–35 12 6.8% College degree 72 40.7%    
>35 6 3.4% Undergraduate degree 62 35.0%    
Mean 25.1 Graduate degree 21 11.9%    
Median 24.0 Doctoral degree 1 0.6%    
SD 5.7 Other 10 5.9%    
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis and Results 
3.3.3.1 Assessment of Measurement Validations 
First, we conducted the Shapiro-Wilk test separately for the data from the female sample and 
the data from the male sample. The results showed that in the female sample, perceived 
effectiveness and perceived susceptibility were not normally distributed and that in the male 
sample, perceived severity, perceived effectiveness, and perceived self-efficacy were not 
normally distributed. We compared the results of the first and the second round as well as the 
first and last 25% within the samples for the two rounds to test whether interest in the topic 
had any influence (Armstrong and Overton 1977). The non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U Test 
showed that no significant differences existed. We used the partial least square (PLS) method 
to evaluate our research model, following the guidelines proposed by Hair et al. (2013). The 
PLS method is appropriate for analyzing our research model due to the (partial) non-
normality of our data and the explorative nature of our study (Hair et al. 2013). With n = 71 
for the female sample and n = 106 for the male sample, our sample size meets the rule of 
thumb that suggests sample sizes larger than ten times the maximum number of paths directed 
to a particular construct in the measurement model (Barclay et al. 1995). The model was 
separately evaluated for male mobile users and female mobile users using SmartPLS software 
(SmartPLS 2016). 
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Table 3: Indicator Reliability 
Indicators 
Females Males 
Loadings Indicator Reliability Loadings Indicator Reliability 
Susc1 0.882 0.778 0.859 0.738 
Susc2 0.787 0.619 0.856 0.733 
Susc3 0.791 0.626 0.810 0.656 
Sev1 0.901 0.812 0.851 0.724 
Sev2 0.940 0.884 0.919 0.845 
Sev3 0.814 0.663 0.575 0.331 
Risk1 0.894 0.799 0.855 0.731 
Risk2 0.728 0.530 0.814 0.663 
Risk3 0.748 0.560 0.723 0.523 
Effective1 0.947 0.897 0.900 0.810 
Effective2 0.900 0.810 0.972 0.945 
Self-eff1 0.940 0.884 0.939 0.882 
Self-eff2 0.868 0.753 0.843 0.711 
Self-eff3 0.857 0.734 0.891 0.794 
Int1 0.933 0.870 0.932 0.869 
Int2 0.938 0.880 0.932 0.869 
Int3 0.892 0.796 0.879 0.773 
 
Following the guidelines for PLS usage (Hair et al. 2013), parameters for indicator reliability 
(Table 3), composite reliability (CR, Table 4), and average variance extracted (AVE, Table 4) 
were computed in the next step in order to ensure convergent validity. With one exception in 
the male sample (Sev3: indicator reliability = 0.331), the indicator reliability values for all 
indicators exceed the minimum acceptable level of 0.4 and are close to or greater than the 
preferred level of 0.7 (Table 3) (Hulland 1999). With one exception (male sample, perceived 
severity: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.687), the values for Cronbach’s alpha (CA) all exceed the 
recommended threshold level of 0.7 (Nunnally et al. 1967) (see Table 4). However, the 
composite reliability values for perceived severity in the male sample and all other constructs 
are well above the recommended threshold of 0.7 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988), confirming the 
internal consistency of the constructs. For all measured constructs, the average variance 
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extracted values are above 0.5 in both the male sample and the female sample (Quan-Haase 
and Young 2010). Furthermore, we conducted the Fornell-Larcker criterion analysis for 
checking discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981) (Table 4). The results showed that 
in the female as well as the male sample the square root of the AVE for each construct is 
greater than the correlation of the construct with any other construct in the model. Overall, 
convergent and discriminant validity can be assumed. 
Table 4: Quality Criteria for the Constructs and Fornell-Larcker Criterion Analysis 
 AVE CR CA SUS SEV R EFF SE I 
Susceptibility 
(SUS) 
0.675 
0.709 
0.861 
0.880 
0.779 
0.797 
0.821 
0.842 
     
Severity 
(SEV) 
0.787 
0.634 
0.917 
0.834 
0.862 
0.687 
0.386 
0.239 
0.887 
0.796 
    
Risk (R) 
0.629 
0.639 
0.835 
0.841 
0.710 
0.714 
0.320 
0.433 
0.542 
0.652 
0.793 
0.799 
   
Effectiveness 
(EFF) 
0.853 
0.877 
0.921 
0.934 
0.831 
0.871 
-0.053 
0.179 
0.095 
0.062 
0.096 
0.202 
0.924 
0.937 
  
Self-efficacy 
(SE) 
0.790 
0.796 
0.919 
0.921 
0.868 
0.874 
-0.466 
-0.281 
-0.187 
-0.031 
-0.089 
-0.099 
0.099 
-0.125 
0.889 
0.892 
 
Intention (I) 
0.849 
0.837 
0.944 
0.939 
0.911 
0.902 
0.006 
-0.094 
0.280 
0.209 
0.333 
0.225 
0.410 
0.010 
0.152 
0.447 
0.921 
0.915 
Note: The results for the female subsample are displayed in standard font and the results for the male 
subsample are displayed in grey italic. 
 
Table 5: Collinearity Statistics 
Constructs 
Females Males 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Susceptibility 0.851 1.175 0.943 1.060 
Severity 0.851 1.175 0.943 1.060 
Risk 0.946 1.057 0.938 1.066 
Effectiveness 0.963 1.038 0.905 1.105 
Self-efficacy 0.971 1.030 0.766 1.305 
Intention 0.873 1.145 0.757 1.321 
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To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the tolerances and variance inflation factor (VIF) 
values separately for the female and male samples. The results are shown in Table 5. The 
tolerance values all exceed the recommended threshold of 0.2 and the VIFs are all below the 
recommended threshold of 5 (Hair et al. 2011). Thus, we can rule out collinearity problems 
for our model. 
3.3.3.2 Behavioral and Qualitative Data 
Only 53 of the 177 participants (29.9%) in the experiment chose the premium security app 
license as a reward for participating in our study; 28 of these were female and 25 were male. 
124 participants (70.1%) decided to take the cash (43 females and 81 males). The Kruskal-
Wallis Test showed that the endowment and order effect did not have any influence on the 
participants’ choices in the experiment, i.e., on their decisions whether to choose the premium 
security app license or the cash (chi-square = 1.838, df = 3, asymp. Sig. = 0.607). The Mann-
Whitney-U Test showed that the decisions made in the experiment were significantly different 
for the male and female mobile users (asymp. sig (2-tailed) = 0.035). Specifically, female 
users were found to be more likely to choose the security app license. However, the 
participant’s choices in the experiment may have been influenced by their previous coping 
actions. For example, if a participant had already taken safeguarding measures that provide 
the same level of protection as the offered security app, the participant’s decision to take the 
cash cannot be interpreted as non-secure behavior. Therefore, we combined the data gathered 
in the personal interviews and the data from our quantitative study in order to evaluate the 
actual security behavior of the participants. 
Eight females and one male did not participate in the interviews. Accordingly, data about the 
participants’ actual IT security behavior is measured only for 168 data sets (63 females and 
105 males). The actual IT security behavior of the participants was classified into three levels 
of problem-focused coping behavior: low, medium, and high. As result of discussions 
between three IS researchers, the assignment of the participants to one of the three coping 
behavior levels was done in three steps. In the first step, the behavioral data from the 
experiment were used. If a participant chose the premium security app license, he or she was 
considered as showing a high level of problem-focused coping. If the participant chose the 
cash, we included information about the participant’s previous coping actions (i.e., 
safeguarding measures already taken) in the actual behavior evaluation. We checked whether 
this participant stated in the prior survey that he or she had installed a free security app, a 
premium version of a security app, or no security app. If the participant had already installed a 
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premium version of a security app, his or her decision was also interpreted as showing a high 
level of coping behavior. For the other two cases (i.e., “free version of a security app 
installed” and “no security app installed”), we additionally included the qualitative data from 
the personal interviews to evaluate the participants’ actual coping behavior in a third step. In 
the qualitative interviews, two groups of other technical security measures were mentioned by 
the participants: system-internal security solutions and open-source security solutions. If a 
participant argued in the interviews that he or she utilizes such a technical security measure 
(“I use the CyanogenMod Operating System and I don’t have Google Play Store installed,” “I 
prefer using a tool like XPrivacy or the embedded functions in CyanogenMod”), the 
participant was also assigned to the group that shows a high level of problem-focused coping. 
Installation of a free version of a security app was considered to be medium problem-focused 
coping behavior, and taking no safeguarding measure a low level of problem-focused 
behavior (“I didn’t need a security app until now”, “Only pictures are important to me. These 
get automatically synchronized with Google Drive. Therefore, the pictures are secured”, “I 
am concerned that the app will slow down the performance of my smartphone and interfere 
with my web browsing experience”). The level classification is shown in Table 6 for both 
male and female mobile users. 
Table 6: Classification of Actual Problem-Focused Coping Behavior 
Problem-focused coping behavior Females (n=63) Males (n=105) Total (n=168) 
Low 25 (35.2%) 41 (38.7%) 66 (37.3%) 
Medium 10 (14.1%) 26 (24.5%) 36 (20.3%) 
High 28 (39.4%) 38 (35.8%) 66 (37.3%) 
 
3.3.3.3 Structural Model Testing 
In the next step, we evaluated our structural model (Figure 3) separately for the female sample 
and the male sample. Our model explains 30.8% of the variance in perceived threat in the 
female sample and 50.7% in the male sample. The variance explained in mobile users’ 
protection intention is 51.6% for females and 41.3% for males. Regarding the observed 
protective actions, 24.9% of the variance is explained in the female sample and only 8.3% in 
the male sample. Given the explorative nature of our study, the values for R² and their 
corresponding discrepancies between the female and the male sample show that the level of 
explanatory power for our research is appropriate. 
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Table 7: Results of Structural Model Testing 
Hypothesis Results 
Path Coefficients 
Females Males 
H1a: Perceived severity  
perceived threat  
Supported: same for males 
and females  
0.492*** 0.582***  
H1b: Perceived susceptibility  
perceived threat  
Supported: stronger for males  0.130  0.294**  
H1c: Perceived threat            
protection intention  
Not supported: same for males 
and females 
0.348*** 0.223**  
H2a: Perceived effectiveness  
protection intention  
Not supported: stronger for 
females 
0.277*** 0.064 
H2b: Perceived self-efficacy  
protection intention  
Supported: stronger for males 0.027 0.222*** 
H3: Protection intention            
coping actions 
Not supported: stronger for 
females 
0.417* 0.226 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
The path coefficients in our structural model and their significance levels were calculated 
based on the PLS method and a bootstrapping procedure (5000 subsamples, no sign changes, 
pairwise deletion). The results are summarized in Table 7. We found that perceived severity 
has a significant positive association with perceived threat for both male and female mobile 
users (female: β = 0.492, p-value = 0.000; male: β = 0.582, p-value = 0.000). To assess 
whether the path coefficients for this significant relationship are different for male and female 
mobile users, we utilized a multi-group analysis (MGA) procedure. This did not reveal any 
significant differences in the association of risk severity with males and with females, 
supporting H1a (p-value = 0.777). In contrast, with respect to perceived susceptibility, the 
results show a significant positive association with perceived threat for male mobile users but 
not for females (female: β = 0.130, p-value = 0.313; male: β = 0.294, p-value = 0.001). 
Accordingly, as the positive effect of perceived susceptibility on perceived threat is stronger 
for males, H1b is also supported. Regarding H1c, the results show that perceived threat is 
significantly positively associated with protection intentions for both female and male mobile 
users (female: β = 0.348, p-value = 0.000; male: β = 0.223, p-value = 0.008). Contrary to our 
expectation, the MGA procedure showed no significant differences in the path coefficients (p-
value = 0.147) for females and males. Thus, H1c is not supported. While perceived 
effectiveness was found to have a significant positive association with protection intentions 
for female but not for male mobile users (female: β = 0.277, p-value = 0.000; male: β = 0.064, 
p-value = 0.458), the positive association of perceived self-efficacy with the protection 
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intention is only significant for male mobile users (female: β = 0.027, p-value = 0.777; male: 
β = 0.222, p-value = 0.008). Thus, H2a is not supported and H2b is supported. The positive 
relationship between mobile users’ stated protection intention and observed actual coping 
actions is significant for females but not for males (female: β = 0.417, p-value = 0.002; male: 
β = 0.226, p-value = 0.052). Even though the influence of protection intentions on coping 
actions is very close to the 5% significance level, H3 cannot be supported. 
Finally, we did not find a significant influence of the control variable age on protection 
intentions (female: β = 0.061, p-value = 0.369; male: β = 0.029, p-value = 0.683) or on 
participants’ coping actions (female: β = -0.141, p-value = 0.217; male: β = 0.066, p-value = 
0.597). The influence of income on protective actions is positively significant for females but 
not for males (female: β = 0.274, p-value = 0.010; male: β = -0.215, p-value = 0.058); 
moreover, the relationship is negative in the male sample. IT expertise is found to 
significantly positively influence males’ but not females’ protection intentions (female: 
β = -0.213, p-value = 0.234; male: β = 0.285, p-value = 0.006). Regarding the influence of IT 
expertise on the actual coping actions, no significant relationship in either the female or the 
male sample is found (female: β = 0.004, p-value = 0.980; male: β = -0.070, p-value = 0.621). 
The negative relationship between perceived effort and protection intention is significant for 
both female and male mobile users (female: β = -0.393, p-value = 0.000; male: β = -0.265, p-
value = 0.002). The path coefficients for the male and female subsamples do not differ 
significantly (p-value = 0.838). 
3.4 Discussion 
In this study, we analyzed the differences between male and female mobile users in cognitive 
IT security appraisals and protective actions. Based on the theoretical underpinnings of PMT 
and Gender Schema Theory, we first derived a variance model of mobile users’ coping 
behavior. Then we conducted a survey and an experiment with mobile users, followed by 
personal interviews. The results of our study show that gender differences play an important 
role in the cognitive processes that predict mobile users’ protection intentions and protective 
behaviors. We found that the protection intentions of male and female mobile users are based 
on different underlying cognitive processes in the threat appraisal and the coping appraisal. 
Moreover, the results indicate that male mobile users fail to take the necessary protective 
actions even though they actually intend to protect their devices from mobile IT security 
threats. 
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Specifically, with respect to the threat appraisal, females’ perceptions of threats were found to 
be primarily predicted by their perceptions of the severity of an incident, while males 
additionally based their threat perceptions on their perceived susceptibility (i.e., the likelihood 
that an incident would happen to them). Accordingly, it can be assumed that females tend to 
perceive a mobile security threat as high as soon as they perceive it to be associated with a 
certain degree of damage, even if the negative event is actually very unlikely to occur. One 
reason for this finding could be that female mobile users are less certain when it comes to the 
assessment of IT security threats. While perceived susceptibility is strongly based on 
technical configurations, the severity of a negative event does not necessarily require specific 
knowledge about IT security. In line with Gender Schema Theory (Bem 1981), it can be 
concluded that the information about risk susceptibility and risk severity that is available to 
mobile users is processed differently by females and males because they have different 
associations with such information. For example, females might be more emotionally upset 
than males when thinking about an attack on the sensitive data stored on their mobile devices. 
Accordingly, females would be likely to evaluate this mobile IT security threat as high 
without considering the probability that the event might occur. In contrast, males will in 
addition process information about their perceived susceptibility when appraising the threat. 
Moreover, the explained variance of the perceived threat is much lower in the female sample 
(30.8%) than in the male sample (50.7%). This may indicate that further factors exist that 
need to be considered as antecedents of female mobile users’ perceived threat. Contrary to our 
expectation, we did not find significant differences between females and males in the 
relationship between mobile users’ perceived threat and protection intentions. In both the 
female and the male sample, the perceived mobile threats were found to significantly 
positively influence mobile users’ protection intentions. One reason for this finding could be 
that both females and males are well aware of the danger of IT security threats because the 
importance of IT security is widely accepted in society and the topic is continually receiving 
increased attention from the media. Accordingly, raising the perceived levels of mobile 
security threats will result in a strengthening of both female and male mobile users’ intentions 
to take protective action. However, while females’ levels of threat perception can be raised by 
emphasizing the severity of the damage that can result from mobile IT security incidents, 
raising males’ perceived levels of threat requires emphasizing both the associated damage and 
their perceived probability that the mobile IT security incidents will happen to them. 
Even though gender differences were found in mobile users’ coping appraisal with respect to 
the perceived effectiveness of safeguarding measures, the positive relationship between 
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perceived effectiveness and protection intentions was found to be significant for females but 
not for males. This is contrary to our expectation that because males are more task-oriented 
and more motivated by achievement, they would therefore be more likely to base their 
protection intention on the perceived effectiveness of a safeguard. However, the positive 
relationship between perceived self-efficacy for coping with a threat and protection intentions 
is only significant for males. In sum, our results indicate that females’ coping appraisal is 
based primarily on the perceived effectiveness associated with protective behavior, while 
males’ coping appraisal is primarily based on their perceived self-efficacy to cope with the 
threat. Accordingly, when deciding about coping with a risky situation, a female mobile user 
will base her decision on the perceived capabilities of a safeguard to effectively reduce the 
perceived risk, while a male mobile user will base his decision on his own capabilities (i.e., 
his perceived self-efficacy). One reason for this result could be that males are more “self-
congratulatory” than females (Pajares 2002) and thus may tend to base their coping appraisals 
more strongly than females do on their assessments of their own capabilities.  
Overall, the results show that the cognitive processes that are assumed by PMT explain a 
substantial portion of the variance in mobile users’ protection intentions. Nevertheless, the 
variance in mobile users’ protection intentions explained by our research model is higher for 
females than for males. Therefore, one can ask whether males base their protection intentions 
more strongly on other factors, such as affective factors.  
With respect to mobile users’ actual behavior, the results of the experiment indicate that 
females are more likely than males to show problem-focused coping behavior, i.e., to adopt an 
IT security safeguard for their mobile devices when they intend to protect their mobile 
devices. In particular, we did not find a significant relationship between protection intentions 
and the implementation of technical IT security measures in the male sample but we did find 
one in the female sample. As such, our results show that male users tend to be less likely to 
confront mobile IT security threats head-on and to show problem-focused coping actions. 
Thus, the question arises whether males are more likely to apply emotion-focused coping 
strategies in response to mobile IT security threats. In this case, males would be more 
emotionally driven in the context of mobile IT security. The variance in mobile users’ 
protective behavior that is explained by their protection intentions is three times less for the 
male sample than for the female sample. This indicates that the problem-focused behavior of 
males is influenced by other, additional factors. For example, males could include their 
perceived control over the data stored on their mobile devices in their decision-making about 
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coping behavior and therefore be more likely to be vulnerable to perception bias, e.g., the 
systematic underestimation of risks. When males — the more self-confident and self-
congratulatory gender — overestimate their control over the data stored on their mobile 
devices, they refrain from implementing necessary IT security measures and show less 
problem-focused coping behavior. As such, our results indicate that males are more likely to 
engage in risky behavior regarding how they use their mobile devices and less likely to show 
problem-focused coping actions. This contradicts the widespread assumption in a large stream 
of research that females — the more emotional gender — are more likely to apply emotion-
focused coping strategies while males are more likely to apply problem-focused coping 
strategies (Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Stone and Neale 1984). However, Tamres et al. (2002) 
found in their meta-review of literature dealing with gender differences in coping behaviors 
that the findings of studies on gender-specific coping behavior are often inconsistent, so that 
the widespread assumption of problem-focused males and emotion-focused females in the 
context of coping behavior needs to be rethought. For example, in certain situations (e.g., in 
coping with relationship stressors) males have been found to apply more emotion-focused 
coping strategies (Tamres et al. 2002), and in the context of personal health behavior, females 
have been found to be more likely to engage in problem-focused coping behavior (Tamres et 
al. 2002). According to Tamres et al. (2002), one reason for these findings regarding problem-
focused and emotion-focused coping behaviors in females and males might be that males 
often exhibit two opposite stereotypes: On the one hand, males are assumed to be more likely 
to confront a problem head-on, while on the other hand, males have also been found to be the 
gender that is more likely to deny that a problem exists (Tamres et al. 2002). Based on the 
results of their meta-analytic review, Tamres et al. (2002) conclude that these opposite 
stereotypes of males might be explained by the situational context. As such, they presume that 
males may particularly exhibit less problem-focused coping behaviors in situations in which a 
threat is perceived as less controllable (e.g., in interpersonal relationships). Considering that 
our study found that perceived effectiveness of technical IT security measures does not have a 
significant influence on males’ protection intentions, it could be speculated that males 
perceive mobile IT security threats as less controllable than do females. As a result, males 
would be more likely to conclude that a threat cannot be avoided. To maintain psychological 
balance, the perceived threat level is lowered by denying that the problem exists (“It won’t 
happen to me”) or by other wishful thinking (“Nobody would be interested in stealing my 
information”) (Liang and Xue 2009). 
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Moreover, our results indicate the presence of an intention–behavior gap for male mobile 
users. Previous studies have similarly shown that individuals may behave inconsistently with 
self-reported intentions regarding their privacy and security (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags 
2004; Belanger et al. 2002; Norberg et al. 2007). In this context, the question arises whether 
this paradoxical intention–behavior relationship is similar to the so-called Privacy Paradox 
(Dinev and Hart 2006; Norberg et al. 2007). However, the intention–behavior relation seems 
to be slightly different in context of our study: While this study analyzes people’s behavior 
with regard to protecting their privacy (i.e., by implementing safeguarding measures), the 
Privacy Paradox focuses on people’s decisions to surrender a certain degree of privacy in 
exchange for outcomes (Dinev and Hart 2006). Nevertheless, the reasons for the paradoxical 
behavior of male mobile users need to be understood in order to ensure that it is not only 
females who actively protect their mobile devices, their private data repositories. 
This study has several important theoretical implications. Overall, this paper extends existing 
research on the IT security behavior of individuals by being the first to examine how mobile 
users’ gender influences their threat and coping appraisals as well as their consequent coping 
behaviors. This paper shows that the underlying cognitive assessments (i.e., the effects of the 
threat and coping appraisals) on which protection intentions are based differ between female 
and male mobile users. This finding highlights the importance of considering users’ gender 
when analyzing coping behaviors in the context of IT security. Ignoring the important role of 
users’ gender may lead to misleading results. For example, since females are still an 
underrepresented population in the IT workforce (Bagchi-Sen et al. 2010), the results of IT 
security research in the organizational context are often based on data primarily gathered from 
males. Considering the results of our study, findings that are based on existing IT security 
research may be correct for males but not for females. Moreover, in contrast to most other 
studies in IS research, this study not only analyzes the way mobile users build their protection 
intentions but also observes the corresponding actual coping behaviors. In this context, the 
results of the experiment and interviews indicate that male mobile users are less likely to 
translate their stated protection intentions into problem-focused coping behavior. This type of 
intention–behavior gap is well-recognized in behavioral research (e.g., Norberg et al. 2007; 
Sheeran 2002) and highlights the importance of conducting more experiments in IT security 
perception and behavior research. In particular, we still do not have a good understanding of 
why individuals fail to effectively protect themselves even in cases with minimal cost. Factors 
mediating and moderating the relationship between protection intentions and protective 
actions need to be identified and analyzed to gain a better understanding of individuals’ actual 
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protection behavior and thereby ultimately increase the security levels of mobile users. 
Furthermore, while it can be noted that PMT is a valid theoretical lens for analyzing 
protection intentions and behavior in the context of mobile IT security, we also found that the 
relationships between the constructs assumed by PMT and mobile users’ protection intentions 
are different for females and males. As such, this study not only extends our theoretical 
understanding of the cognitive processes that predict females’ and males’ intentions to behave 
securely but also shows that the validation of theories in IT security that are based on 
individuals’ cognitive processes can be strongly influenced by individuals’ gender. This 
finding might provide an explanation for the contradictory findings in previous research that 
uses PMT in the IT security context. For example, while Herath and Rao (2009b) and 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) found that only severity had an significant influence on the 
perceived threat, Lee et al. (2008) found that only susceptibility was significant, and Liang 
and Xue (2010) found significant influences of both severity and susceptibility on individuals’ 
perceived threat. Although some of these studies include gender as a control (e.g., Herath and 
Rao 2009b; Liang and Xue 2010), they do not consider the influence of gender on the paths 
between the cognitive constructs assumed in PMT. 
This study also has several implications for mobile users and practitioners, such as suppliers 
of IT security and organizations in general. Female mobile users can learn from this study that 
they should consider their perceived susceptibility to a greater degree in their threat appraisals 
in order to avoid overestimation of a threat and subsequent ineffective decisions. Male mobile 
users can learn that they do not sufficiently consider the perceived effectiveness of available 
security measures in their coping appraisals. Moreover, our results indicate that mobile users 
— especially male mobile users — do not necessary behave as securely as they originally 
intended. Accordingly, this study may sensitize mobile users to the fact that they should 
carefully consider whether the safeguarding measures they have taken for their mobile 
devices are adequate to ensure the security level they intend to achieve for their smartphones. 
For suppliers of IT security products, it is essential, when designing marketing campaigns, to 
consider that males and females cope differently with IT security threats. In particular, 
marketing messages for male mobile users should also underline the likelihood of an incident 
and encourage users’ self-efficacy. Moreover, the results of the experiment and the interviews 
indicate that IT security suppliers should focus not only on customers’ perceptions of the 
product characteristics influencing their protection intentions but also the factors that 
influence customer’s translation of their intentions into protective behavior (e.g., buying a 
security app). Organizations can use the results of this study regarding the different 
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underlying processes influencing the protection intentions of female and male mobile users 
when developing educational programs. The fact that users are often considered to be the 
weakest link in organizations’ IT security (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010) particularly highlights 
the need for gender-specific training and educational programs addressing the specific impact 
factors that are relevant in females’ and males’ IT security perceptions and coping behaviors. 
For example, awareness programs aiming to raise the intention of employees to secure the 
organizational IT systems should especially emphasize the severity of the potential damage in 
the case of an IT security incident within the organization and the effectiveness of the coping 
behavior that is specified in the organization’s IT security policies. Neglecting gender 
differences in females’ and males’ cognitive appraisals when educating them about how to 
cope with IT security threats confronting the organization might result in investments that will 
not pay off as much as they could. 
3.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Three limitations of this study merit consideration. First, the results of the empirical analysis 
are based on data from users of only one mobile operating system (Android) and a student 
sample. However, even though the Android operating system still dominates the market, 
further research could nevertheless enrich the results of this study by verifying these results in 
additional quantitative and experimental studies with more representative samples and 
different operating systems. These studies could also further analyze gender-specific reasons 
for the different cognitive and affective processes by considering additional gender-specific 
personality traits (e.g., self-regulation and overconfidence). Second, this study does not 
analyze security perceptions and behaviors longitudinally. The threat and coping appraisals 
may change over time due to new information. For example, a user’s peer (e.g., a family 
member, friend, or colleague) might become a victim of a security incident, or the user might 
learn new information about security threats through the media. As a consequence, the 
perceptions of security threats and safeguarding measures might be influenced, which in turn 
would influence protection intentions and respective coping behaviors. Accordingly, we 
encourage future research to conduct longitudinal studies and thereby analyze the perceptions 
and behaviors of female and male mobile users at various points in time. This may also enable 
researchers to better understand the different underlying cognitive processes within males’ 
and females’ threat and coping appraisals and potential changes over time. Third, the results 
of this study regarding the relationship between the measured protection intention in the first 
research step (survey) and the coping behavior observed in the second research step 
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(experiment and interviews) have to be interpreted carefully. Specifically, while the measured 
protection intention of the participants was formulated as the goal of protecting a smartphone 
and the data stored on it, the observed coping behavior was limited to single actions regarding 
the implementation of technical security measures. Despite our use of a behavioral 
experiment and personal interviews to correctly capture the problem-focused coping actions 
of the participants as much as possible, we cannot say with certainty that we succeeded. 
Moreover, we did not measure emotion-focused responses. Accordingly, additional 
experiments are required to further analyze the gender-specific relationship between mobile 
users’ stated protection intentions and their actual coping behaviors as well as gender-specific 
applications of emotion-focused and problem-focused coping strategies. 
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Abstract 
Despite the widely recognized importance of top managers’ IT security awareness for 
effective IT security management, previous research has paid little attention to its complex 
nature. Against this backdrop, we conducted a structured literature review to identify and 
organize factors that have been found to determine managerial IT security awareness. 
Particularly, a systematic consolidation of the literature streams in combination with expert 
interviews and Q-sorting revealed that individual- and organization-related factors form two 
distinct dimensions of managers’ IT security awareness. Within the qualitative evaluation, we 
identified two supplementary factors (one in each dimension). Further, we found that the 
awareness of both top managers and managers at the department level is crucial for effective 
IT security management. Our proposed conceptualization will enable both researchers and 
practitioners to better understand managers’ IT security awareness and to subsequently 
develop interventions dedicated at improving managers’ awareness and thus the effectiveness 
of IT security management. 
 
Keywords: IT Security, Management, Awareness, Effectiveness, Literature Review. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, the protection of sensitive data and information technology (IT) systems from 
security incidents represents one of the major challenges for organizations. The costs for data 
leakage, lost productivity, and long-term reputational damage can be huge and therefore, a 
single security breach can even threaten an organization’s existence. Fittingly, Ginni Rometty, 
chairman, president and CEO of IBM stated at the IBM Security Summit in 2015 that 
cybercrime “is the greatest threat to every profession, every industry, every company in the 
world” (Forbes 2015a). This statement also reflects findings of recent statistics. According to 
Statista, the average financial loss of large organizations due to IT security incidents was $3.9 
million in 2013 and increased to $5.9 million in 2014. The worldwide damage for cybercrime 
is predicted to hit $6 trillion annually by 2021, up from $3 trillion in 2015 (Cybersecurity 
Ventures 2016). The number of security incidents is constantly rising and an opposing trend is 
not foreseeable. Compared to 2014, the number of detected security incidents increased by 
roughly about 38 percent in 2015 (Socialnomics 2016). For IT security experts, these statistics 
are frustrating — not only because they demonstrate the increasing sophistication of attackers, 
but also because effective safeguards would have been readily available in many cases but 
were obviously not implemented in the organizational IT systems. According to the ‘Data 
Protection & Breach Readiness Guide’ of the Online Trust Alliance (OTA), 91 percent of the 
data breaches in 2015 could have been prevented (OTA 2016). By way of example, experts 
claim that the Sony Pictures hack in 2014 could have been easily prevented by mail 
encryption (Virtru 2015). Another example is given by the IRS hack where hackers gained 
access to personal data from more than 700,000 taxpayer accounts (The Wall Street Journal 
2016). Experts assume that this incident could have been easily prevented with the 
implementation of two-factor authentication (Forbes 2015b). Thus, those specialists 
responsible for the organization’s IT security actually should have been aware about the 
existence of the necessary safeguarding measures. However, previous studies have found that 
IT security specialists’ scope for action (e.g., the IT security budget) within an organization is 
often too restricted due to a lack of top management support, so that they cannot effectively 
secure the organizations’ IT systems (pwc 2015). As such, top managers’ IT security 
awareness plays a central role in effective IT security management as well (e.g., Ashenden 
2008; Choi et al. 2008; Sharma and Yetton 2007). If the top management is not aware about 
the threats their organization faces with respect to IT security, the topic will not be of high 
priority when it comes to decisions about resource allocations. Against this backdrop, 
previous studies have demonstrated that top managers are not well prepared for the higher 
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complexity of IT security risks arising from trends, such as Big Data and Cloud Computing 
(EMC 2014). In order to overcome the problem of organizations’ insufficient protection 
levels against IT security risks, it is essential to improve the awareness about IT security at 
the top management level. Thus, to ensure effective IT security management, it is necessary 
to understand the nature and role of top managers’ IT security awareness.  
Previous IS research repeatedly highlighted the important role of the top management in an 
effective IT security management (e.g., Hu et al. 2012; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Sharma and 
Yetton 2007). It is argued that top management attention and commitment to IT security 
positively influences the IT security level of an organization because the greater top 
management support in an organization the more resources will be allocated for IT security 
management (Herath and Rao 2009b; Kankanhalli et al. 2003). Moreover, it is commonly 
assumed that managerial actions toward IT security (e.g., information security policies or 
security trainings) increase employees’ IT security awareness (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; 
Haeussinger and Kranz 2013; Spears and Barki 2010) and therefore, enhances employees’ IT 
security behavior (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Hu et al. 2012). As such, a top-down effect from 
the management level to the employee level is proposed (e.g., Kritzinger and Smith 2008). 
Although the importance of top managers for effective IT security risk management in 
organizations is widely recognized (e.g., Ashenden 2008; Sharma and Yetton 2007), research 
on the nature and role of top managers’ IT security awareness is still rare. The extant 
literature is predominantly focused on employees’ IT security awareness and largely neglects 
the awareness of top managers in organizations (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; D'Arcy et al. 
2009; Herath and Rao 2009a; Posthumus and Von Solms 2004; Vance et al. 2012). Moreover, 
those few studies dealing with IT security awareness at the top management level tend to 
focus on either individual-related factors (e.g., top managers’ individual knowledge about IT 
security risks and controls) or organization-related factors (e.g., top managers’ perception of 
industry-specific sensitivity of data and IT systems). An exhaustive conceptualization that 
includes individual- as well as organization-related factors of the concept of top managers’ IT 
security awareness in IT security management is still missing. To address this research gap, 
we follow the call for research by Haeussinger and Kranz (2017) and focus our study on the 
concept of IT security awareness at the top management level. It can be assumed that factors 
determining this concept at the top management level differ from factors at the employee 
level, for example due to different responsibilities of employees and top managers (see also 
Siponen 2001). We chose a two-step research approach (see Figure 6). First, we develop a 
conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness based on a structured literature 
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review and insights from related research streams. The proposed conceptualization considers 
both factors representing the individual dimension and factors representing the organizational 
dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness as well as its role in an organization’s IT 
security management. In our second step, we evaluate the developed conceptualization using 
qualitative expert interviews with multiple IT security experts from different hierarchical 
levels in an organization as well as with IT security suppliers. In addition, the validity of the 
proposed conceptualization is confirmed by applying the Q-sort method. 
 
Figure 6: Research Approach (Research Paper B) 
By developing and evaluating an exhaustive conceptualization of top managers’ IT security 
awareness, this work makes significant contributions to IS research and practice. First of all, 
the study contributes to the emerging body of IT security awareness literature by highlighting 
and confirming the important role of IT security awareness at the top management level for an 
effective IT security management in organizations. Based on the structured literature review, 
we identify and organize factors that have been found to determine top managers’ IT security 
awareness in the extant literature. These factors are empirically evaluated and validated with 
expert interviews and Q-sorting. This second step revealed two additional factors that are 
relevant to top managers’ IT security awareness but have been disregarded by previous 
studies: previous IT security experience and legal requirements. Additionally, since we found 
that not only the IT security awareness of top managers is crucial for effective IT security 
management but also the awareness of managers at the department level, our results indicate 
that future research should consider all hierarchical levels of an organization when studying 
IT security management. The resulting conceptualization provides a basis for future research 
to better understand the formation of organizational IT security investment decisions. From a 
practitioner’s perspective, our study clearly shows that not only top managers but all 
managers throughout the entire organization must be aware of IT security and their important 
roles in establishing effective IT security management. Specifically, our findings emphasize 
that the combination of decision-making power (i.e., scope for action) and IT security 
knowledge is crucial for effective IT security management. Therefore, organizations should 
identify and integrate appropriate positions in their organizational structure to increase their 
Evaluation of Conceptualization2. Qualitative Interviews, Q-sort
Step Method
Development of Conceptualization1. Literature Review
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overall IT security level (Wu and Saunders 2005). Further theoretical and practical 
implication will also be discussed. 
4.2 Step 1: Development of Conceptualization 
4.2.1 Overview of Related Literature Streams 
Since employees are often considered to be the weakest link in an organization’s IT security, 
many researchers have focused their studies on the employee level. Specifically, the 
antecedents of employees’ information security policy compliance and incompliance 
behaviors are extensively analyzed (see e.g., Abdul Talib and Dhillon 2015; Bulgurcu et al. 
2010; Siponen et al. 2010; Siponen and Vance 2010; Vance et al. 2012). Within their 
systematic review of quantitative studies in employees’ information security policy 
compliance, Sommestad et al. (2014) identify more than 60 variables that have been 
investigated by previous research. 40 of these 60 variables were only analyzed in a single 
study whereas the most popular variables in previous research are subjective norm, self-
efficacy, and perceived severity of sanctions (Sommestad et al. 2014). 
Several studies analyze the effect of employees’ IT security awareness on their compliance 
behavior (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; D'Arcy et al. 2009; Vance et al. 2012). Employees’ IT 
security awareness is commonly defined in previous research as the extent to which 
employees are aware of and committed to their organizations’ IT security objectives (e.g., 
Siponen 2000a). For example, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) analyzed the impact of employees’ IT 
security awareness (both IT security policy awareness and general IT security awareness) on 
their attitudes regarding compliance with their organizations’ IT security policies. As such, 
within those studies the IT security awareness of employees is believed to be the key for 
effectively protecting an organizations data and IT systems (Goodhue and Straub 1991; Hu et 
al. 2007; Siponen 2000a; Siponen 2000b; Whitman 2004). Therefore, many researchers 
investigated the effect of different security education training and awareness (SETA) 
programs, such as IT security workshops and trainings (e.g., Puhakainen and Siponen 2010; 
Thomson and von Solms 1998) or learning tutorials (e.g., Chen et al. 2006). It is argued that 
SETA programs increase employees’ IT security awareness (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; 
Haeussinger and Kranz 2013; Spears and Barki 2010) and are thus effective countermeasures 
for reducing employees’ misbehaviors (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; D'Arcy et al. 2009; 
Peltier 2005; Spears and Barki 2010). In this context, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) show in 
their experimental research that employee participation enhances their IT security awareness 
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and consequently, their information security policy compliance behavior. The positive effect 
of employee participation through greater IT security awareness on the IT security of an 
organization is empirically tested and confirmed by Spears and Barki (2010). 
Another research stream in this context deals with the so-called “IT security culture” of 
organizations (e.g., Dojkovski et al. 2010; Knapp et al. 2006; Ruighaver et al. 2007; Van 
Niekerk and Von Solms 2010). These studies have investigated information security from an 
organizational point of view and often highlight the importance of management attention and 
management support as success factors for effective IT security risk management in 
organizations (e.g., Ashenden 2008; Sharma and Yetton 2007). Ma and Ratnasingam (2008) 
analyze the influence of organizational characteristics such as firm size, financial 
commitment, and management support on IT security management. Uffen et al. (2012) focus 
on the influence of personality traits and other cognitive factors on IT security management. 
Kankanhalli et al. (2003) found in their empirical study among managers that organizations 
with stronger top management support engage in more preventive efforts to ensure IT security 
compared to organizations with weaker top management support. 
Overall, findings from related research at the employee level indisputably demonstrate that IT 
security awareness is fundamental for effectively protecting the data and IT systems of an 
organization. However, even though previous research repeatedly highlighted the important 
role of the top management in an effective IT security management (e.g., Hu et al. 2012; 
Kankanhalli et al. 2003), studies investigating top managers’ IT security awareness are still 
rare. 
4.2.2 Literature Review on Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness 
In accordance with the framework for conducting IS literature reviews suggested by Vom 
Brocke et al. (2009), we structured our literature review in five phases (see Figure 7): 
definition of review scope, conceptualization of topic, literature search, literature analysis and 
synthesis, and research agenda. 
 
Figure 7: Framework for Literature Reviewing (based on Vom Brocke et al. 2009) 
First, we defined our review’s scope: we focus on IT security awareness at the top 
management level in the context of organizational IT security management (Phase I). Second, 
Definition of
Review Scope
Conceptualization
of Topic
Literature Search
Literature Analysis 
and Synthesis
Research 
Agenda
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V
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we performed an explorative search using Google Scholar and the Business Source Premier to 
gain a conceptual understanding of the topic, to identify relevant journals, and to identify a 
relevant search term (Phase II). Third, we conducted a literature search using the selected 
search term (see Table 8; Phase III). As proposed by Vom Brocke et al. (2009), the literature 
search in Phase III involves database, keyword, backward, and forward search. We selected 
three databases that provide access to leading IS journals: the AIS Electronic Library 
(AISeL), ScienceDirect, and Business Source Premier. As our initial explorative search 
already showed that research within the managerial IT security awareness domain is rare, we 
decided to include journals, conference papers, and books in the review process (Webster and 
Watson 2002). The keyword search identified 1512 papers in total. Following the literature 
search process proposed by Vom Brocke et al. (2009), we then performed a title screening 
followed by an examination of the abstracts of the remaining papers. The title screening 
resulted in 445 papers and the abstract screening in 56 papers. Next, through a detailed 
reading of the 56 papers, we identified that only 15 of these papers deal with top managers’ IT 
security awareness itself and its role in IT security management. Finally, we conducted a 
forward and backward search in accordance with Webster and Watson (2002), which resulted 
in the identification of one additional relevant paper. The results of the literature search 
(Phase III) are summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8: Overview of the Literature Search Process 
Step 
Keyword   
Search 
Title               
Screening 
Abstract           
Screening 
Full Text          
Screening 
Forward & 
Backward 
Search 
Papers 
Remaining 
1512 445 56 15 16 
Search 
Term 
(title: (managerial OR management OR organization) AND title: (security 
awareness OR ISA)) OR  
(abstract: (managerial OR management OR organization) AND abstract: 
(security awareness OR ISA)) 
 
The results of Phase IV and Phase V of the framework for conducting IS literature reviews 
(Vom Brocke et al. 2009; see Figure 7) are presented in the remaining part of this paper. 
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4.2.3 Conceptualization of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness and Proposition 
Development 
Altogether, our literature research showed that research on IT security awareness at the top 
management level is rare. The extant literature focuses mainly on the impact of top managers’ 
IT security awareness on the effectiveness of IT security management. Only a few studies 
analyze factors that determine top managers’ IT security awareness. Moreover, these studies 
tend to focus on either individual-related or organization-related factors. 
In the following, we first analyze top managers’ IT security awareness by identifying the 
relevant factors that previous research has indicated. Then we focus on the concept of top 
managers’ IT security awareness by investigating its role in organizational IT security 
management. 
4.2.3.1 Factors of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness 
Only three papers in the final set were found to address factors that are relevant to top 
managers’ IT security awareness (Isomäki and Bilozerov 2012; Ng and Feng 2006; Siponen 
2001). Overall, the analysis of the identified literature indicates that top managers’ IT security 
awareness is based on two dimensions: the individual and the organizational dimension. The 
individual dimension is determined by factors that result from top managers’ personal 
environment and personal characteristics (e.g., Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; Isomäki and 
Bilozerov 2012; Siponen 2000a). For example, top managers’ individual knowledge about IT 
security threats and IT security controls or top managers’ personal trust in IT security 
specialists are factors ascribed to the individual dimension of top managers’ IT security 
awareness (see e.g., Isomäki and Bilozerov 2012; Ng and Feng 2006). Contrary, the 
organizational dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness is determined by factors that 
result from the organization-specific environment such as the industry-specific sensitivity of 
an organization’s data and IT systems to IT security threats or the organization-specific IT 
security environment as a result of an organization’s previous investments in its IT security 
(e.g., Ng and Feng 2006; Straub and Welke 1998). 
Siponen (2001) identifies five dimensions of general IT security awareness (organizational, 
general public, socio-political, computer ethical, and institutional education dimensions) 
whereas only the organizational dimension was found to apply to top managers. Within the 
organizational dimension the author argues that the members of different hierarchical levels 
(i.e., top management, IT management, IT security staff, computing/IT professionals, end-
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users of various kinds, and third parties) need different kinds of knowledge about IT security 
to build an appropriate IT security awareness and that only sufficient knowledge about IT 
security risks and controls will enable them to fulfill their responsibilities with regard to the 
organizational IT security management. 
Isomäki and Bilozerov (2012) conducted a literature review focusing in the first step on 
factors of IT security awareness at the top management level. They analyzed the most 
commonly used IT security awareness definitions at the employee level and extracted their 
factors. They found that two main factors (knowledge and behavior) were covered by all 
definitions. Drawing on the work of other authors, they also included attitude and motivation 
as factors of IT security awareness. In the second step, they used the four identified factors 
(i.e., knowledge, behavior, attitude, and motivation) for further investigations of top 
managers’ IT security awareness. They conducted 19 semi-structured interviews with 
managers of small and medium-sized Northwest Russian enterprises and used a grounded 
theory approach to conceptualize the properties of the four individual factors of IT security 
awareness at the top management level. Other studies demonstrate that attitude and behavior 
are predominately associated with managerial and employee actions toward IT security (e.g., 
Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2006; Choi et al. 2008). For example, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
argue that IT security awareness influences attitudes toward IT security and, eventually, 
behavior. In our study, we focus on the factors of top managers’ IT security awareness that 
influence their IT security behavior regarding the organizational IT security management. 
Specifically, we analyze the influence of top managers’ IT security awareness on top 
managers’ decisions about IT security specialists’ scope for action (e.g., IT security budget 
allocation). Therefore, in line with Bulgurcu et al. (2010) and Choi et al. (2008)
2
 we consider 
attitude and behavior to be descendants of managerial IT security awareness and thus not 
factors of the individual dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness. Based on the 
findings of related research (e.g., Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; Siponen 2000a), we agree 
with Isomäki and Bilozerov (2012) that IT security knowledge and motivation are factors 
within the individual dimension of managerial IT security awareness. IT security knowledge 
can be seen as a precondition for understanding IT security risks. Individual motivation, 
which is also emphasized by Siponen (2000a), concerns issues that stimulate top managers to 
prioritize IT security issues (Isomäki and Bilozerov 2012). For example, top managers’ 
                                                        
2
  The studies by Choi et al. (2006) and Choi et al. (2008) are based on the same data, first published in 
Proceedings of the Americas Conference on Information Systems 2006 and two years later as an 
extended version in the journalInformation Management & Computer Security. 
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motivation covers the alignment between IT security and business needs (Ng and Feng 2006). 
Specifically, top managers are usually more motivated to invest in IT security when these IT 
security investments support the achievement of business goals. Furthermore, Ng and Feng 
(2006) identify top managers’ trust in employees as a further factor of top managers’ IT 
security awareness. Accordingly, trust in the IT security specialists is also assumed to 
constitute a factor within the individual dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness. 
For example, if top management trusts the IT security specialists, the top management will be 
more likely to support the specialists’ decisions, thus giving the IT security specialists a larger 
scope for action. Altogether, regarding the individual dimension of top managers’ IT security 
awareness we propose: 
Proposition 1 (P1): The individual dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness is 
determined by top managers’ individual IT security knowledge, their personal 
prioritization of IT security, and their trust in IT security specialists. 
According to Choi et al. (2008), top managers’ perceptions regarding IT security issues in the 
organization-specific environment are also relevant for their IT security awareness. For 
example, even if top managers have sufficient IT security knowledge and are generally 
motivated to protect the organizational IT systems, they might still perceive IT security risks 
as not relevant for their organization because they do not perceive their organization’s data 
and IT systems to be attractive to attackers. Accordingly, top managers’ evaluation of the 
industry-specific sensitivity of their organizations’ data and IT systems is identified to be an 
organization-related factor of managerial IT security awareness. Moreover, several studies 
indicate the evaluation of the present IT security environment of an organization to be a 
further relevant factor of top managers’ IT security awareness. As such, this factor reflects the 
organization-specific conditions of the IT systems. For example, it covers the effort that has 
been already taken to increase the IT security level of the organization (Choi et al. 2008; 
Goodhue and Straub 1991; Straub and Welke 1998). Consequently, we identify two factors 
within the organizational dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness and propose: 
Proposition 2 (P2): The organizational dimension of top managers’ IT security 
awareness is determined by the industry-specific sensitivity of data and IT systems and 
the current IT security environment within the organization. 
The definitions of the factors that are proposed to determine the individual and organizational 
dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness (P1 and P2) are summarized in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Factors of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness 
Dimension Factor Definition References 
Individual 
Dimension (P1) 
Individual IT 
Security 
Knowledge 
A top manager’s general 
knowledge about IT security 
threats and IT security controls. 
Isomäki and 
Bilozerov (2012); 
Siponen (2001) 
Personal 
Prioritization of 
IT Security 
A top manager’s personal 
motivation to increase the IT 
security level of the 
organization. 
Isomäki and 
Bilozerov (2012); Ng 
and Feng (2006) 
Trust in IT 
Security 
Specialists 
The extent to which a top 
manager believes the IT security 
specialists are honest, capable, 
and helpful in effectively 
protecting the organization’s 
data and IT systems. 
Ng and Feng (2006); 
Rustagi et al. (2008) 
Organizational 
Dimension (P2) 
Industry-
Specific 
Sensitivity of 
Data and IT 
Systems  
A top manager’s evaluation of 
the industry-specific sensitivity 
of the organizations data and IT 
systems. 
Choi et al. (2008); 
Goodhue and Straub 
(1991); Ng and Feng 
(2006); Straub and 
Welke (1998) 
IT Security 
Environment 
A top manager’s evaluation of 
the current IT security level in 
the organization. 
Choi et al. (2008); 
Goodhue and Straub 
(1991); Ng and Feng 
(2006); Straub and 
Welke (1998) 
 
4.2.3.2 The Role of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness in the Organizational IT Security 
Management 
Most of the 16 papers in the final set focus on the role of top managers’ IT security awareness 
in organizational IT security management. These studies reveal that IT security awareness of 
top managers is critical to the effectiveness of IT security management (e.g., Boni 2000; 
Goodhue and Straub 1991; Rhee et al. 2012). For example, Wang and Hsu (2010) argue that 
top managers’ IT security awareness not only influences IT security awareness at the 
employee level but also directly influences the organizational integration of IT security 
management. Specifically, IT security specialists’ scope for action and thus, their ability to 
implement all necessary IT security controls strongly depends on the IT security awareness at 
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the top management level, which in turn influences the effectiveness of the organizational IT 
security management (e.g., Dang and Nkhoma 2013; Goodhue and Straub 1991; Wu and 
Saunders 2005). Choi et al. (2008) analyze the influence of top managers’ IT security 
awareness on their actions toward IT security (e.g., development of IT security policies and 
procedures). The study shows that the effectiveness of IT security management within an 
organization strongly depends on the top managers’ IT security awareness. Accordingly, the 
authors reveal that raising IT security awareness at the top management level should be an 
organization’s priority in order to ensure effective IT security management. In this context, 
they are the first to provide evidence that supports the relationship between top managers’ IT 
security awareness and managerial actions toward IT security. Moreover, Kajava et al. (2007) 
study the role that top managers’ IT security awareness has in the process of implementing an 
IT security culture in the organization. The authors argue that top managers often assess IT 
security as a prerequisite for business success but do not have sufficient IT security 
knowledge for ensuring effective IT security management. They state that raising the top 
management’s IT security awareness will positively influence the effectiveness of IT security 
management because IT security-aware top managers will take more effective IT security 
measures. As such, a top-down effect from the management level to the employee level is 
proposed (e.g., Kritzinger and Smith 2008). Numerous studies have investigated the success 
of IT security measures at the employee level and thus, the protection of the entire 
organization (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; D'Arcy et al. 2009; Herath and Rao 2009a; Vance et 
al. 2012). 
Overall, researchers argue that the relation between top managers and IT security specialists is 
particularly important (e.g., Forte 2008; Mouratidis et al. 2008). IT security awareness at the 
top management level determines top management’s strategic decisions and consequently the 
IT security specialists’ scope for action (i.e., the organizational integration of IT security 
management) (Cline and Jensen 2004). In particular, only sufficient IT security awareness at 
the top management level will ensure a focus on IT security within the organization’s 
strategy. Especially in cases of conflicting objectives, attracting top management support for 
the organization’s IT security management is crucial (e.g., Dutta and McCrohan 2002; 
Johnson and Goetz 2007; Knapp et al. 2006; Narain Singh et al. 2014). For example, if the top 
management does not have sufficient IT security awareness, they are more likely to focus on 
business-driven investments than on investments in their organizations’ IT security and thus 
will not allocate sufficient resources and flexibility in IT security-related decision-making to 
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the organizations’ IT security specialists. Accordingly, top managers’ IT security awareness is 
proposed to increase the IT security specialists’ scope for action. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 3 (P3): Top managers’ IT security awareness positively affects the scope 
for action of IT security specialists. 
By definition, the IT security specialists’ scope for action strongly influences the 
effectiveness of the organizational IT security management (e.g., Dang and Nkhoma 2013; 
Goodhue and Straub 1991; Wu and Saunders 2005). In particular, the IT security specialists 
can only ensure an appropriate level of IT security within the organizations when they have 
the necessary budget to build the required resources (Workman et al. 2008). Therefore, we 
further propose: 
Proposition 4 (P4): The scope for action of IT security specialists positively affects the 
IT security level of an organization. 
The developed conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness after Step 1 of this 
study (literature review) can be extracted from Figure 8 (see page 65). 
4.3 Step 2: Evaluation of the Conceptualization of Top Managers’ IT Security 
Awareness 
In this section, we present an evaluation of the developed conceptualization of top managers’ 
IT security awareness. 
4.3.1 Research Approach 
We conducted qualitative expert interviews to evaluate the factors identified in the previous 
sections within the individual and organizational dimensions of top managers’ IT security 
awareness, to identify additional factors of top managers’ IT security awareness, and to 
evaluate its role in the organizational IT security management. 
On the one hand, we interviewed IT security experts at different hierarchical levels of a 
European organization and on the other hand IT security suppliers. Interviewing different 
parties responsible for the IT security management in a large organization allowed us to cover 
different perspectives on top managers’ IT security awareness and its role in organizational IT 
security management from different hierarchical levels. Moreover, interviewing IT security 
suppliers enabled us to benefit from their wide-ranging experiences with the IT security 
management in several organizations. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Information for Interviewed Experts 
 
In total, seven semi-structured interviews with a total duration of 10 hours and 28 minutes 
were fully transcribed and coded by the authors of this paper (three IS researchers). 
Descriptive information about the interviewed experts is given in Table 10. The structure and 
guiding questions of interviews with the different participants (IT security experts in the 
organization and IT security suppliers) are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Structure of Interviews 
 Participants 
 
IT Security Experts in Organization IT Security Suppliers 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 o
f 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
1. Profile of participant and organization 1. Profile of participant and organization 
2. Definitions 2. Definitions 
3. Guiding questions: 
 How are decision-processes in the 
IT security management of your 
organization designed? 
 How would you describe the IT 
security awareness of top managers 
and its role in organizational IT 
security management? 
3. Guiding questions: 
Based on your experiences with 
customer organizations, …  
 How are decision-processes in the 
IT security management designed? 
 How would you describe the IT 
security awareness of top managers 
and its role in organizational IT 
security management? 
4. Further comments and conclusion 4. Further comments and conclusion 
Ex-
pert 
Position 
Company Size  
(No. of Employees) 
Sales p.a. Industry 
#1 CISO 
Large (>249) > 99 m EUR 
Transpor-
tation 
#2 
IT security manager (policies & 
compliance) 
#3 IT security director (cyber defense) 
#4 
IT security manager (department 
level) 
#5 CEO Small (<50) 1-9 m EUR 
IT security 
products 
and 
services 
#6 Product manager Large (>249) 
10-99 m 
EUR 
#7 IT security auditor Large (>249) > 99 m EUR 
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4.3.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
For initial coding of the data, we decided to apply an exploratory coding method since these 
methods permit open-ended investigation (Saldaña 2015). Specifically, within the first coding 
cycle we chose provisional coding (see also Dey 2003; Miles and Huberman 1994). The 
corresponding provisional list of codes is generated from the results of the literature review as 
suggested by Saldaña (2015). Thus, we use our conceptualization of top managers’ IT 
security awareness developed in Step 1 of this study (propositions P1-P4) as the coding 
framework and accordingly focused on the individual and organizational factors determining 
top managers’ IT security awareness as well as on the role of top managers’ IT security 
awareness in IT security management. 
For the second coding cycle, we chose focused coding which is appropriate for almost all 
qualitative studies and particularly for developing major categories from the data and 
developing new theory about a phenomenon (Charmaz 2014; Saldaña 2015). The two coding 
cycles resulted in three coding categories, as shown in Table 12. The codes within each of the 
categories are explained in the following sections. 
Table 12: Coding Categories 
Coding Categories Number of Codes 
Individual dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness (P1) 67 
Organizational dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness (P2) 39 
Role of top managers’ IT security awareness in IT security management 
(P3, P4) 
37 
 
4.3.2.1 Factors of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness 
Our results show that the three factors — the individual IT security knowledge and the 
personal prioritization of IT security of top managers as well as their trust in IT security 
specialists — determine the individual dimension of IT security awareness at the top 
management level, as proposed in P1. All experts confirmed that top managers need a certain 
degree of individual IT security knowledge to be able to understand the necessity of IT 
security in the organizational IT systems. They emphasized that a lack of IT security 
knowledge is one of the main obstacles regarding top managers’ IT security awareness. 
Moreover, expert #1 stated that often, top managers do not even try to understand the issue. 
Therefore, it is even more difficult for IT security specialists to explain the necessity and 
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benefits of IT security risk reduction (e.g., prevention of customer loss or reputational image): 
“People think IT security is a highly complex topic that one simply cannot understand. That is 
why it is often so difficult for us to explain the benefit we want to generate with that 
investment […] and to explain the topic to the management board” (#1). 
Regarding the personal prioritization of IT security within the individual dimension of top 
managers’ IT security awareness, the results show that this individual IT security awareness 
factor strongly depends on conflicting objectives. These conflicting objectives are perceived 
to be mainly due to the tension between IT security, usability, and costs (“It is always a trade-
off between IT security, usability, and costs”, #3). While IT security specialists’ main 
objective is to effectively protect the organization from IT security risks, top managers tend to 
be more business-oriented (i.e., usability- and cost-oriented): “IT security investments are 
always in competition with other IT investments […] which are seen to be more useful and 
valuable from the business perspective” (#1). Conflicting objectives, not only between the top 
management level and IT security specialists but also between department managers and IT 
security specialists, were highlighted by the experts. A primary objective of department 
managers is ensuring smooth, fast processes for attaining business objectives. Consequently, 
they often perceive IT security as a barrier that slows down business processes and requires 
high investments while there is neither an obvious return on the investment nor a visible 
effect: “[The departments] have to reach their business goals. And the most important 
objective is that people can do their work […]. [Most of them] perceive IT security as a 
barrier and just want to attain their business goals” (#5); “And when they invest a million no 
one sees anything […], because the IT security specialists are blocking it. And then they ask: 
For what am I spending money? I never hear anything” (#4); “They normally could invest the 
money in business goals. Why should they spend it on this expensive thing called IT 
security?” (#3); “As a result, […] IT security is actually never requested” (#1). 
The potential for conflicting objectives between top management, IT security specialists, and 
department management was summarized by expert #6: “The top management is focused on 
investments with benefit. […] The IT security specialists always want to have the most secure 
solution, which is usually also the most expensive. […] And since IT security is always 
associated with a reduction in the ease of system use, you will always encounter resistance 
from the department level”. 
In sum, personal prioritization of IT security was found to be a relevant factor of the 
individual dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness, strengthening support for P1. 
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The higher a top manager’s priority of IT security, the higher the individual dimension of 
managerial IT security awareness. Expert #3 stated that the source of the individual 
motivation of top managers toward IT security is crucial: “Is it important to him because it 
protects him personally in terms of his personal liability as a board member? Or is it 
important to him because he believes that he will ensure the survival of the company […] or 
because he knows that he must be compliant […] due to regulatory reasons?” 
Regarding the trust of top managers in IT security specialists, the experts often mentioned 
that top managers frequently do not trust the recommendations of their own IT security 
specialists and therefore demand a second opinion: “The top management would more likely 
listen to an IT security specialist of another organization than to its own” (#4). Expert #5 
explained that he already had the experience that top managers got angry when IT security 
specialists disclosed essential new IT security risks to them and, moreover, that sometimes 
they would not even trust the opinion of a second specialist: “Most of our clients calm down 
when a second opinion is available. But we have also encountered situations where a second 
opinion did not matter”. 
Furthermore, our study identified not only IT security knowledge, personal prioritization of IT 
security, and trust in IT security specialists as factors determining the individual dimension of 
top managers’ IT security awareness, but also top managers’ individual experience with IT 
security incidents (“The awareness is always as great as the pain you have experienced”, #1), 
extending P1. Expert #5 mentioned that organizations predominately react in a passive 
manner in the context of IT security: “If the phone rings and someone says: ‘We want to talk 
about security’. Then you can be sure that something already happened. […] No organization 
handles that really proactively”. Expert #6 also acknowledged this: “In my experience, many 
organizations do not even look at IT security seriously, and so they do not even realize that it 
can be serious. And most of the organizations only react when something has already 
happened”. Additionally, the experts argued that top managers also show a higher level of IT 
security awareness when they observe IT security incidents in other organizations that have 
resulted in financial and reputational damage. Accordingly, when top managers’ IT security 
awareness is higher due to a recent IT security incident, IT security specialists have better 
chances to implement the corresponding IT security safeguards: “What we have learned in the 
past […] is that [we can use] large security incidents [in other organizations] for our own 
goals. Always, when something has just happened we have […] higher [management] 
attention” (#2). 
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Moreover, we found that individual experiences with IT security incidents in both working 
life and private life increase the level of the individual dimension of managerial IT security 
awareness: “If he has just been a victim — he has just been hacked in his private life or the 
organization has just lost large databases and has suffered reputational damage — both can be 
just as beneficial [from the IT security specialists’ perspective]” (#3). 
Regarding the organizational dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness, the results of 
our study also strengthen support for P2. The experts argued that the organizational dimension 
of top managers’ IT security awareness strongly depends on the perceived industry-specific 
sensitivity of data and IT systems, i.e., the evaluation of IT security risks that organizations 
face in terms of their industrial environment. The experts stated that in organizations that 
operate in industries where research and development activities are essential, which raises the 
risk of industrial espionage, top managers tend to show a higher level of managerial IT 
security awareness. As an example, the automotive and the pharma industries were mentioned 
multiple times. Within these industries, very sensitive data is processed and stored by 
organizations’ IT systems, e.g., blueprints of a new car: “For example, in the automotive 
industry. The development of a car costs a few billion Euros. And therefore, they make it 
more secure” (#4). 
Moreover, the perceived IT security environment at present was also evaluated by the experts 
to be a relevant factor in the organizational dimension of top managers’ IT security 
awareness. In this context, while the relevance to the business model was found to increase 
the level of top managers’ IT security awareness, previous investments to ensure the IT 
security of the organizational IT systems show a decreasing effect on the organizational-
dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness: “But you can actually assume that when 
organizations operate with critical personal information, such as credit card information, these 
organizations are investing significantly more [in IT security] because their business model is 
based on this data. For example, if it were to become public that Amazon has lost all customer 
data and that it was not encrypted, they may have to close their store” (#6). Expert #7 stated: 
“And then top managers ask why the IT security specialists still want to have a larger budget. 
They have already invested so much money and effort to achieve a more secure situation”. 
In addition to the perceived industry-specific sensitivity of data and IT systems and the 
perceived IT security environment of the organization, legal requirements (e.g., compliance 
guidelines in the financial sector) were often mentioned as a factor within the organizational 
dimension of top managers’ IT security awareness: “Changes in legal requirements […] will 
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always have the strongest impact on top managers’ IT security decision-making” (#7). This 
indicates that P2 has to be extended by the addition of legal requirements as a factor of the 
organizational dimension of managerial IT security awareness. Nevertheless, even though 
legal requirements were often mentioned by the experts, our findings also show that their 
effect on managerial IT security awareness is doubted to some extent. Expert #1 stated that 
the actual fulfillment of legal requirements in an organization is situation specific (“The status 
of compliance varies a lot”, #1). Expert #5 further explained: “At the moment, we have that 
huge question in the banking sector. They only meet the legal requirements. […] They check 
legal requirements with the help of a lawyer. […] And try to meet the relevant legal 
requirements at the lowest possible costs. They do not care if the measures they take make 
any sense or are effective. And I can say that in many cases, the top management only 
employs a CISO […] because of legal regulations”. 
4.3.2.2 The Role of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness in the Organizational IT Security 
Management 
Our results show that the contrary distribution of IT security knowledge and decision power 
across the different hierarchical levels of an organization is often perceived to inhibit the 
effectiveness of the organizational IT security management. While top management often 
shows a lack of IT security knowledge, the IT security specialists at the department level 
usually have better knowledge concerning IT security yet their scope for action is restricted 
by the top management. The experts emphasized that effective IT security management needs 
both IT security knowledge (“Decision makers need a fundamental understanding of IT 
security issues for ensuring effective IT security management”, #1) and the corresponding 
decision power (“The problem is that the final decisions are usually made at the top 
management level”, #6). For example, expert #5 stated: “When we only talk to the technical 
staff, we do not get far, because the budget is controlled by the top management” (#5). Expert 
#6 observed that even if “the IT security specialists have good ideas […], there is no one in 
the top management who understands these issues […]”. Expert #7 argued that “even in the 
early planning phase for IT security strategies and goals, IT security specialists are for the 
most part not included or not taken seriously in the discussions”. Furthermore, expert #5 
highlighted that an organization’s IT security management is characterized by “a lot of 
politics. There are many political dependencies within the organization, but there is often a 
low level of common sense among managers”. Accordingly, expert #6 stated that to ensure 
effective IT security awareness, an IT security specialist with relevant knowledge about IT 
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security should be positioned in the top management: “Particularly because […] decisions are 
finally made in the top management, an appropriate position must be represented in and heard 
by the top management”. It was argued that positioning IT security specialists in the top 
management is the key for “making the issue and its dimensions understandable at the top 
management level and for achieving acceptance in the organization” (#6). This was also 
confirmed by expert #1: “A position that has decision power and IT security knowledge at the 
same time would be a critical success factor for effective IT security management”. In sum, 
our results show that in order to ensure IT security in an organization, IT security specialists 
need a certain scope for action which is ultimately determined by top managers’ IT security 
awareness, thus supporting P3. A higher level of top managers’ IT security awareness will 
positively influence the scope for action of IT security specialists within an organization. 
Specifically, the experts mentioned three main problems regarding IT security specialists’ 
scope for action that inhibit effective IT security management: budget restrictions, restricted 
human resources, and lack of flexibility. Expert #2 highlighted the challenge of budget 
restrictions: “I think that in 80 to 90 percent of the cases, the budget is the reason for a 
decision against an IT security investment”. Expert #1 mentioned that although an IT security 
safeguard had already been proven to be necessary and effective, the top management did not 
perceive the necessity of its implementation and accordingly, did not allocate the budget for 
the investment: “I did not get the money for the implementation until now because the 
mechanisms in the organization prevented that”. Not only budget restrictions but also 
restrictions regarding human resources are often perceived to restrict IT security specialists’ 
scope for action and thus, to further inhibit IT security specialists to increase the 
organization’s IT security level: “We assume that you also need a basis of human resources. 
But currently we do not have enough IT security specialists in our organization. Or at least 
they are not employed full-time for performing IT security management tasks, because that 
would mean a permanent […] resource commitment in our organization” (#1). Many decision 
makers in the participating organizations mentioned that another major inhibitor for ensuring 
a high level of IT security is restricted flexibility in the decision-making of IT security 
specialists. The experts stated that IT security investments have to compete with other IT 
investments in their organization. As a result, decisions about IT security investments have to 
“go through a process that you cannot really accelerate. This decreases the flexibility of the IT 
security specialists […] and sometimes it takes two, three, or more years until they achieve 
something” (#3). Expert #7 concluded that IT security specialists need a certain degree of 
flexibility, or at least “easy and direct communication between IT security specialists and 
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decision makers”. The flexibility of IT security specialists becomes even more important 
when the dynamic nature of IT security due to the fast technological developments (i.e., new 
IT security threats arise) is considered. Especially in situations that require timely decisions to 
ensure protection of the organization against IT security risks, IT security specialists need to 
have a certain degree of flexibility: “Identifying a new IT security risk means that there is a 
new threat to our organization and therefore, we have to be prepared as quickly as possible” 
(#3).  
Our findings strengthen the support for P4 by confirming that IT security specialists’ scope 
for action positively influences the effectiveness of the organizational IT security 
management and thus, the IT security level of an organization. In addition, our results show 
that this scope for action is primarily restricted by resources, including financial resources 
(i.e., IT security budgets), human resources (i.e., the number of full-time employed IT 
security specialists), and the degree of flexibility in decision-making (i.e., dependence on 
decisions made by top managers). 
Moreover, our results point out that not only managerial IT security awareness at the top 
management level determines IT security specialists’ scope for action but also the managerial 
IT security awareness of department managers: “And there are five departments that have to 
share the costs for the IT security safeguard implementation. Maybe two or three of them will 
assess the IT security investment as positive, but […] there will be other departments whose 
managers say ‘No, that is too expensive for us’” (#2); and if “the CISO is integrated in the IT 
department, he cannot do anything about it, because he cannot tell these departments to make 
certain investments” (#7). In line with P4, not only is “the IT security awareness of top 
managers […] a key success factor for effective IT security management” (#1), but also the IT 
security awareness of the department managers. Accordingly, IT security specialists’ scope 
for action was confirmed to depend on managerial IT security awareness at both the top 
management level and the department level. 
Altogether, the evaluation of the proposed conceptualization revealed that top managers’ IT 
security awareness has both an individual and an organizational dimension (P1 and P2). The 
results also confirm that a high level of managerial IT security awareness positively 
influences IT security specialists’ scope for action (P3) and that an appropriate scope for 
action of IT security specialists (financial resources, human resources, and flexibility in 
decision-making) in turn, positively influences the IT security level of an organization (P4). 
The resulting conceptualization is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Conceptualization of Top Managers’ IT Security Awareness 
To further confirm the validity of the initial clustering of the identified factors within the 
individual and organizational dimension, we additionally applied a Q-sort method (Thomas 
and Watson 2002) as a final step in our evaluation of the developed conceptualization of top 
managers’ IT security awareness. Q-sorting is “a modified rank-ordering procedure in which 
stimuli are placed in an order that is significant from the standpoint of a person operating 
under specified conditions” (Brown 1986). In total, eight IS researchers in IT security and 
privacy participated in the Q-sort. First they were presented with short definitions of the 
identified factors. Then, they were asked to assign the factors identified within the literature 
review and expert interviews to the two dimensions of top managers’ IT security awareness. 
As the method allows marking factors that do not fit to any dimension, it can also eliminate 
factors that are not a part of top managers’ IT security awareness. However, none of the 
factors were perceived by the IT security experts to not fit the construct. Afterwards, we 
calculated interrater reliability metrics to assess the validity of the categorization (Moore and 
Benbasat 1991). In this regard, an average Fleiss Kappa value of 0.63 and an average 
dimension hit ratio of 0.89 point to a high degree of validity (Landis and Koch 1977). In sum, 
the results of the Q-sorting confirm that the individual dimension of top managers’ IT security 
awareness is determined by the following four factors: top managers’ IT security knowledge, 
Managerial IT Security Awareness
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Scope for Action 
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decision-making)
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personal prioritization of IT security, trust in IT security specialists, and previous IT security 
experience (extended P1). Three factors were found to belong to the organizational dimension 
of top managers’ IT security awareness: industry-specific sensitivity of data and IT systems, 
the IT security environment, and legal requirements (extended P2). 
4.4 Discussion 
Our literature review revealed that only a few studies analyze the conceptualization of IT 
security awareness at the top management level in organizations. In the first step, we 
developed a conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness. Therefore, we 
identified the relevant factors and analyzed how they determine the individual and 
organizational dimensions of top managers’ IT security awareness. Specifically, we found in 
the extant literature that top managers’ individual IT security knowledge, their personal 
prioritization of IT security, and trust in IT security specialists determine the individual 
dimension, whereas the perceived industry-specific sensitivity of an organization’s data and 
IT systems and the evaluation of the current IT security environment determine the 
organizational dimension. In the second step, we evaluated the proposed conceptualization 
with qualitative expert interviews and Q-sorting. This led to the confirmation of previously 
identified factors and moreover, revealed two additional factors that have been overlooked by 
previous studies identified in our literature review but are relevant to top managers’ IT 
security awareness: previous IT security experience and legal requirements. While the IT 
security experience (individual dimension) has an apparent positive effect on managerial IT 
security awareness, industry-specific legal requirements (organizational dimension) were 
assessed to only have a marginal effect in certain situations. In particular, it has been 
emphasized by the IT security experts that top managers often try to fulfill mandatory legal 
requirements at the lowest possible cost and consequently do not effectively address IT 
security risks. 
Additionally, we analyzed the role of top managers’ IT security awareness for the 
effectiveness of the organizational IT security management. Even though the IT security 
specialists are generally more focused on ensuring a high level of IT security in the 
organization, their scope for action is oftentimes too restricted by top management. 
Specifically, we found that the scope for action of IT security specialists is restricted by 
financial resources (i.e., IT security budgets), human resources (i.e., the number of full-time 
employed IT security specialists), and the degree of flexibility in decision-making (i.e., 
dependence on decisions made by top managers). For example, IT security specialists might 
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be aware of a specific IT security risk and thus recommend the implementation of a certain IT 
security measure to the top management level. If top managers do not take this IT security 
risk seriously, they will not allocate the necessary budget or additional human resources. 
Additionally, dependent on the organizational size, not only IT security awareness of top 
managers can be crucial to the effectiveness of IT security management, but also the IT 
security awareness of managers at the department level. If department managers are involved 
in organizational decision-making regarding IT security management (e.g., participation in IT 
security budget allocation), they also need to have an appropriate level of managerial IT 
security awareness. For example, if an IT security investment incurs running costs or 
additional efforts for departments individually, these departments will only support the IT 
security investment with the relevant managerial IT security awareness at hand. 
This paper provides three theoretical contributions. First, our study makes important 
theoretical contributions by developing and evaluating an exhaustive conceptualization of 
managerial IT security awareness at the top management level including both individual- as 
well as organization-related factors. Second, this work shows that not only top managers’ IT 
security awareness but also department managers’ IT security awareness is relevant for an 
effective IT security management. Thus, we highlight the importance to consider all 
hierarchical levels of an organization when studying IT security management. Third, our 
study contributes to the emerging body of IT security awareness literature by highlighting and 
confirming the important role of managerial IT security awareness for an effective IT security 
management in organizations. 
In addition, this paper provides important contributions for practitioners. It shows that the 
effectiveness of organizational IT security management strongly depends on the managerial 
IT security awareness of decision makers at both the top management and the department 
levels. The IT security level of the entire organization can only be increased when managers 
throughout the entire organization are aware of IT security and their important roles in 
establishing effective IT security. Consequently, organizations should not only focus on IT 
security awareness at the employee level but also on the IT security awareness of all 
managers in the organization. Our findings emphasize that the combination of decision-
making power (i.e., scope for action) and IT security knowledge is crucial for effective IT 
security management. Specifically, specialists responsible for the IT security in the 
organization need — apart from the required IT security knowledge — sufficient financial 
resources, human resources, and the necessary degree of flexibility in decision-making for 
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effectively protecting an organization’s IT systems. Thus, organizations should identify and 
integrate appropriate positions in their organizational structure to increase their overall IT 
security level. For example, in order to increase managers’ trust in IT security specialists, 
organizations need to adjust the organizational integration of the IT security management 
assuring a direct communication between involved parties. Additionally, the IT security 
specialists should provide regular management reports about current IT security threats for 
their organizations on an abstract and non-technical level. In doing so, top managers can 
easily gain knowledge about IT security issues and realize the necessity of certain IT security 
investments. In this context, round-table discussions between managers and IT security 
specialists could be used to ensure a balanced discussion of the organizations’ IT security 
needs in view of the business objectives. 
4.5 Limitations and Future Research 
The aim of this study was to improve our understanding of top managers’ IT security 
awareness by developing and evaluating an exhaustive conceptualization of managerial IT 
security awareness including both individual- as well as organization-related factors. With a 
better understanding of these factors, this work provides a basis for future research to better 
understand the formation of organizational IT security investment decisions. In particular, 
results from previous studies indicate that although managers might show concern regarding 
the IT security of their organizational IT systems, their stated attitudes may not be in 
accordance with their actual IT security behavior (i.e., low IT security investments). Taking 
the results from this study into account, the conceptualization of top managers’ IT security 
awareness may enable future research to explain this paradoxical attitude–behavior gap. 
Additionally, understanding the factors determining managers’ IT security awareness enables 
researchers to develop and empirically test dedicated measures to improve managers’ IT 
security awareness (e.g., awareness trainings particularly designed for managers, or security 
incident event management tools or systems of IT security indicators aligned to the needed 
managerial IT security awareness), and thus increase the effectiveness of the organizational 
IT security management. 
Nevertheless, four limitations of this paper merit consideration. First, the developed 
conceptualization in this paper is only a starting point in research about top managers’ IT 
security awareness. Without a doubt, further studies that evaluate the proposed 
conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness are needed. Future research can 
enrich the results of this paper by testing the proposed conceptualization of top managers’ IT 
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security awareness and the influence of its dimensions in a large-scale empirical study. 
Moreover, while our results highlight the importance of considering all hierarchical levels of 
an organization when studying IT security management, only four managers in one 
organization and three IT security suppliers were interviewed during Step 2 of our study. 
These experts might have their own and thus biased security-related views, values, and goals. 
Therefore, future research should conduct additional interviews with all managers that 
participate in the organizational IT security management — including CEOs, CISOs, CIOs, 
and department managers — within different organizations of various industries. These 
studies should also analyze to what degree the identified factors of managers’ IT security 
awareness are different and similar among different industries. Beyond that, additional 
research is needed regarding the influence of managerial IT security awareness at different 
management levels (i.e., top management and department management) on IT security 
specialists’ scope for action as well as the effectiveness of the IT security management. By 
using the results of this study as a starting point and further validating the results, future 
research can better understand and address potential areas of conflict between different 
organizational levels in the context of IT security investment decisions. Second, the proposed 
conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness is rather generic. In particular, the 
organizational structure of small organizations may differ from the organizational structure 
presented in this paper (e.g., the CEO may also be directly involved in IT security 
management). Small organizations may have less IT security knowledge (Kotulic and Clark 
2004) because larger organizations can employ more IT security specialists (Hoffer and 
Straub 1994) and allocate more resources for IT security. Hence, future research can add to 
the findings of our study by investigating the effects of firm size and different organizational 
structures on managerial IT security awareness. Third, the study was conducted in a European 
country. The experts mentioned that they perceive organizations in the U.S. to be more aware 
of IT security. Accordingly, future studies should also consider international differences. 
Fourth, this study assumes that IT security specialists possess an adequate knowledge about 
IT security risks and measures to make proper decisions for ensuring an appropriate level of 
IT security. Future research can enrich the findings of this study by investigating the decision-
processes and the organizational integration of IT security management in order to assess the 
actual quality of decisions concerning the organizational IT security. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Overall, this paper advances our understanding about the role of top managers’ IT security 
awareness in organizational IT security management and provides several theoretical and 
practical implications. By developing and evaluating an exhaustive conceptualization of 
managerial IT security awareness and by identifying two additional factors that have been 
disregarded by previous research, this work provides a basis for the emerging body of IT 
security awareness literature. Moreover, since the study revealed that not only the IT security 
awareness of top managers but also managers at the department level is crucial for effective 
IT security management, we highlight the need for considering all hierarchical levels of an 
organization when studying IT security management. Practitioners can learn that an effective 
IT security management is ensured by the combination of decision-making power (i.e., scope 
for action) and IT security knowledge. Without identifying and integrating appropriate 
positions in their organizational structure, organizations will be not able to maintain or 
(eventually) increase their overall IT security level. An organization that overlooks or ignores 
the impact of top managers’ IT security awareness on the outcome of IT security management 
might pay a significant price when an IT security incident occurs. Such an IT security incident 
could have been prevented by sufficient awareness of the managers, resulting in an 
appropriate IT security management. 
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Abstract 
Although cost-benefit analyses are an important aspect of information technology (IT) 
security management, previous research focuses largely on the customer perspective and 
neglects the supplier side. However, since ensuring a high level of IT security in modern IT 
products is typically associated with a large investment, customers’ willingness to pay is 
essential for decision making in the context of IT product development. We draw on Kano’s 
Theory of Attractive Quality to analyze how customers generally evaluate implemented IT 
security safeguards. Based on expert interviews and a large-scale empirical study involving 
customer company decision makers, this paper demonstrates that different customer 
evaluations of IT security safeguards are associated with different levels of willingness to 
pay. Therefore, our results will enable IT suppliers not only to understand their customers’ IT 
security needs but also to derive optimal IT security strategies, which may provide both 
economic and competitive advantages. Further theoretical and practical implications are also 
discussed. 
 
Keywords: Customer Satisfaction, Companies, Security, Investment, Economics, Information 
Systems, Software Development, IT Security, Willingness to Pay, Kano.  
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5.1 Introduction 
In the last few decades, the information technology (IT) needs of companies have grown 
tremendously. Recent technological advances and the Industry 4.0 paradigm are further 
leveraging this development. Due to the high complexity of modern IT systems, such as 
complex enterprise software, most of these are purchased from specialized supplier 
companies. However, the ubiquity of IT systems and the increasing interconnectedness of the 
resources entail constantly rising IT security risks. Recent studies reveal that customers are 
generally highly concerned about the security of their systems and data and therefore expect a 
high level of IT security, making it an important attribute of IT products and a possible 
competitive edge for suppliers (Lacity et al. 2009). Nevertheless, keeping IT security breaches 
down also requires suppliers to make larger investments for the development and 
implementation of effective IT security safeguards. Given the considerable increase in IT 
security effort, more and more suppliers face the question of whether their customers are 
actually willing — at least partially — to bear these costs, e.g., by paying a higher price for 
the product (Willcocks et al. 1996). As such, the trade-offs between risk and costs are relevant 
not only to customer organizations but are also essential for IT suppliers when making 
decisions about which safeguards to implement in their IT products. Although several studies 
address IT security at the organizational level (e.g., Goodhue and Straub 1991; Straub and 
Welke 1998), these studies focus only on perceptions of the absence of IT security (i.e., IT 
security risks) and largely neglect assessments of the presence of IT security (i.e., safeguards). 
Thus, little is understood about how customer companies evaluate the implementation of 
safeguards. Even more importantly, due to this knowledge gap, much uncertainty still exists 
about customers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for IT security safeguards, which is eventually 
determined by their evaluations of the measures taken. This study seeks to provide data that 
will help address these research gaps. 
We conducted expert interviews with customer company decision makers and draw data from 
a large-scale empirical study. By transferring Kano’s Theory to the IT security context, we 
were able to shed light on the different evaluations of IT security safeguards made by 
customer companies. Safeguards typically have functional (e.g., prevention of unauthorized 
data access) as well as dysfunctional (e.g., reduced ease of system use due to requiring 
multiple passwords) characteristics. However, the weighing of the functional and 
dysfunctional characteristics of a safeguard may differ for different targeted customer groups. 
For example, some customers may utilize a suppliers’ IT product to process sensitive data 
(e.g., personal and financial data) and thus assess the function of a particular safeguard as 
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indispensable. Other customers may not require the same level of IT security due to different 
IT security risk protection requirements and may therefore assess the safeguard as rather 
negative because of its dysfunctional characteristics. In addition to examining customers’ 
evaluations of a safeguard’s functional and dysfunctional characteristics, we show that these 
evaluations largely determine their WTP. 
By enriching our understanding of how customer companies evaluate IT security safeguards, 
this study makes significant contributions to IS research. The study also offers theoretical 
explanations of and empirical support for the relationship between IT security safeguard 
evaluation and customers’ WTP. Whereas previous IT security management research only 
focuses on the cost-benefit analyses made by customer organizations, this study adopts the 
perspective of suppliers and investigates the economic efficiency of providing security in IT 
products. Moreover, our results enable IT supplier firms to understand their targeted 
customers’ IT security risk protection requirements so that they can develop optimal IT 
security strategies that may provide them with both economic and competitive advantages. 
Further theoretical and practical implications will also be discussed. 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Kano’s Theory of Attractive Quality 
In Kano’s Theory of Attractive Quality (Kano et al. 1984), the presence of a certain product 
attribute does not necessarily imply a higher level of customer satisfaction. The theory 
postulates that the relationship between a product attribute and customer satisfaction generally 
depends on the customer’s individual requirements (Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998). 
Accordingly, the theory considers both customer assessments of an attribute’s functional 
characteristics (i.e., their response when a certain attribute is present in the product) and their 
assessments of the attribute’s dysfunctional characteristics (i.e., their response when the 
attribute is absent). Based on these assessments, product attributes can be classified into five 
categories that meet different kinds of customer requirements and therefore influence 
customer satisfaction differently: basic, performance, advanced, indifferent, and reverse 
attributes (Kano et al. 1984; Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998). 
Basic attributes are those that lead to dissatisfaction when they are absent but do not generate 
satisfaction when they are present. Basic attributes represent the minimal requirements for a 
customer. If these requirements are not fulfilled, the customer will not even consider the 
product. Therefore, basic attributes can be interpreted as a market entry “threshold” (Matzler 
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et al. 2004a). For example, airbags might be an attribute meeting the basic requirements for a 
car. The presence of a performance attribute leads to a proportional degree of satisfaction, and 
its absence leads to a proportional degree of dissatisfaction. For example, high gas mileage 
(low petrol consumption) might be a performance attribute for a car, and the higher the 
mileage, the greater the satisfaction (Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; Tan and Shen 2000). 
Advanced attributes have the greatest influence on customer satisfaction but their absence 
does not lead to dissatisfaction, because customers do not expect these attributes to be present. 
Their presence delights customers and thus, according to Kano’s Theory, advanced attributes 
have the greatest potential for differentiating a company’s product from competitor products. 
For a car, a power rear view mirror might be an advanced product attribute (Tan and Shen 
2000). In contrast, reverse attributes lead to dissatisfaction because the customer does not 
want them and expects them to be absent. As an example, the presence of rust spots on a car 
would produce dissatisfaction because the customer perceives this attribute to be 
dysfunctional. In the case of indifferent attributes, the customer does not care about the 
attribute’s presence or absence. Thus, an indifferent attribute produces neither satisfaction nor 
dissatisfaction. For example, a sun roof might be an indifferent attribute for some customer 
groups. 
Kano’s Theory has been applied in several research fields, including product development 
projects (e.g., Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; Tan and Shen 2000), management support 
systems (e.g., Mayer 2012), new (mobile) service creation (e.g., Bhattacharyya and Rahman 
2004; Mette et al. 2013), website design (e.g., Gemmo et al. 2003; Zhao and Roy Dholakia 
2009), internet community bonding (e.g., Szmigin and Reppel 2004), and e-services (e.g., 
Nilsson-Witell and Fundin 2005). Based on customer questionnaires, the theory helps supplier 
companies derive product development strategies, e.g., prioritizing development efforts and 
managing product development resources (Seder and Alhazza 2014). Since Kano’s Theory 
provides insights into which different product attributes influence customer satisfaction and 
how, the model is also appropriate for investigating the influence of different product 
attributes on customers’ WTP (e.g., Sakao 2009). The financial impact of customer 
satisfaction on supplier companies is well recognized (e.g., Ittner and Larcker 1998; Mittal et 
al. 2005). For instance, several studies in marketing research have already examined the 
relationship between customer satisfaction and customer WTP (e.g., Anderson 1996; 
Homburg et al. 2005). 
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In accordance with the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, we define IT 
security as “a system characteristic and a set of mechanisms [...]” (Stoneburner et al. 2002). 
Consequently, the IT security safeguards (i.e., the set of IT security mechanisms) that are 
implemented in an IT system can be seen as different IT security attributes of the IT product. 
Recent research already recognizes that IT security safeguards are not only perceived as 
functional (e.g., reducing risks) but also as dysfunctional (e.g., reducing the usability of the IT 
system). For instance, there is a separate research stream that emphasizes the negative 
consequences of poor usability resulting from security mechanisms (e.g., Cranor and 
Garfinkel 2005; Smetters and Grinter 2002). Thus, from a supplier perspective, it is important 
to understand customers’ evaluation of both the functional and the dysfunctional 
characteristics of IT security safeguards in order to uncover customers’ IT security risk 
protection requirements and to derive strategies that ensure effective and economical IT 
security safeguard development. 
5.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
In recent years, customer organizations have increasingly realized the important role of IT 
security in their systems. The demand as well as the market for IT security mechanisms is 
constantly growing (pwc 2015). Accordingly, several studies in IS research analyze IT 
security safeguards from an economic point of view (with optimization models of IT security 
investments) (e.g., Cavusoglu et al. 2008; Sonnenreich et al. 2006). IT security is an important 
issue for customer organizations, and based on their evaluation of an IT security safeguard, 
they are generally willing to make considerable investments for its implementation. 
Moreover, because the evaluation of IT security safeguards is determined by different 
customer requirements — the specific requirements individual customer organizations have 
for protection of an IT product against certain IT security risks — IT security risk protection 
requirements are strongly determined by their decision makers’ perceptions of IT security 
risks. Thus, the implementation of IT security safeguards may have different impacts on 
satisfaction (Oliver 1980) and be associated with different levels of customer WTP (Sakao 
2009). Hence, we hypothesize: 
H1: Different evaluations of IT security safeguards are associated with different levels 
of customer WTP. 
Based on the theoretical underpinnings of the Kano Theory, the five attribute categories in the 
context of IT security safeguards can be defined as follows: 
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Basic IT security safeguards are safeguards whose presence is a prerequisite for customer 
satisfaction. Their absence leads to dissatisfaction because the addressed IT security risks are 
perceived as relevant to the customer organization, and thus these safeguards represent the 
customer’s minimal (basic) IT security risk protection requirements (Kano et al. 1984). 
However, a customer will not show an additional WTP for the implementation of these IT 
security safeguards, because their implementation is a precondition for considering adoption 
of an IT product (Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; Sauerwein et al. 1996). Performance IT 
security safeguards lead to dissatisfaction if absent, but their implementation has a 
proportional effect on customer satisfaction. The addressed IT security risks are perceived as 
relevant, and thus IT security safeguards in this category meet the customer company’s 
performance IT security risk protection requirements (i.e., a certain degree of implementation 
is needed to prevent dissatisfaction) (Kano et al. 1984; Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; 
Sauerwein et al. 1996). Hence, customers will be more likely to show an additional WTP for 
the implementation of these safeguards. The implementation of advanced IT security 
safeguards has a disproportionate influence on satisfaction, but their absence does not lead to 
dissatisfaction (Kano et al. 1984). IT security safeguards in the advanced category address IT 
security risks of which customers are not aware. Nevertheless, these safeguards are evaluated 
as functional by customers. Thus, customers may show an additional WTP if the supplier 
implements these safeguards. Customers do not care about the presence or absence of 
indifferent IT security safeguards. Neither their implementation nor their absence influences 
satisfaction (Clegg et al. 2010; Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; Nilsson-Witell and Fundin 
2005; Sauerwein et al. 1996). The IT security risks addressed by this category of safeguards 
are not perceived as relevant by the customer. Additionally, dysfunctional characteristics of 
these IT security safeguards may not be perceived as critical. Since these IT security 
safeguards do not meet any IT security risk protection requirements, the customer will not be 
interested in making additional investments for them, i.e., will not show any additional WTP 
(Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; Sauerwein et al. 1996). Reverse IT security safeguards are 
those that customers do not want to have implemented in their IT system, because they 
perceive these safeguards to be more dysfunctional than functional. The addressed IT security 
risks are not perceived as relevant, while the implementation is associated with dysfunctional 
characteristics, perhaps due to perceived restrictions or conflicting objectives. Consequently, 
the implementation of these safeguards will result in customer dissatisfaction (Nilsson-Witell 
and Fundin 2005). Accordingly, these safeguards will negatively influence customer WTP for 
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the IT product, especially if the market offers suitable alternatives. Table 13 provides an 
overview of the characteristics of the five IT security safeguard categories. 
Table 13: Characteristics of the IT Security Safeguard Categories 
Charac-
teristics 
IT Security Safeguard Categories 
Basic Performance Advanced Indifferent Reverse 
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implement-
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mentation 
leads to dis-
satisfaction but 
implement-
tation does not 
generate 
satisfaction. 
Implemen-
tation leads to 
proportional 
satisfaction and 
non-implemen-
tation leads to 
proportional 
dissatisfaction. 
Implemen-
tation 
disproportion-
nately influen-
ces satisfaction 
but non-imple-
mentation does 
not generate 
dissatisfaction. 
(Non-) 
Implemen-
tation produces 
neither satis-
faction nor dis-
satisfaction. 
Implemen-
tation leads to 
dissatisfaction. 
 
Based on the influence of the different IT security safeguard categories on customer 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, as described above, only the implementation of IT security 
safeguards evaluated as advanced or performance can generate customer satisfaction. Since 
advanced IT security safeguards potentially have the strongest influence on satisfaction, we 
hypothesize: 
H2: IT security safeguards evaluated as advanced are associated with a higher level of 
customer WTP than IT security safeguards that are evaluated as performance. 
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The implementation of basic and indifferent IT security safeguards will not be associated with 
additional customer WTP because their implementation cannot generate customer 
satisfaction. As pointed out above, basic IT security safeguards can be seen as prerequisites 
for customers to consider the purchase of the supplier’s IT product. In the case of indifferent 
IT security safeguards, the customer does not care about their implementation. Compared to 
basic and indifferent IT security safeguards, customers will show an additional WTP for the 
implementation of performance IT security safeguards because these positively influence 
customer satisfaction. In contrast, the implementation of reverse IT security safeguards in an 
IT product will lead to customer dissatisfaction and thus will be associated with less WTP. 
Based on these theoretical underpinnings, we hypothesize: 
H3: IT security safeguards evaluated as performance are associated with a higher level 
of customer WTP than IT security safeguards that are evaluated as basic, indifferent, or 
reverse. 
H4: IT security safeguards evaluated as basic, indifferent, and reverse are not 
associated with a higher level of customer WTP. 
5.3 Research Methodology and Data Analysis 
First, we conducted a qualitative pre-study in order to identify relevant and appropriate IT 
security safeguards before developing the questionnaire for the quantitative study. The 
research approach is shown in Figure 9 and is presented in detail in the following sections. 
5.3.1 IT Security Safeguard Identification 
For the pre-study, discussions were conducted between IT security security specialists and 
representatives of a leading enterprise software supplier. These began with a discussion of the 
definitions of the five IT security safeguard categories. Since including too many IT security 
safeguards in the quantitative study would negatively influence the response rate, four criteria 
were deemed relevant for the IT security safeguard selection process. First, the IT security 
safeguards (potentially) had to be relevant to a wide variety of customer organizations. 
Second, at least one IT security safeguard that is perceived as basic by most customers had to 
be represented. Third, IT security safeguards that are often brought up by customer 
organizations in negotiations with suppliers should be included to gather data covering 
different customer evaluations. Fourth, it was necessary that the principles underlying the 
selected safeguards should be understood by most of the surveyed customers. As a result, six 
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IT security safeguards were identified. Next, we prevalidated our measurement model and 
discussed the developed survey with two IT practitioners and three IS researchers. Based on 
the results of this phase, we conducted four qualitative interviews to obtain a deeper 
understanding of IT security safeguard evaluation as well as to verify our measurement 
model. We interviewed a CIO of a large organization in the mechanical engineering sector 
(#1), a CEO from a small organization in the real estate industry (#2), the CTO of a medium-
sized e-commerce organization (#3), and an IT security specialist for a large transportation 
organization (#4). Thus, we obtained insights from different hierarchical positions and 
organizations. The average interview lasted 36 minutes, and the interviews were fully 
transcribed and coded. 
As a result of this pre-study, the quantitative study is focused on the following six IT security 
safeguards: automatic installation of IT security updates, IT security certification of the 
supplier, multifactor authentication, full data encryption, role-based access control, and daily 
backups. 
 
Figure 9: Research Approach (Research Paper C) 
5.3.2 Questionnaire Development and Quantitative Study 
Our quantitative study was conducted between October 30 and November 19, 2014. We 
contacted 61 decision makers from different organizations via an online social business 
network and a further 390 directly via e-mail. To encourage participation, a management 
report was offered to the participants. After two weeks of data collection, we reminded the 
contacts about the study via e-mail or messages in the business network. With 84 completed 
surveys, the response rate was 18.6%. Of the participants, 66.7% were CIOs, 11.9% IT 
security managers, 3.6% CEOs, 3.6% business managers, and 14.3% other managers. More 
than half (65.5%) of the companies were corporations (>249 employees), 28.6% were 
medium-sized companies (50–249 employees), and 6.0% were small companies (<50 
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employees). Among the participants, 81% had more than 11 years’ professional experience, 
14.3% 6–10 years, and 4.8% 1–5 years. Two main reasons were given for not participating: 
their organizations did not participate in such studies in general or there were time pressures. 
Content validity was established by adopting validated measurement items from previous 
studies with minor changes in wording. For each of the six IT security safeguards, two 
questions (functional and dysfunctional) were formulated: “How do you evaluate the 
implementation [of the IT security safeguard, as specified above]?” and “How do you 
evaluate the non-implementation [of the IT security safeguard, as specified above]?” In 
accordance with previous research, five answers were possible: desirable, indispensable, 
neutral, acceptable, and negative. This construction and interpretation of the questionnaire has 
been widely used (e.g., Berger et al. 1993; Kano et al. 1984; Tan and Shen 2000). We also 
asked the participants to evaluate the degree of their WTP for each of the IT security 
safeguards: “For implementing [the IT security safeguard] our organization is willing to 
make…”, 1=no investments to 7=very high investments) (Liang and Xue 2010). 
Since the 84 records could have differently distributed data about the six IT security 
safeguards, we standardized the stated WTP data to achieve comparability. After transforming 
the safeguard-specific variables into standardized scores, we had (comparable) data for each 
of the six IT security safeguards in every one of the 84 records (504 in total). 
5.3.3 Statistical Analysis and Results 
5.3.3.1 Different Evaluations of IT Security Safeguards 
Each IT security safeguard can be classified into one of the five categories of Kano’s Theory 
of Attractive Quality by combining its functional and dysfunctional assessments (see Table 
14) (Berger et al. 1993; Matzler et al. 2004b). Table 15 shows the outcomes of the 
categorization for the six IT security safeguards. The most common customer evaluations are 
highlighted in grey. The results indicate that daily backups are unambiguously assigned to the 
basic category (83.3% agreement). This finding is also validated by the results of the 
customer interviews conducted in the pre-study. All participants assessed daily backups as a 
common, standard practice. Customers evaluated the functional and dysfunctional 
characteristics differently for the other five IT security safeguards. Automatic updates and 
role-based access control were assessed to be basic by most of the participants, but more than 
20% assessed these as performance IT security safeguards. The customer interviews indicated 
that automatic updates are sometimes perceived as dysfunctional because “this may fix 
5 Research Paper C: Decision Makers’ Willingness To Pay for IT Security 
 
81 
vulnerability but can also be associated with new risks” (#3) and “because of our complex IT 
systems, including legacy systems, we are often confronted with the conflict of securing the 
system and minimizing the operational impairment” (#4). In contrast, role-based access 
control was evaluated as basic — “lived praxis” (#1), “standard” (#2), “should be granted 
even in case of medium protection needs” (#4) — by all interviewees, because “access should 
be minimized to the necessary information” (#3). 
Table 14: IT Security Safeguard Evaluation Table 
IT Security 
Safeguards 
Dysfunctional 
Desirable 
Indis-
pensable 
Neutral Acceptable Negative 
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l 
Desirable Q A A A P 
Indispensable R I I I B 
Neutral R I I I B 
Acceptable R I I I B 
Negative R R R R Q 
B: Basic, P: Performance, A: Advanced, I: Indifferent; R: Reverse, Q: Questionable 
Table 15: Results of the IT Security Safeguard Categorization 
IT Security 
Safeguards 
B P A I R Q Total IT Security 
Safeguard 
Category n 160 66 94 161 21 2 504 
Updates 34 17 11 14 8 0 84 
Basic 
[Performance] 
Certification 2 7 31 44 0 0 84 
Indifferent 
[Advanced] 
Multifactor 
Authentication 
8 10 21 40 4 1 84 
Indifferent 
[Advanced] 
Data 
Encryption 
6 7 21 43 7 0 84 
Indifferent 
[Advanced] 
Role-based 
Access Control 
40 19 8 14 2 1 84 
Basic 
[Performance] 
Backups 70 6 2 6 0 0 84 Basic 
B: Basic, P: Performance, A: Advanced, I: Indifferent, R: Reverse, Q: Questionable 
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With regard to IT security certification of the supplier, multifactor authentication, and full 
data encryption, most of the participants in the quantitative study were indifferent, although 
more than 24% assigned these safeguards to the advanced category. Our qualitative results 
indicate doubt about the effectiveness of certifications: “This is a nice to have […] but may be 
associated with more efforts than benefits” (#1), a “kind of false sense of security […] with 
regard to the actual cost–benefit analysis” (#2), “The risk can be reduced […] but is also a 
matter of interpretation” (#4), “certification [might be] necessary due to [environmental] 
requirements” (#3). Opinions about multifactor authentication differed: “My colleagues 
would not be amused” (#1), “this would be very useful” (#2, #3), “but implementation is 
difficult, because of restrictions on usability; on some days, I am performing dozens of 
logins” (#3). Thus, it can be concluded that multifactor authentication is fundamentally 
associated with perceived risk reduction but the effort is perceived as outweighing the 
benefits. One comment about full data encryption was: “We do not see the necessity of full 
data encryption because it is associated with effort but no benefits for us. But if it would be 
implemented it would not bother me” (#1). Another was that full data encryption might result 
in availability problems (#3). In summary, the quantitative results indicate that basic IT 
security safeguards are often also perceived as performance IT security safeguards, and 
indifferent IT security safeguards as advanced ones. Our qualitative data show that these 
different evaluations are caused by different IT security risk protection requirements.  
In previous studies, questionable results (which are shown in Table 14) were typically deleted 
for the quantitative analysis (e.g., (Berger et al. 1993; Sauerwein et al. 1996)). Thus, we 
removed the questionable IT security safeguard evaluations and performed the following 
quantitative analysis with a sample size of 502. Because our data show only two questionable 
results (Table 15), this indicates that our functional and dysfunctional questions did not suffer 
from phrasing problems (Kano et al. 1984). 
5.3.3.2 WTP associated with Different IT Security Safeguard Categories 
The Shapiro-Wilk-Test indicated that our quantitative data are not normally distributed. 
Accordingly, we tested our hypotheses by using nonparametric statistics. In a first step, we 
applied the Kruskal-Wallis-Test to examine whether the five Kano categories are generally 
associated with different levels of customer WTP. The results show that significant 
differences between the five IT security safeguard categories exist (chi-square 20.283; df 4; 
asymp. sig. 0.000), supporting H1. Moreover, we introduced two group variables as shown in 
Table 16. To investigate between which groups and categories significant differences in 
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customer WTP exist, we used the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. The results of the analyses are 
shown in Tables 16 and 17. Significant differences are highlighted in grey. The average 
values of customers’ WTP within the different categories are shown in Table 18.  
Table 16: Results for the Group Variables 
Group 
Variable 
Group 1 Group 2 Sig. 
d1 A P, B, I, R 0.014 
d2 P B, I, R 0.000 
B: Basic, P: Performance, A: Advanced, I: Indifferent, R: Reverse 
Table 17: Results for Different Levels of WTP within the IT Security Safeguard Categories 
Significant 
Differences for 
WTP 
P B I R 
A 0.351 0.416 0.000 0.001 
P  0.127 0.000 0.001 
B   0.000 0.011 
I    0.229 
B: Basic, P: Performance, A: Advanced, I: Indifferent, R: Reverse 
Table 18: Descriptives for Customers’ WTP 
IT Security 
Safeguard Category n Mean Std. Dev. 
Group 1 (d1) 408 -0.054 0.994 
Group 2 (d2) 342 -0.135 0.974 
Basic 160 0.092 1.051 
Performance 66 0.366 0.998 
Advanced 94 0.236 0.975 
Indifferent 161 -0.311 0.857 
Reverse 21 -0.517 0.835 
 
Regarding the differences between customers’ WTP for advanced IT security safeguards and 
for the other IT security safeguard categories, the Mann-Whitney-U-Tests showed significant 
results for the comparison of the advanced and indifferent IT security safeguard categories as 
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well as for the comparison of the advanced and reverse categories. The average customer 
WTP for indifferent (-0.311) and reverse (-0.517) IT security safeguards were significantly 
lower than the WTP for advanced IT security safeguards (0.236; see Table 18). Nevertheless, 
no significant differences between performance and advanced IT security safeguards were 
found. Moreover, the average WTP for advanced IT security safeguards (0.236) was lower 
than the WTP for performance IT security safeguards (0.366; see Table 18). Thus, H2 has to 
be rejected. However, the Mann-Whitney-U-Test revealed significant differences between IT 
security safeguards evaluated as advanced and those evaluated as performance, basic, 
indifferent, or reverse (Table 16). As shown in Table 18, the average WTP for advanced IT 
security safeguards was 0.236 and thus higher than the mean for the IT security safeguards 
perceived as performance, basic, indifferent, or reverse (-0.054). 
Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney-U-Test showed that customers’ WTP for performance IT 
security safeguards was significantly different from their WTP for IT security safeguards that 
have less or no influence on customer satisfaction (i.e., basic, indifferent, and reverse 
safeguards; see also Table 16). The average customer WTP for performance IT security 
safeguards was 0.366, and for the other three categories it was -0.135 (see Table 18). 
Consequently, H3 is supported. In particular, the WTP for performance IT security safeguards 
was significantly different compared to IT security safeguards evaluated as indifferent and 
reverse. The means for indifferent (-0.311) and reverse IT security safeguards (-0.517) were 
lower than the mean for performance IT security safeguards (see Table 18). However, no 
significant differences between performance and basic IT security safeguards were found (see 
Table 17). Thus, the results show that the customers’ WTP for IT security safeguards 
evaluated as performance was significantly higher than their WTP for IT security safeguards 
evaluated as indifferent or reverse. Moreover, the comparisons between basic and indifferent 
and between basic and reverse IT security safeguards yielded significant differences in 
customers’ WTP (see Table 17). Indifferent IT security safeguards had a mean WTP of -0.311 
and reverse IT security safeguards a mean of -0.517 (see Table 18), while the average WTP 
for basic IT security safeguards (0.092) was significantly higher. The results in Table 18 
indicate that the customers did not show additional WTP for the implementation of IT 
security safeguards that they perceive as basic. The standardized mean value of customers’ 
WTP for basic IT security safeguards is close to zero. Moreover, IT security safeguards that 
were evaluated as indifferent or reverse by the customers tended to be associated with a lower 
level of WTP. However, the average customer WTP for basic IT security safeguards was 
found to be significantly higher than their WTP for indifferent or reverse IT security 
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safeguards. Nonetheless, the mean values for customers’ WTP indicate that H4 can be 
regarded as supported. 
Overall, our results show that while there are no significant differences between customers’ 
WTP for basic, performance, and advanced IT security safeguards, there are significant 
differences between their WTP for these three categories and their WTP for indifferent and 
reverse IT security safeguards. While the additional WTP for IT security safeguards that are 
perceived as basic was close to average, the WTP for IT security safeguards evaluated as 
performance and advanced was well above average. Accordingly, these IT security safeguards 
are associated with a higher customer WTP. 
5.3.3.3 Impact on Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction 
The Kano Theory also allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the effects of the 
implementation or non-implementation of certain IT security safeguards on customer 
satisfaction. We determined the customer satisfaction (CS) and customer dissatisfaction (CD) 
coefficient as suggested by previous research (e.g., Berger et al. 1993; Clegg et al. 2010; 
Matzler and Hinterhuber 1998; Sauerwein et al. 1996). For calculating the average impact on 
satisfaction (CS), advanced (A) and performance (P) IT security safeguards are of interest 
because these IT security safeguards have the potential to produce customer satisfaction if 
implemented by the supplier. Similarly, for determining the average impact on customer 
dissatisfaction (CD), basic (B) and performance IT security safeguards are of interest as these 
IT security safeguards will cause customer dissatisfaction if they are not implemented in the 
supplier’s IT products. The implementation of IT security safeguards that customers are 
indifferent (I) about produce neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction. The formulas are as 
follows: 
 
The values of CS and CD for each of the six IT security safeguards are presented in Table 19. 
A graphical overview of potential influences on customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction is 
provided in Figure 10. The x-axis represents the impact on satisfaction (CS values) and the y-
axis the impact on dissatisfaction (CD values). The partition lines represent the means of the 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction coefficients. Accordingly, the higher an IT security safeguard 
is positioned above the horizontal line, the greater the dissatisfaction that is produced when 
the IT security safeguard is not implemented by the supplier (Q1 and Q2). The further an IT 
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security safeguard is positioned to the right of the vertical line (Q1 and Q4), the greater the 
satisfaction that is associated with its implementation in the IT product. Consequently, IT 
security safeguards positioned in Q1 produce more satisfaction than IT security safeguards in 
Q2. The influence of IT security safeguards in Q3 on both customer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction is below average. However, IT security safeguards in Q4 have above-average 
potential to cause satisfaction. From the suppliers’ perspective, the resulting four areas can be 
useful for deriving appropriate strategies. 
Table 19: Impact on Customer Satisfaction 
IT Security Safeguards CS Values CD Values 
Updates 0.368 -0.607 
Certification 0.452 -0.107 
Multifactor Authentication 0.392 -0.214 
Data Encryption 0.364 -0.155 
Role-based Access Control 0.333 -0.702 
Backups 0.095 -0.905 
CS: Customer Satisfaction, CD: Customer Dissatisfaction 
 
 
Figure 10: Impact on Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction 
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5.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was not only to advance our understanding of how IT security 
safeguards implemented in IT products are evaluated by customer organizations but also to 
expand our knowledge of the impact of different IT security safeguard evaluations on 
customers’ associated WTP. Understanding this trade-off for risks vs. costs on the customer 
side will enable IT suppliers to optimize their decision making about investments in 
developing and implementing different safeguards in their products. 
Based on a large-scale empirical study and qualitative interviews, we were able to 
demonstrate that the appropriateness of an IT security safeguard that is implemented in an IT 
system may be perceived differently by different customer organizations. In particular, the 
very same IT security safeguard might be a basic requirement for one customer company but 
assessed as counterproductive by another. We show that these heterogeneous evaluations are 
generally associated with different levels of customer WTP. Customers are willing to invest 
more money when they perceive an IT security safeguard as more functional than 
dysfunctional (i.e., advanced, performance, or basic). In contrast, when an IT security 
safeguard is perceived as indifferent or as more dysfunctional than functional (i.e., reverse), 
customers show a significantly lower level of WTP for its implementation. Contrary to our 
expectations, we did not find significant differences between customers’ WTP for advanced, 
performance, and basic IT security safeguards. One reason for this finding might be that 
customers tend to evaluate an IT security safeguard as basic when the organization is aware of 
the safeguard and the IT security risks it addresses. If customers have insufficient information 
about the IT security safeguard, they might tend to be indifferent (e.g., they might not 
perceive the addressed IT security risk to be relevant). Future research could enrich this 
study’s findings by gathering a larger number of different customer evaluations of IT security 
safeguards and controlling for awareness of the functional and dysfunctional characteristics of 
the analyzed safeguards. This might offer more detailed information about the differences 
between basic, performance, and advanced IT security safeguards as well as their differences 
from IT security safeguards that are perceived as indifferent and reverse. 
This study makes several contributions to IS research and practice. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to adapt Kano’s Theory to the IT security context. Our study 
highlights the importance of considering the assessment of both the functional and the 
dysfunctional characteristics of safeguards; these are often neglected by IT security studies, 
especially in the organizational context (e.g., Cavusoglu et al. 2015). Future research can 
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build on our results when analyzing evaluations of safeguarding measures in different fields 
of application. For example, the results of this study are important for mathematical 
optimization models. Furthermore, our study will enable researchers to better understand and 
predict the outcome of IT security management decisions by considering the 
multidimensional nature of IT security safeguard evaluation in terms of the five IT security 
safeguard categories. Understanding the multidimensional nature of IT security safeguard 
evaluation might also allow future research to reinvestigate behavioral phenomena in the IT 
security context that are yet unclear (e.g., why people decide not to adopt safeguarding 
measures even when they perceive the addressed risks to be very critical (e.g., Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010). As our proposed framework can be applied to investigate how a product’s 
IT security is assessed by customer companies, managers of IT suppliers can particularly 
benefit from this study. Based on the developed set of questions presented in the data analysis 
part of this study, IT suppliers can analyze how the safeguards implemented in their products 
influence their customers’ satisfaction and hence their associated WTP. Following this study’s 
approach, they can effectively identify which safeguards should be implemented, improved, 
or removed from the product. For example, the customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction (CS 
and CD) values for Q2 in our study show that non-implementation of a basic IT security 
safeguard (daily backups in our example) largely creates customer dissatisfaction. Suppliers 
should therefore definitely implement these IT security safeguards in their product (Sakao 
2009); otherwise, their product may not be competitive. The two IT security safeguards in Q1 
(automatic updates and role-based access control in our example) also cause dissatisfaction 
when they are not implemented but have a greater impact on satisfaction when they are 
implemented. IT security safeguards that are mainly evaluated as performance should be 
further enhanced by the supplier, depending on the costs and customers’ WTP (Sakao 2009). 
The influences of the IT security safeguards in Q3 on customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
are both below average. Thus, removal of the IT security safeguards in Q3 has the potential to 
considerably reduce costs for suppliers since customers seem to be mostly indifferent about 
their implementation (Sakao 2009). The IT security safeguards in Q4 (multifactor 
authentication, full data encryption, and certification in our example) have above-average 
potential to result in satisfaction. From the suppliers’ perspective, these safeguards therefore 
have the potential to produce a competitive advantage. If IT security safeguards are perceived 
mainly as indifferent or advanced (see Table 15), suppliers should reconsider their 
implementation. The implementation of advanced IT security safeguards may bring a 
competitive advantage, but investing in the development of (future) indifferent IT security 
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safeguards will most likely result in financial losses. In this regard, due to the dynamic nature 
of product attributes (Nilsson-Witell and Fundin 2005), IT security safeguards might be 
evaluated as indifferent because customers are not aware of the addressed IT security risks 
and therefore do not have the corresponding IT security risk protection requirements. 
However, their perception of the addressed IT security risks might change over time based on 
new information or other environmental factors. That is, the evaluation of an IT security 
safeguard can shift from indifferent to advanced and thus represent a future competitive 
advantage for suppliers (Nilsson-Witell and Fundin 2005). Nevertheless, if an IT security 
safeguard is not promising from either the supplier’s or the customer’s perspective, the 
supplier should not further invest in its development and implementation. Reverse IT security 
safeguards should generally be removed, because their implementation only produces 
customer dissatisfaction and might therefore represent a competitive disadvantage. 
5.5 Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion 
Three limitations of this study merit consideration. First, we analyzed a subset of IT product 
safeguards. Future research can enrich our study’s results by empirically investigating the 
evaluation of a larger number of safeguarding measures. Second, our study focuses on the top 
echelon’s assessment of IT security safeguards. Even if these decision makers are ultimately 
responsible for the organizations’ IT and trigger the final decisions, other managers and 
employees might be involved as well and thus influence organizational IT decisions. Hence, 
we encourage future research to investigate the IT management process in depth at different 
hierarchical levels of organizations. Third, our study is cross-sectional and static. We did not 
study the decision makers’ IT security safeguard evaluations longitudinally and thus did not 
consider the influence of time on the perception of IT security safeguards. It is conceivable 
that an IT security safeguard might be viewed as indifferent or advanced at the outset but 
then, after a certain period of time, come to be perceived as performance or basic, e.g., 
because the organization has become aware of the addressed IT security risk or the perceived 
effort changes (Nilsson-Witell and Fundin 2005). Future research should explore this dynamic 
as well. These studies might also examine the effects of potential errors in the decision 
makers’ assessments of IT security risks and the prioritization of IT security risk protection 
requirements (e.g., Loske et al. 2013) in order to perform an appropriate importance–
performance analysis (Matzler et al. 2004a). Moreover, potential antecedents of IT security 
safeguard evaluations should also be included in these studies. IT security risk protection 
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requirements might be influenced not only by the perceived IT security risks but also by other 
factors (e.g., legal requirements or other stakeholders). 
Overall, our study advances the understanding of customers’ evaluations of IT security 
safeguards and has several theoretical and practical implications. The results highlight that IT 
suppliers should carefully consider customers’ IT security needs when making decisions 
about the IT security in their IT products. By doing so, suppliers can derive effective 
strategies to gain economic and competitive advantages.  
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Abstract 
Despite the “buzz” about Software as a Service (SaaS), decision makers still often refrain 
from replacing their existing in-house technologies with innovative IT services. Industry 
reports indicate that the skeptical attitude of decision makers stems primarily from a high 
degree of uncertainty that exists, for example, due to insufficient experience with the new 
technology, a lack of best practice approaches, and missing lighthouse projects. Whereas 
previous research is predominantly focused on the advantages of SaaS, behavioral economics 
conclusively demonstrate that reference points like the evaluation of the incumbent 
technology or a familiar product are oftentimes prevalent when decisions are made under 
uncertainty. In this context, Status Quo-Thinking may inhibit decisions in favor of potentially 
advantageous IT service innovations. Drawing on Prospect Theory and Status Quo Bias 
research, we derive and empirically test a research model that explicates the influence of the 
incumbent technology on the evaluation of SaaS. Based on a large-scale empirical study, we 
demonstrate that the decision makers’ attitude toward SaaS is highly dependent on their 
current systems and their level of SaaS. A lack of SaaS experience will increase the impact of 
the Status Quo, thus inhibiting a potential advantageous adoption of the new technology. 
 
Keywords: Status Quo Bias, Prospect Theory, Software as a Service (SaaS), Adoption.  
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6.1 Introduction 
The World Economic Forum stated already in 2010 that “in addition to reducing operational 
costs, cloud technologies have become the basis for radical business innovation and new 
business models, and for significant improvements in the effectiveness of anyone using 
information technology” (World Economic Forum 2010, p. 1). Fittingly, recent analyses of 
research institutes forecast the public cloud services market to reach a total of $204 billion in 
2016 (e.g., Gartner 2016; IDC 2016; Synergy 2016). A substantial part of that growth is 
contributed to Software as a Service (SaaS) — the provisioning of applications running on a 
cloud infrastructure — that will remain the dominant public cloud computing type at an 
estimated 20.3 percent growth rate resulting in forecasted revenues of roughly $37.7 billion in 
2016 (e.g., Cisco 2016; Gartner 2016; IDC 2016). Associated with a large variety of benefits 
like scalability, mobility or cost savings that are increasingly affirmed by practitioners, SaaS 
has been hailed as the future default software delivery solution (e.g., Dahlberg et al. 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, IDC predicts that the penetration of SaaS solutions compared to traditional 
software deployment will be over 25 percent by 2020 (IDC 2014b). However, especially 
current European reports show that nearly 80 percent of EU enterprises still do not use cloud 
services implying that adoption rates are not as high as expected (Eurostat 2016). Given its 
role as state-of-the-art technology and innovative service model in an evolving business 
environment, it is thus crucial to understand why many decision makers today still refrain 
from using SaaS in a business environment shaped by increased mobility and disruptive 
marketing strategies (e.g., Lin and Chen 2012).  
Previous research explains the non-adoption of SaaS in organizations either with legal or 
strategic requirements to keep data processing completely in-house or as the result of a risk-
benefit-analysis (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011). Whereas theoretical studies mostly consider 
purely rational decision makers, experts claim that decision makers “have been more 
protective of their existing infrastructure and, in many cases, have been the biggest obstacle to 
cloud-based solutions” (van der Meulen and Rivera 2015). This non-rational behavior is a 
common assumption in behavioral economics studies when analyzing decisions that are made 
under uncertainty. Decision makers actually violate the axioms of rational choice under 
uncertainty due to cognitive biases or “shortcuts” that compensate for a lack of information or 
experience (Tversky and Kahneman 1975). To account for these shortcuts, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) established the so-called Prospect Theory. This theory postulates that people 
faced with a decision under uncertainty will derive utility from gains and losses measured in 
relation to some reference points rather than on final assets. The dependence on reference 
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points has been frequently discussed in individual strategic choice contexts and was 
demonstrated in several empirical studies on the assessment of new products and services 
(e.g., Bamberger and Fiegenbaum 1996; Shoham and Fiegenbaum 2002). Surprisingly, the 
SaaS technology adoption literature has largely overlooked this reference-dependence 
although the decision to adopt SaaS generally entails a high degree of uncertainty due to the 
unknown complexity of IT security risks, lack of previous experience with cloud-based 
technologies, or missing best practices and lighthouse projects in the industry (e.g., Eduserv 
2015; Eurostat 2014; Lin and Chen 2012). The decision to be protective of their existing 
(incumbent) infrastructure, i.e., the exaggerated preference for maintaining the current state of 
affairs, hints at another cognitive bias, namely the influence of Status Quo-Thinking 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Status Quo Bias itself has been demonstrated in a wide 
range of studies of consumer and investment behavior and is increasingly used in 
management of information systems (MIS) research (Fleischmann et al. 2014). However, 
research on software selection and particularly studies investigating the intention to adopt 
cloud based services did not account for this cognitive bias in decision making.  
To account for this research gap, we first investigated the influence of reference-dependence 
on SaaS adoption at the organizational level and from there, analyzed how this dependency is 
affected by Status Quo-Thinking (e.g., Gerlach et al. 2014; Schweitzer 1995). The 
distinctiveness of the Status Quo Bias depends on the degree of uncertainty, i.e., the lack of 
information and experience decision makers are faced with. Based on the data of a large scale 
empirical study with decision makers in charge of the organizational IT, we confirmed our 
assumptions in a two-step approach: In the first step, we demonstrate the strong influence of 
the assessment and prevalence of the incumbent in-house technology on decision makers’ 
attitudes toward a new technology — in our case SaaS. In our second step, we uncover the 
effect of the Status Quo Bias by comparing experienced and non-experienced or less-
experienced decision makers. We specifically chose SaaS as a clearly definable object of 
investigation given that the majority of organizations will need to evaluate whether to adopt 
SaaS as a new technological service model now or in the near future due to the increasing 
amount of data processing and the demand for mobility (e.g., McLellan 2016; Rivera and van 
der Meulen 2014).  
Our study provides several theoretical and practical implications. Given that virtually all 
technology adoptions nowadays imply a replacement decision, our study highlights the 
relevance of reference-dependence in MIS research. In this regard, it is essential for future IS 
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research to acknowledge that Status Quo-Thinking has a profound effect on decision-making 
processes regarding new technology acceptance in organizations. Our findings are also highly 
relevant to both providers of SaaS and decision makers of (potential) customer organizations. 
Providers should consider the varying degrees of Status Quo-Thinking and group their 
customers according to their level of SaaS experience. These identified customer groups can 
be addressed appropriately and more effectively by adapting marketing and sales strategies 
accordingly, whereas decision makers need to acknowledge the role of reference points and 
Status Quo-Thinking to avoid missing out on beneficial technological developments. Joining 
expert roundtables or including objective assessors could reduce the influence of the Status 
Quo Bias in decision-making processes. These measures can reduce the possibility that Status 
Quo-Thinking inhibits SaaS adoption even if the new technology would objectively be the 
better option. 
6.2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
6.2.1 Technology Adoption Models and Rational Choice 
There is a rich tradition in technology acceptance and adoption research. The theories 
primarily used to study the acceptance and adoption of innovations in information systems or 
information technologies generally originate in social psychology, such as Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and its extension Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1985). Drawing on TRA, many researchers added constructs or 
derived new models such as Davis (1986) Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) or 
Venkatesh et al. (2003) who later consolidated the aforementioned and five further models 
into the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT). 
Despite different factors and research model designs, the majority of studies base their 
assumptions on rational choice, i.e., the rational weighing up of costs and benefits concerning 
the technology adoption. Specifically, perceived risks and perceived benefits are often singled 
out and commonly considered as decisive antecedents of behavioral intention or attitude 
toward SaaS (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011) or sometimes described as drivers and inhibitors 
of SaaS adoption (e.g.,Benlian et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2013). Several studies look at risks and 
benefits as relative advantage, i.e., already implicitly weighing up potential benefits of a new 
technology with the current advantages of the incumbent technology (e.g., Chau 1996; Wu 
and Wang 2005). 
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In line with the predominant literature stream, we draw on a benefit-risk framework in an 
organizational setting. Previous research oftentimes studied differences in the perceptions of 
IT executives’ in both SaaS adopter and non-adopter firms, but they did not link the 
differences they found directly to cognitive biases (Benlian and Hess 2011). Contrarily, 
consumer studies went further and highlighted the importance of reference points as an 
“anchor” for decisions to either replace or stick to the incumbent technology or product 
(Moqbel and Bartelt 2015; Roster and Richins). This dependence on reference points often 
explains the influence of the incumbent technology when people have to analyze the relative 
advantage of a new technology during a decision-making process under uncertainty (e.g., 
Gerlach et al. 2014). Accordingly, it is important to consider Prospect Theory and Status Quo 
research in the context of organizational SaaS adoption. 
6.2.2 Prospect Theory, Status Quo Bias, and Hypothesis Development 
Prospect Theory was designed to analyze decision-making processes under uncertainty by 
considering so-called certainty and isolation effects (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). These 
two effects assume that decisions do not necessarily follow mathematical optimality (i.e., the 
rational weighing up of risks and benefits and their probability weights) due to several 
reasons: people either underestimate hardly probable outcomes in comparison with certain 
outcomes and/or people base their decisions rather on change of wealth than on total wealth, 
i.e., an absolute outcome (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Accordingly, Prospect Theory 
postulates that decision makers’ value functions are rather dependent on reference points than 
on the actual final outcome. These reference points are defined as the neutral position used by 
decision makers in order to determine the extent to which the expected outcomes of a decision 
constitute gains (i.e., above this position) or losses (i.e., below this position) (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Kahneman and Tversky (1984) argue that individuals set up mental accounts 
to specify advantages and disadvantages associated with the offered option(s) when faced 
with a transaction or trade decision relative to a certain reference point. Several studies used 
Prospect Theory to analyze strategic choice and risk/return tradeoffs in organizational 
decision making (e.g., Fiegenbaum et al. 1996; Shoham and Fiegenbaum 2002; Sinha 1994). 
It is argued, therefore, that managerial decision processes often depend on reference points 
because many decisions must be made without advanced knowledge of their full impact and 
are thereby made under uncertainty. A similar utilization of reference points is at times 
applied in replacement decisions regarding consumer goods (e.g., Gerlach et al. 2014; Roster 
and Richins 2009). 
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Based on the theoretical underpinnings of Prospect Theory, it can be assumed that a 
replacement decision in the context of technology adoption generally entails a decision 
between opting for a new technology or maintaining the incumbent technology, i.e., the 
enterprise software that is currently hosted and operated in-house on the organization’s IT 
infrastructure. An aggravating factor is the lack of historical data and experiences that inhibits 
a well-informed, more rational decision-making process. The absence of information or 
experience is pervasive in the context of service innovations as lighthouse projects and hard 
facts about the realization of assumed risks and benefits are missing. To overcome this issue, 
it can be assumed that the incumbent technology will serve as a reference point for the 
assessment of a new technology (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Shoham and 
Fiegenbaum 2002). Consequently, decision makers will compare the new technology with the 
incumbent technology because experience and knowledge are available due to the familiarity 
in this regard. For example, when it comes to the decision whether to replace an existing in-
house application with a new SaaS application, we assume that the attitudinal beliefs toward 
incumbent in-house technologies (i.e., attitudinal beliefs toward the currently used, well-
known technology) will serve as reference points for the decision makers when forming the 
attitudinal beliefs toward new, yet partly unknown, SaaS technologies. As our research model 
is based on a risk-benefit framework frequently utilized by previous research in technology 
adoption (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011), the attitudinal beliefs are formed by the juxtaposition 
of perceived benefits and risks. Therefore, the decision makers perceived benefits of a new 
SaaS technology will be influenced by the perceived benefits of the incumbent in-house 
systems that serve as a reference point. Furthermore, decision makers with little knowledge 
and experience will tend to underestimate the perceived benefits of SaaS in comparison with 
their familiar incumbent system. If the level of perceived benefits of the incumbent system is 
high, replacing this system will be regarded as futile. Logically, decision makers who are 
fully satisfied with their current in-house system will not regard the potential benefits of a 
new SaaS solution as equally high. Simultaneously, a decision maker who perceives the in-
house system, for example, as costly and unreliable, will be more prone to change and will 
not consider this deviation from a certain outcome (i.e., subsequent use of the incumbent 
system) as a loss. Accordingly, decision makers who perceive the risks of their incumbent 
system as high, are more likely to consider a new SaaS technology to be less risky. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H1a: Perceived benefits of in-house systems are negatively associated with the 
decision makers’ perceived benefits of SaaS. 
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Analogously, we assume the same influence regarding the evaluation and reference-
dependence of the perceived risks: 
H1b: Perceived risks of in-house systems are negatively associated with the decision 
makers’ perceived risks of SaaS. 
The benefits and risks associated with a new technology are fundamental in technology 
adoption decisions. Thus, previous studies in SaaS adoption show that behavior and intentions 
are largely determined by weighing up risks and benefits (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011). These 
overall perceived risks and benefits include financial, strategic, security, performance, and 
management dimensions (Benlian and Hess 2011). In line with previous SaaS research (e.g., 
Benlian and Hess 2010; Benlian and Hess 2011; Lee 2009), we expect perceived risks to 
generally have a negative impact on decision makers’ intentions to adopt a SaaS technology. 
For example, if decision makers perceive a high risk of downtime errors and data loss to be 
associated with SaaS technologies, they will be less likely to consider an adoption of this new 
SaaS technology. On the other hand, the perceived benefits are generally expected to 
positively influence decision makers’ intentions to adopt. For example, if decision makers 
perceive SaaS technologies to be associated with potential cost reductions (e.g., due to lower 
server administration costs) their intention to adopt SaaS will be positively influenced. 
Therefore, high perceived benefits will more likely lead to an intention to adopt, whereas the 
perceived risks of SaaS will inhibit the intention to adopt. Accordingly, we further 
hypothesize: 
H2a: Perceived benefits of SaaS are positively associated with the decision makers’ 
intention to adopt SaaS. 
H2b: Perceived risks of SaaS are negatively associated with the decision makers’ 
intention to adopt SaaS. 
Building on Prospect Theory and several experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1985) 
discovered that decision makers prefer to be passive and inactive rather than experiencing 
negative results due to their actions or decisions. Some literature refers to this concept as 
reference point bias (Levy 1997), whereas a more common stream of research coined the term 
Status Quo Bias as an effect of the loss aversion discussed in Prospect Theory (Kahneman et 
al. 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Loss aversion entails an overestimation of certain 
positive outcomes, whereas potential losses are weighted disproportionately. This 
demonstrates the preference for the current state of affairs, i.e., if individuals take the Status 
Quo as a reference point, then they will perceive any deviation from it as loss. Therefore, a 
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decision maker will avoid change and an unknown outcome unless the advantages clearly 
outweigh the perceived disadvantages. Another explanation for the Status Quo Bias is 
provided by Zajonc (1968) and Bornstein (1989) who argue that mere exposure to a stimulus 
(i.e., the incumbent product) enhances the attitude toward it and, therefore, argue that 
familiarity leads to liking. 
A well-known example for the maintenance of the Status Quo is the QWERTY keyboard. 
Although a different arrangement of letters could lead to a more productive and better 
keyboard, QWERTY is still omnipresent because switching from the Status Quo could entail 
huge costs of retraining individuals and replacing the current design in systems and devices 
(David 1985). Especially, research on replacement decisions regarding (technological) 
consumer goods consider these high potential switching costs to inhibit a change from the 
Status Quo (e.g., Moqbel and Bartelt 2015; Roster and Richins 2009). Studies focusing on 
technology systems are increasingly building on these findings adding further contributing 
factors like habit or inertia (Kim and Kankanhalli 2009; Polites and Karahanna 2012). Almost 
all of these studies attribute the Status Quo Bias at least partially to insufficient available 
information and experience. Past experiences serve as an “anchor” or “frame” for decisions as 
decision makers frequently do not exclusively follow rational concepts of mathematical 
optimality (e.g., Schwenk 1984; Slovic 1975).  
In line with previous research, we expect that decision makers in companies that already 
possess a certain degree of knowledge and past experience will demonstrate a lower Status 
Quo Bias in comparison to less or non-experienced decision makers. Decision makers with a 
low level of SaaS experience, will be more affected by the Status Quo Bias because they 
overestimate the losses that they would encounter when replacing the incumbent technology. 
Therefore, the correlation postulated in hypotheses H1a and H1b will be increased. On the 
other hand, decision makers who already possess a SaaS solution among their incumbent in-
house technology will draw on the experience that they already accumulated with SaaS. 
Therefore, their decision-making process will be better informed and consequently less 
affected by Status Quo-Thinking. Greater experience and further facts available to decision 
makers will enable a more “rational” decision making process (Bazerman and Moore 2008). 
For example, experienced decision makers can judge the perceived benefits like cost 
reductions without drawing upon a comparison to their incumbent system because a previous 
adoption of a SaaS technology already proved to be cost-efficient. Similarly, experienced 
decision makers will evaluate the perceived risks of SaaS depending on past experience and 
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be less affected by Status Quo Bias. Whereas, inexperienced decision makers might, for 
example, believe that downtime issues are more pronounced in contrast to their reliable in-
house technology and will thus attribute higher perceived risks to a new SaaS technology. 
Hence, we hypothesize: 
H3a: Perceived benefits of in-house systems will have a stronger negative association 
with the perceived benefits of SaaS for organizations with no or low SaaS experience 
than for organizations with SaaS experience. 
H3b: Perceived risks of in-house systems will have a stronger negative association with 
the perceived risks of SaaS for organizations with no or low SaaS experience than for 
organizations with SaaS experience. 
The research model is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Research Model (Research Paper D) 
6.3 Research Methodology and Data Analysis 
6.3.1 Survey Administration and Sample Characteristics 
Construct validity was established by adopting validated measurement items from previous 
research studies with minor changes in wording. All latent constructs were reflective and 
measured with multiple items on a 7-point Likert scale. To ensure a consistent understanding 
Perceived Benefits
of SaaS 
Perceived Benefits
of In-house 
Systems
Perceived Risks
of SaaS 
Perceived Risks
of In-house 
Systems
Attitudinal Beliefs Regarding
Incumbent In-house Systems
Attitudinal Beliefs Regarding
SaaS
Intention to Adopt
SaaS
H1a (-)
H1b (-)
H2a (+)
H2b (-)
Controls:
Organization-specific: 
Organization Size, Revenue, IT 
Budget
Decision Maker-specific: Work 
Experience, Numbers of
Decisions, Responsibility
SaaS Experience
H3a: stronger for organizations
with no or low SaaS experience
H3b: stronger for organizations
with no or low SaaS experience
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of enterprise software in case of in-house systems and in case of SaaS, we used the following 
definitions within the study: 
 Enterprise software is defined as business applications, such as Customer 
Relationship Management (CRM) systems, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
systems, or Project Management (PM) applications. 
 SaaS is defined as enterprise software provided by a supplier and accessible via a 
public network, such as the Internet (i.e., public cloud). 
 In-house systems are defined as enterprise software that is hosted and operated on 
the organization’s IT infrastructure. 
As suggested by previous research, we included work experience (in years), numbers of 
sourcing decisions already made, the responsibility for sourcing decisions in the organization 
(1=not responsible at all - 4=completely responsible), organization size (revenue and number 
of employees), and IT budget as controls in our research model (Benlian 2009; Hsu et al. 
2015). We pre-validated our measurement model in a pretest with 8 MIS researchers by using 
a cognitive interview technique. The pretest resulted in minor changes to improve the clarity 
of the model. Our study’s final measurement items are shown in Table 20. 
Table 20: Overview of Constructs 
Construct Items Source 
Perceived 
risks 
 
How do you evaluate the overall risk (i.e., financial, strategic, 
security, performance, and management risks) associated with 
adoption of [in-house / SaaS] applications?  
(1=not risky at all - 7=extremely risky) 
Based on 
Featherman 
and Pavlou 
(2003) 
How do you evaluate the risk that the expected benefits of 
adopting [in-house / SaaS] applications will not materialize? 
(1=not risky at all - 7=extremely risky) 
How do you evaluate the danger that is generally associated 
with the adoption of [in-house / SaaS] applications?  
(1=not risky at all - 7=extremely risky) 
Perceived 
benefits 
 
The overall advantage of adopting [In House / SaaS] 
applications is… (1=very low - 7=extremely high) 
Based on 
Gewald and 
Dibbern 
(2009) 
The potential cost reduction associated with the adoption of 
[in-house / SaaS] applications is...  
(1=very low - 7=extremely high) 
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Overall, I consider [in-house / SaaS] adoption to be a useful 
strategic option.  
(1=strongly disagree - 7=strongly agree) 
Intention 
 
If there is a superior offer, a SaaS solution should be used for 
the application domain that I am in charge of. 
(1=strongly disagree - 7=strongly agree)  
Based on 
Gewald and 
Dibbern 
(2009) 
Our company should increase the existing level of adopting 
SaaS applications. 
(1=strongly disagree - 7=strongly agree) 
I support the further adoption of SaaS applications for the 
application domain that I am in charge of. 
(1=strongly disagree - 7=strongly agree) 
 
Our quantitative study was conducted between March 17 and May 1, 2016 in a European 
country. In a key informant approach, we contacted a total of 1,126 decision makers from 
organizations of various industries via a contact request on an online social business network. 
To encourage participation, a management report about the results was offered to the 
participants. A total of 251 (22.3%) of the 1,126 contacted decision makers agreed to 
participate in our study and were sent links to access the online survey. One week after 
sending the invitation, a reminder was sent via another direct message on the social business 
network. With 131 completed surveys, the response rate was 11.6%. Two main reasons were 
given for not participating: the contacted decision makers either stated time pressure or that 
their organizations do not participate in such studies in general. Altogether, 4 of the 131 
participants stated to be not responsible for sourcing decisions in their organizations and 4 
data sets were identified to have poor data quality. These 8 data sets were excluded from the 
data analysis, which is therefore based on 123 valid data sets. The sample characteristics can 
be extracted from Table 21. 
In addition to these sample characteristics, we further analyzed the differences within our 
sample according to the proportion of participating industry sectors and the respective average 
level of SaaS experience within those sectors. Table 22 shows the proportion of each industry 
sector relative to the overall sample and the average level of self-reported SaaS experience in 
each industry (0%=complete absence of SaaS use-100%=all enterprise applications deployed 
as a service). According to our analysis, most respondents work in IT, Professional Services, 
and Manufacturing and the highest experience levels are reported by decision makers in 
Telecommunications, IT, Retail, and Professional Services. 
6 Research Paper D: Managers’ Status Quo-Thinking 
 
102 
Table 21: Overview of Sample Characteristics 
Company Size (Number of Employees) Position 
Small (<50) 36 (29.3%) CEO 3 (2.4%) 
Medium (50-249) 18 (14.6%) CIO 73 (59.3%) 
Corporation (>249) 69 (56.1%) CTO 20 (16.3%) 
Sales p.a. IT Manager 21 (17.1%) 
<1 m EUR 22 (17.9%) Others  6 (4.9%) 
1-9 m EUR 23 (18.7%) Work Experience 
10-99 m EUR 23 (18.7%) 1-5 years 16 (13.0%) 
>99 m EUR 55 (44.7%) 6-10 years 30 (24.4%) 
 11 years and more 77 (62.6%) 
Table 22: Segmentation of Industry Sectors 
Industry Sector Proportion of Total Sample Average SaaS Experience 
Real Estate 0.8% 0 % 
Travel & Tourism 0.8% 0 % 
Education & Administration 4.1% 1.20 % 
Pharmacology & Medical  2.4% 3.33 % 
Logistics & Transportation 3.3% 3.75 % 
Energy & Utilities 2.4% 5.00 % 
Health Care 4.1% 7.00 % 
Manufacturing 13.0% 7.06 % 
Construction 5.7% 7.14 % 
Consumer Goods 2.4% 8.33 % 
Financial Services 6.5% 27.00 % 
Professional Services 17.1% 34.43 % 
Retail & Wholesale 6.5% 37.00 % 
IT 22.8% 39.00 % 
Telecommunications 4.9% 53.33 % 
Others 3.3% 33.75 % 
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6.3.2 Assessment of Measurement Validations 
The Shapiro-Wilk Test showed that the data is not normally distributed. Furthermore, we 
calculated the time to respond by considering the number of days between sending access to 
the online survey to the participants and the actual survey completion to test for non-response 
bias. Based on that, we compared the data of the first 25% of participants (i.e., shortest time to 
respond in days) with the last 25% (i.e., longest time to respond in days) (Armstrong and 
Overton 1977). The Mann-Whitney-U test revealed the non-existence of significant 
differences. Given that studies using self-report measures to capture dependent and 
independent variables in the same survey might suffer from common method biases 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003), we included a marker variable in our survey. The results of the 
correlation analysis did not indicate significant correlation between the marker variable and 
the measurement variables. Accordingly, it can be assumed that our data does not suffer from 
common method bias (Lindell and Whitney 2001). 
Due to the explorative nature of our study and the non-normality of our data, we evaluated 
our research model by using the non-parametric Partial Least Squares (PLS) methodology 
following the guidelines proposed by Hair et al. (2013). Correspondingly, we first evaluated 
criteria for discriminant and convergent validity in order to assess our measurement model 
correctly. Therefore, we extracted parameters for indicator reliability, composite reliability 
(CR), average variance extracted (AVE) and computed Cronbach’s alphas (CA) (see Table 
23). With a single exception (indicator 2 of perceived benefits: 0.655), all outer loadings are 
above the threshold of 0.7. However, all indicator reliability values are larger than the 
minimum acceptable level of 0.4 and beyond that, most of them are close or above the 
optimal level of 0.7 (Hulland 1999). The values of composite reliability of all constructs are 
well-above the threshold level of 0.7, as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). Regarding 
AVE, the values of all the constructs exceed the level of 0.5 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988) and the 
values for Cronbach’s alpha, reflecting the internal consistency of the constructs, are also all 
above the threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978). Moreover, according to Hair et al. (2012)’s 
recommendation of sample sizes in PLS, a statistical power of 80% is sufficient for a 
measurement model with a sample size of 123. In summary, the discriminant and convergent 
validity of our model can be presumed. 
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Table 23: Assessment of Measurement Model 
# Construct Loadings 
Indicator 
Reliability 
CA CR 
Correlation to Construct # / 
Square Root of AVE [bold] 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Risks  
in-house 
0.864-
0.936 
0.746-
0.876 
0.886 0.929 0.902     
2 Risks  
SaaS 
0.800-
0.881 
0.640-
0.776 
0.814 0.888 -0.540 0.852    
3 Benefits 
in-house 
0.706-
0.858 
0.498-
0.736 
0.704 0.832 -0.488 0.534 0.790   
4 Benefits 
SaaS 
0.655-
0.897 
0.429-
0.805 
0.742 0.850 0.471 -0.605 -0.439 0.811  
5 Intention 
SaaS 
0.885-
0.960 
0.783-
0.904 
0.925 0.952 0.540 -0.727 -0.522 0.720 0.932 
 
The Fornell-Larcker Criterion Analysis for checking discriminant validity (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981) showed that the square root of the AVEs of each construct (highlighted bold) is 
greater than the correlations among the construct with any other construct in the model (see 
Table 23). In sum, it can be concluded that our measurement model is well-specified. 
To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. The 
VIFs values (Risks in-house=1.313, Risks SaaS=1.903, Benefits in-house=1.313, Benefits 
SaaS=1.749) are all below 5 (Hair et al. 2011). Thus, we can exclude collinearity problems 
for our model. 
6.3.3 Data Analysis and Results 
In order to test our hypotheses, we chose a two-step data analysis approach (see Figure 12). In 
the first step, we test our research model regarding the influence of reference points 
(attitudinal beliefs about incumbent in-house systems) on the perception of risks and benefits 
associated with SaaS (attitudinal beliefs about SaaS) (H1a and H1b) as well as the resulting 
intention to adopt SaaS (H2a and H2b). In the second step, we utilized a multi-group analysis 
(MGA) for analyzing whether the influence of reference points is moderated by the existing 
experience with SaaS applications. 
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Figure 12: Data Analysis 
6.3.3.1 Step 1: The Role of Reference Points in SaaS Adoption 
To test our hypotheses H1a and H1b as well as H2a and H2b, the effect sizes and significance 
of path coefficients were evaluated based on a PLS algorithm and a bootstrapping procedure 
(5,000 samples, no sign change option, mean replacement). The results are shown in Table 
24. 
We found that the perceived benefits of in-house systems are significantly negatively 
associated with the perceived benefits of SaaS (β=-0.451, p<0.001), supporting H1a. The 
negative relationship between the perceived risks of in-house systems and perceived risks of 
SaaS is also identified to be significant (β=-0.545, p<0.001), supporting H1b. Regarding H2a 
we found that the positive association of perceived benefits of SaaS with the intention to 
adopt SaaS is significant (β=0.439, p<0.001). Thus, H2a is supported. Moreover, our analysis 
showed that the negative association of the perceived risks of SaaS with the intention to adopt 
SaaS is significant (β=-0.462, p<0.001). Accordingly, H2b is supported as well.  
Following the bootstrapping-based approach of Preacher and Hayes (2008), we found that a 
significant indirect effect of the perceived benefits of in-house systems on the intention to 
adopt SaaS through the perceived benefits of SaaS is -0.198 (p=0.006). The size of the 
indirect effect of the perceived risks of in-house systems on intention to adopt SaaS through 
the perceived risks of SaaS is significant with an indirect effect size of 0.252 (p=0.002). 
In sum, the results show that our model explains 70.2% of variance in the intention to adopt 
SaaS (R²=0.702), 29.7% of the variance in perceived benefits of SaaS (R²=0.297), and 20.3% 
of the variance in the perceived risks of SaaS (R²=0.203). 
• Influence of attitudinal beliefs regarding incumbent in-house 
systems on attitudinal beliefs regarding SaaS (H1a and H1b)
• Influence of attitudinal beliefs regarding SaaS on intention to
adopt SaaS (H2a and H2b)
• Influence of the current level of SaaS in an organization on the
relationship between attitudinal beliefs regarding incumbent in-
house systems and attitudinal beliefs regarding SaaS (H3a and
H3b)
Step 1: Analyzing the Role of Reference Points in SaaS Adoption
Focus of Data Analysis Method
Step 2: Analyzing the Effect of Status Quo Bias
Variance Model Estimation
Multi-Group Analysis
Separation of the sample 
according to current level of
SaaS experience
Evaluation of the complete 
sample
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Table 24: Results of the Variance Model Estimation 
Relationship Path Coefficients Results 
Perceived benefits of in-house systems  
perceived benefits of SaaS  
-0.451*** H1a supported 
Perceived risks of in-house systems  
perceived risks of SaaS 
-0.545*** H1b supported 
Perceived benefits of SaaS  intention to 
adopt SaaS level 
0.439*** H2a supported 
Perceived risks of SaaS  intention to 
adopt SaaS 
-0.462*** H2b supported 
Significance level: ***p < 0.001 
 
There was no significant influence of the control variables (work experience: β=0.059, 
p=0.427; number of decisions: β=0.009, p=0.722; self-stated responsibility for sourcing 
decisions: β=-0.021, p=0.512; revenue: β=0.025, p=0.598; size: β=-0.031, p=0.477; IT 
budget: β=0.069, p=0.439). 
6.3.3.2 Step 2: The Effect of Status Quo Bias on Attitudinal Beliefs Regarding SaaS 
In order to test H3a and H3b, we had to perform a multi-group analysis (MGA) procedure 
(e.g., Hair et al. 2011; Sarstedt et al. 2011). Accordingly, we separated our data set into two 
groups: organizations currently maintaining almost all of their enterprise applications in-
house (i.e., organizations with no or a low SaaS level) and organizations that already utilize a 
substantial degree of SaaS (i.e., organizations with a medium or high SaaS level). We split the 
data sets at a marginal level of SaaS use of 5% in an organization. Accordingly, organizations 
that still host more than 95% of their enterprise applications in-house (n=39) are considered to 
have less experience with the new technology, thus, face a higher level of uncertainty when 
making decisions about future SaaS usage. On the other hand, organizations that already use 
5% or more of their enterprise applications as a service (n=84) are assigned to the group that 
is expected to have a certain degree of experience with SaaS and, therefore, will base the 
adoption decision less on reference points (attitudinal beliefs about in-house systems). The 
results of the MGA are shown in Table 25. These results show that all of the hypothesized 
relationships in H1 and H2 are significant for both organizations with no or low SaaS 
experience and organizations with medium or high SaaS experience. However, the path 
coefficients of the relationships between perceived benefits and risks of in-house systems and 
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perceived benefits and risks of SaaS are found to be significantly different with respect to the 
differences in experience with SaaS. Specifically, the negative influence of perceived benefits 
of in-house systems on the perceived benefits of SaaS is significantly higher for organizations 
that have no or low SaaS experience (β=-0.640; p<0.001) than for organizations that have 
medium or high SaaS experience (β=-0.379; p=0.008; MGA p=0.029). Accordingly, H3a is 
supported. Regarding the relationship between the perceived risks of in-house systems and 
perceived risks of SaaS, significant differences were found as well (MGA p=0.017). As such, 
the negative relationship between the perceived risks of in-house systems and perceived risks 
of SaaS is significantly higher for organizations with no or low experience with SaaS (β=-
0.728; p<0.001) than for organizations with a medium or high level of experience with SaaS 
(β=-0.445; p=0.001). Therefore, H3b is supported. Differences between the two groups of 
organizations regarding the influence of perceived benefits and risks of SaaS on the intention 
to adopt SaaS were not found. 
Table 25: Results of the Multi-Group Analysis 
Relationship 
Path Coefficients 
p-value 
of Multi-
Group 
Analysis 
Results 
Low or No 
SaaS 
Experience 
(n=39) 
Medium or 
High SaaS 
Experience 
(n=84) 
Perceived benefits of 
in-house systems  
perceived benefits of 
SaaS 
-0.640*** -0.379*** 0.029 
H3a supported: stronger 
for organizations with no 
or low SaaS experience 
Perceived risks of in-
house systems   
perceived risks of SaaS 
-0.728*** -0.445*** 0.017 
H3b supported: stronger 
for organizations with no 
or low SaaS experience 
Significance level: ***p < 0.001 
 
6.4 Discussion 
Previous research has repeatedly highlighted the importance of perceived risks and benefits in 
organizational service innovation adoption (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011; Featherman and 
Pavlou 2003; Wu et al. 2011). However, when analyzing decisions about replacing incumbent 
technologies with new technologies, it is essential to consider the complexity along with the 
high degree of uncertainty due to a lack of experience surrounding such decisions. Confronted 
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with decision making under uncertainty, individuals often rely on cognitive “shortcuts”, i.e., 
the dependence on reference points in a particular decision-making process (Shoham and 
Fiegenbaum 2002). In the context of a replacement decision of an existing in-house 
technology with a new technology, decision makers encounter a lack of information because 
of lacking experience or absent historical data that induces such cognitive shortcuts. On 
account of this, we developed a research model that demonstrates the influence of incumbent 
technologies (i.e., in-house systems) on the assessment of attitudinal beliefs (i.e., perceived 
benefits and risks) regarding SaaS on the basis of Prospect Theory and Status Quo Bias 
research. In a two-step analysis, based on the data of a large scale empirical study with 
decision makers who are responsible for the organizational IT, we (1) identified the 
significant influence of reference-dependence affecting the rational weighing up of risks and 
benefits associated with a new SaaS technology and (2) measured the effect of the Status Quo 
Bias depending on the already acquired experience level of SaaS use.  
We discovered that decision makers’ assessments of a new SaaS technology are negatively 
influenced by their attitude toward the incumbent technology. In other words, if decision 
makers consider their incumbent system to be satisfactory because the perceived benefits 
outweigh the perceived risks, they will tend to form a rather negative attitude toward new, 
unfamiliar SaaS technologies. Vice versa, decision makers that, for example, already 
experienced security incidents with their incumbent technology and thus perceive higher risks 
associated with existing in-house solutions, will more likely display a positive attitude toward 
SaaS. Accordingly, decision makers who realized that their incumbent system does not offer 
financial benefits (any longer) will be more receptive of potential cost reductions offered by a 
SaaS solution and therefore, perceive benefits of SaaS higher. To conclude, the incumbent 
technology can exert a pronounced influence on the final SaaS adoption decision. 
In addition, our results illustrate that the dependence on reference points differs significantly 
according to the SaaS experience in the respective organization. In contrast to previous 
research (Vetter et al. 2011), we are not measuring self-stated experience with SaaS according 
to Dibbern (2004) or Roodhooft and Warlop (1999), but rather control our study for this 
relationship with a defined moderator variable called SaaS experience for objective 
measurement. We were able to demonstrate a stronger influence of the Status Quo Bias in 
organizations with little to no SaaS experience. Especially, less experienced decision makers 
will regard the retention of the Status Quo as less risky compared to the potentially negative 
consequences of an adoption or replacement decision. This inaccurate assessment of risks can 
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be regarded as a result of loss aversion, i.e., the overestimation of perceived risks of the SaaS 
solution. For example, decision makers could overestimate the probability and the actual 
consequences of down-time issues and will assess this risk more severely compared to the 
current risks of their incumbent system. Thus, without the necessary knowledge and past 
experience, a deviation from the incumbent system will be regarded as an unnecessary risk 
resulting in the retention of the Status Quo. 
Our study offers several theoretical and practical implications. We specifically contribute to 
the stream of technology acceptance research by singling out the importance of reference 
points and Status Quo Bias in the context of SaaS adoption decisions. In particular, our study 
is the first using Prospect Theory to analyze decision makers’ appraisals of SaaS in an 
organizational context by considering their evaluation of the incumbent technology they are 
familiar with. Moreover, our results indicate that Status Quo-Thinking is more pronounced 
according to the experience level indicating that adoption decisions of service innovations are 
potentially more affected by Status Quo Bias. Given that new organizational IT systems are 
almost exclusively replacement decisions, future research should consider the relevance of 
incumbent systems when devising their study designs. We deliberately chose a research 
approach based on a very generic risk-benefit assessment which could thus be adjusted 
according to other scenarios considering adoption, service innovation, or replacement 
decisions (Lee 1999). In addition, our way of measuring the Status Quo Bias at the group 
level can contribute to future research as most studies so far measure Status Quo Bias with 
indicators such as perceived inertia or perceived sunk costs that are predominantly based on 
self-assessment on an individual level (e.g., Polites and Karahanna 2012).  
We also offer insights and contributions for practice. Our results indicate that providers of 
SaaS technologies need to adapt their business models by altering their communication and 
sales approach according to the respective group of potential customers. Customer groups 
which already passed a certain threshold in terms of their SaaS level, suffer from a less 
pronounced degree of Status Quo Bias and will, therefore, be easier to convince of the relative 
advantage of SaaS and potentially display a higher intention to adopt further solutions. Hence, 
providers should intend to further capitalize on their current client base with additional 
horizontal or vertical integration solutions. Another approach for providers that involves the 
current client base is customer recommendation programs. Due to the social influence on risk 
assessment (Lee 2009), recommendations given by existing customers can decrease the level 
of uncertainty. Especially, non-adopters will demand more facts and examples to realize the 
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relative advantage of a SaaS solution and, therefore, organized roundtables with SaaS-
experienced organizations can help both SaaS providers and unexperienced decision makers 
to realize financial or strategic advantages. A similar way to decrease the inherent Status Quo 
Bias is the acquirement of further knowledge gained in workshops, lighthouse projects or 
extended trial versions to gain more experience with a potential new technology. From an 
organizational perspective, decision makers can already benefit from our study by 
acknowledging the influence of reference points and Status Quo-Thinking. In order to arrive 
at a more objective assessment of risks and benefits of both the incumbent and new 
technology, organizations should, therefore, encourage roundtables or group discussions. 
These decision-making processes should also include objective assessors such as consultants 
to accomplish a more objective and rational evaluation of both their incumbent system as well 
as a possible new SaaS solution. Furthermore, decision makers might be unaware of the 
difficulties their employees experience with the incumbent technology and, as a consequence, 
overestimate the benefits of the existing systems. This may result in a distorted perception of 
the new technology and, hence, obstruct an optimal adoption or replacement decision. 
Additional information from various parties in the organizational hierarchy might compensate 
for this lack of information and support an optimal decision-making process further. Against 
this backdrop, organizations should also scrutinize if their current company culture might 
encourage Status Quo-Thinking. Previous research in this context demonstrated that company 
culture itself can enhance Status Quo-Thinking when decision makers “reflect the imprint of 
cultural socialization more so than professional experience” (Geletkanycz 1997, p. 615). 
According to Geletkanycz and Black (2001), a deviation from the Status Quo will be regarded 
even more as an unnecessary risk that could possibly jeopardize a decision maker’s position 
in those organizations characterized by more hierarchical and traditional cultures. 
Interestingly, our descriptive analysis indicates indeed that more “traditional” industry sectors 
seem to be less likely to adopt SaaS. Consequently, organizations and individual decision 
makers should realize that the Status Quo Bias might actually be an obstacle for achieving 
certain organizational goals, and therefore encourage processes and measures that minimize 
Status Quo-Thinking. 
6.5 Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion 
As with any research, some limitations of this study merit consideration. First, our study is 
cross-sectional and static. IT services and systems constantly change entailing new 
requirements and the perceptions of new as well as incumbent technologies might change 
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over time. As such, future research could enrich the findings of our study regarding the 
replacement process by measuring the assessments of different technologies longitudinally. 
By doing so, factors that address the Status Quo Bias, and especially factors that could 
quickly change the attitude toward the new technology, could be identified in order to develop 
appropriate countermeasures. Second, this study focuses on the top echelon’s assessments of 
incumbent and new technologies. Even if these decision makers are ultimately responsible for 
the sourcing decisions in their organizations, IT decisions are often made by groups and may 
also be influenced by other organizational stakeholders (e.g., customers or investors). Future 
research can supplement our results by conducting case studies and expert interviews with 
decision makers at different hierarchical levels in order to fully capture the technology 
replacement process in organizations. In addition, the results of this study need to be verified 
within the context of other decisions about organizational technology adoption and in 
different cultural and legal settings. Decision makers in US companies or in more traditional 
industry sectors might display different perceptions and attitudes or draw on different 
reference points due to divergent company cultures than those in Europe, Asia or innovative 
and service-oriented industries. By way of example, a future study directed primarily at start-
ups that are faced with green-field adoptions could analyze whether the attitude toward SaaS 
is influenced by different reference points (e.g., experience with a technology in a previous 
organization or recent news about security breaches). Another recommendation for future 
research would, therefore, encompass experiments to verify our results and to test for other 
effects, such as further cognitive biases in the organizational decision-making process. 
To sum up, our study enhances the understanding of an organization’s acceptance of SaaS 
technologies in particular and replacement decisions in general. When decision makers are 
confronted with a new technology, they frequently encounter a lack or insufficiency of data 
and experience. As this is often the case when assessing SaaS technologies, decision makers 
will draw on their experience with familiar technologies and evaluate the new technology 
based on their assessment of the existing one. It is essential for SaaS providers to 
acknowledge this relationship as they risk losing potential selling opportunities if they neglect 
to frame their sales strategy and marketing efforts according to these cognitive decision-
making processes. Correspondingly, decision makers in organizations should be aware that 
their assessments of risks and the benefits associated with the incumbent technology may be 
skewed due to Status Quo-Thinking, which in turn, may discourage their organizations from 
adopting a more efficient technology and inhibiting service innovations in general. Neglecting 
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to acknowledge these findings could have far-reaching negative consequences for overall 
organizational performance. 
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7 Summary of Key Findings and Thesis Conclusion 
Today, IT security risks are omnipresent in our private and professional life. The extensive 
usage of IT greatly challenges society to effectively protect data and IT systems from IT 
security incidents. However, although a large number of various IT security safeguards are 
available, private individuals and organizations often refrain from adopting those measures 
that would increase their IT security levels. Against this background, the overarching 
objective of this thesis was to gain a better understanding about how IT security is perceived 
by private individuals and managers in organizations and how these perceptions influence 
protection behaviors. Specifically, the following research objectives were in focus: 
 Analyzing gender differences in IT security appraisals and the protective behaviors of 
private individuals (chapter 3) 
 Developing a conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness (chapter 4) 
 Analyzing managers’ WTP for IT security safeguards (chapter 5) 
 Analyzing managers’ Status Quo-Thinking (chapter 6) 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
Overall, the findings across the four research papers included in this thesis contribute to IS 
research in the field of IT security by advancing our understanding of IT security perceptions 
and the protective behaviors of private individuals and managers in organizations. Within the 
four studies presented in chapters 3 to 6, the different perspectives on IT security are taken 
within the private context and business context. As — depending on the research questions — 
these studies draw on different literature streams, the main theoretical implications that can be 
derived from the studies in this thesis will be separately discussed in the following. 
Regarding IT security perceptions and the protective behaviors of private individuals 
(research paper A, chapter 3), we extended existing IS research by being the first to examine 
the role of individuals gender. The results show that females and males base their perceptions 
on different cognitive processes and therefore, their protective behaviors are influenced by 
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different factors. These gender differences in threat and coping appraisals are important to be 
contemplated in future research since they may explain inconsistencies in findings across 
previous IS studies on IT security perceptions. When analyzing the compliance behavior of 
employees within the business context, gender differences may be of similar relevance. If 
females’ threat and coping appraisals are based on different cognitive processes than males’ 
threat and coping appraisals, the information given within SETA programs may have a 
different impact on the compliance behavior of males and females. 
Furthermore, we contribute to existing IS research by not only analyzing the IT security 
perceptions and stated intentions of the participants but also their actual protection behavior. 
The conducted behavioral experiments and supplementary interviews showed that a 
significant positive relationship between the stated intentions and the actual protection 
behaviors only exists within the female sample but not within the male sample. Males seem to 
be less likely to translate their protection intention into actual behavior than females. Future 
research should build on the results of this study and further analyze possible reasons for this 
intention-behavior gap (see e.g., Sheeran 2002) across males. 
Within the business context, the study presented in research paper B (chapter 4) highlights 
and confirms the crucial role of top managers for effective IT security management in 
organizations as assumed in previous research (e.g., Ashenden 2008; Sharma and Yetton 
2007). By drawing on a structured literature review and qualitative expert interviews, an 
exhaustive conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness — comprising both 
individual as well as organizational factors — is developed and tested. This conceptualization 
serves as a fundamental basis for future research to better understand the formation of 
organizational IT security investment decisions. For example, previous studies indicate that 
although managers might show concerns regarding the IT security of their organizational IT 
systems, their actual IT security behavior might not be appropriate (i.e., low IT security 
investments). The developed conceptualization of top managers’ IT security awareness may 
enable future IS research to explain this paradoxical attitude–behavior gap. Furthermore, the 
results indicate, that for effective IT security management, not only top managers’ IT security 
awareness is crucial but also the IT security awareness of department managers. Built on that, 
future studies should intensify the research on managers’ IT security awareness and thereby 
consider all the hierarchical levels of an organization. The future studies should also analyze 
whether and to what degree differences regarding the concept of IT security awareness across 
the different hierarchical levels exist. 
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The study in research paper C (chapter 5) highlights the necessity to consider that the 
implementation of IT security safeguards is not only associated with advantages (e.g., risk 
reduction) but can be also associated with disadvantages (e.g., performance reduction). The 
findings show that IT security safeguards are differently evaluated by different managers in 
various organizations and that these different evaluations determine their WTP for the 
respective measure. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first adapting Kano’s 
Theory (Kano et al. 1984) to the IT security context. It is demonstrated that both positive 
(functional) characteristics and negative (dysfunctional) characteristics of IT security 
safeguards are relevant when analyzing managers’ WTP and adoption decisions. As such, the 
results enable researchers to better understand and predict the outcome of IT security 
management decisions by considering IT security safeguard evaluation in terms of five IT 
security safeguard categories: basic, performance, advanced, indifferent, and reverse IT 
security safeguards. Considering this multidimensional nature of the evaluation of IT security 
safeguards might also allow future research to reinvestigate yet unclear behavioral 
phenomena like people refraining from adopting safeguarding measures even when they 
perceive the addressed risks to be very critical (e.g., Johnston and Warkentin 2010). 
Furthermore, the results are also relevant for future research in mathematical IT security 
optimization models. 
Research paper D (chapter 6) also comes with several important theoretical implications. The 
results demonstrate that when managers are confronted with decision making under 
uncertainty, they frequently rely on cognitive “shortcuts”: Their risk and benefit assessments 
regarding a new technology are significantly influenced by reference points (Shoham and 
Fiegenbaum 2002). These reference points are given by the perceived benefits and risks of the 
currently used technology (the Status Quo) and have an even stronger influence the less 
experienced a manager is with the new technology. In particular, it is found that managers’ 
decisions to adopt a new SaaS technology is strongly influenced by the perceived risks and 
benefits associated with an existing in-house solution. As a consequence, when a manager 
perceives the existing IT solution as being associated with low risk, the perceived risk of a 
new technology will be automatically higher — even though the new technology actually 
brings more benefits and less risks. As such, the study contributes to the stream of technology 
acceptance research by singling out the importance of reference points and Status Quo Bias. 
Since previous IS research found that IT security risks are the dominant factor influencing 
managers’ overall risk perception of SaaS adoption (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011), it can be 
concluded that the evaluation of perceived IT security risks will be most probably also 
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affected by Status Quo-Thinking. Future research can build on our findings by considering the 
role of reference points and a possible Status Quo Bias in IT security risk perception when 
analyzing managers’ decisions to adopt IT security safeguards.  
In sum, this thesis provides substantial theoretical implications with empirical evidence to the 
emerging body of research on IT security perceptions and behaviors. It is demonstrated that 
— in both the private and the business context — IT security perceptions and behaviors are 
multifaceted and highly complex in nature. Therefore, many research questions remain 
unanswered and behavioral phenomena are far from being well understood. By conducting 
multiple research studies, we advance the existing research on IT security perceptions and 
behaviors of private individuals and managers in organizations, provide a basis for future 
studies, and hope to encourage future researchers to further validate and analyze our findings 
in other settings. 
7.2 Practical Implications 
Besides the theoretical implications, a number of practical implications and recommendations 
can be derived from the studies in this thesis. In particular, private individuals, managers in 
organizations, and suppliers of IT and IT security products benefit from our results. Again, 
the main practical implications of the four studies will be consecutively presented. 
Research paper A (chapter 3) shows that female and male smartphone users evaluate IT 
security risks differently and that they also differ in their protective behavior. Specifically, our 
results indicate that, during risk assessment, female users only consider the severity that 
would result from a risk, while male users also take the probability of becoming a victim into 
consideration. Therefore, female users might evaluate risks that are associated with less 
damage but are very likely to happen to be lower than IT security risks that are extremely 
unlikely to happen but would come along with far-reaching consequences. Female users 
should strive to assess risks more rationally by also considering the probability of the negative 
event in order to avoid possible underestimations of risks that they are highly susceptible to 
— even though the associated damage seems to be somehow manageable. On the other side, 
our results show that male users should be aware that they tend to not necessarily behave as 
securely as they originally intended. We only found a significant positive relationship 
between stated intentions and actual protection behaviors within the female sample but not 
within the male sample. Overall, it is demonstrated that private users should carefully 
consider on which factors their threat and coping appraisals are based on and whether the 
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safeguarding measures that they have taken for their mobile devices are adequate. 
Furthermore, organizations as well as suppliers of IT security products can also benefit from 
the findings. Specifically, since females and males are found to base their threat and coping 
appraisals on different cognitive processes, organizations can use the results of this study 
when developing and revising security, education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs. 
Similarly, suppliers of IT security products should consider our results when developing 
marketing campaigns and strategies. 
The first study conducted within the business context (research paper B, chapter 4) clearly 
showed that for ensuring a high level of IT security, organizations should not only focus on IT 
security awareness at the employee level but also at the management level. Of course, a high 
level of IT security awareness among employees is in fact highly relevant. Nevertheless, 
managers’ awareness about IT security is at least of similar importance and, therefore, should 
not be neglected. A lack of IT security awareness of top and/or department managers can 
result in insufficient scope for action of the organizations’ IT security specialists (i.e., 
financial resources, human resources, and flexibility in decision-making) and in turn, threaten 
the organization’s data and IT systems. Our results show that the combination of decision-
power and IT security awareness is crucial for effective IT security management. Thus, to 
ensure an adequate IT security level within an organization, appropriate positions must be 
identified and integrated in the organizational structure. Moreover, since we identified 
individual and organizational factors that together build the concept of top managers’ IT 
security awareness, the results are also helpful when developing educational programs 
specifically for managers with decision-power regarding the organizational IT security 
management. 
The results of our second study within the business context (research paper C, chapter 5) are 
especially beneficial for suppliers of IT security products as well as for IT suppliers. Suppliers 
of IT security products can analyze to what degree their products are differently evaluated by 
their customers and thereby identify relevant customer groups with different IT security 
requirements and different levels of WTP. Based on that, product development, pricing 
strategies, and marketing strategies can be optimized. Suppliers of IT products can analyze 
how the safeguards implemented in their IT products influence their customers’ satisfaction 
and, therefore, their associated WTP. By doing so, they can effectively allocate development 
resources by identifying which safeguards should be implemented, improved, or removed 
from a certain IT product. Overall, the results highlight that IT (security) suppliers should 
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carefully consider their customers’ individual IT security needs in order to derive effective 
strategies and thereby to gain economic and competitive advantages. 
Finally, important practical implications can be derived from the findings of the third study 
conducted among managers within the business context (research paper D, chapter 6). We 
found that managers are prone to Status Quo-Thinking and that the resulting Status Quo Bias 
is larger the less experienced a manager is with a new technology. From the perspective of 
suppliers of IT and IT security products, it may, therefore, be beneficial to categorize 
customer groups with respect to different levels of experience. Based on that, sales and 
communication approaches can be accordingly adapted. Moreover, from the perspective of 
managers in customer organizations, the results highlight the importance of roundtables, 
expert groups, and extended trial versions to create a reliable basis of knowledge and 
experience and thus, to avoid Status Quo Bias when deciding to adopt a new IT (security) 
product. In addition, especially when IT security knowledge and experience is generally very 
low within an organization, objective assessors during evaluation and decision-making 
processes might be necessary to ensure that the best decision for the organization is made. 
In conclusion, this thesis provides a further step toward an understanding of the risk 
perceptions and protective behaviors of private individuals and managers in organizations. In 
summary, the findings provide helpful recommendations to private individuals and managers 
in organizations on how to improve their protection behaviors, and the suppliers of IT and IT 
security products on how to better understand their customers’ needs and thereby gain 
economic and competitive advantages. Nevertheless, future research should use our work as a 
basis for supplementary analysis and verifications, and to further advance our knowledge 
about IT security perceptions and behaviors. 
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